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Canada’s drug insurance system remains fragmented and expensive. The plethora of 
private and public plans still do not adequately cover all Canadians. Demographic 
changes, disease profiles and the introduction of many new very high cost drugs mean 
Canadians will be increasingly unable to afford access to medically necessary drug 
therapy.  
 
The lack of adequate universal drug insurance, a policy known in Canada as national 
pharmacare (NPh), is an important problem. A solution must address patient needs for 
access and equity at a cost that is sustainable to payers. Most academic literature has 
identified a public single payer model as the optimal approach but despite many studies 
and reports, this has yet to be implemented. This suggests the need for an alternative. 
 
The Canadian alternative to a single payer plan is popularly called “fill the gaps.” This 
approach argues that the federal government should target its funding to expand 
provincial coverage to cover the uninsured. A social drug insurance model, used in many 
European countries, retains private insurance but improves on it by regulating, 
structuring and aligning it with medicare. As such it is the logical proxy for those who 
favour “fill the gap.”  
 
Social insurance may achieve adequate universal drug insurance at a much lower per 
capita cost. Social insurance financing relies primarily on employers and workers, which is 
very similar to our very large private drug insurance market. However, private drug plans 
are mostly tied to employment, are voluntary and face similar threats to sustainability and 
affordability as provincial plans. An organized mixed-financing model like social drug 
insurance would spread risk and is a more feasible approach than a single payer plan to 
achieve adequate universal drug insurance. If a comprehensive single payer NPh plan is 
not implemented, adopting key social insurance features and regulations would 
significantly improve access and quality. 
 
An extensive literature review is presented, followed by a qualitative thematic analysis of 
drug insurance opinion leader interviews and a comparative analysis of health and drug 
systems in three jurisdictions. The theoretical perspective of how a government may 
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recognize and prioritize certain problems over others draws on John Kingdon’s Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies (2011). 
 
Major findings are found in four chapters. Chapter 4 examines our current shared-funding 
model for prescription drugs and establishes that social drug insurance could work in the 
context of our institutionalized model.  
 
Chapter 5 provides a comparative review of social health insurance (SHI) models in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Quebec to help identify the form and features useful in a 
pan-Canadian system. Certain features warrant serious consideration in Canada. The 
Netherlands has created an aggressive drug price and cost control architecture. Germany’s 
Federal Joint Committee is a participatory multi-stakeholder governance model that could 
improve transparency and better address system complexity and sustainability. Quebec 
provides 20 years of guidance on key drug system features and risks in a Canadian 
context.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 present the most important findings from 26 interviews with drug plan 
experts and influencers in different sectors from across Canada. Thematic analysis 
identified five roles for the federal government: funder, coordinator/secretariat, leader, 
relationship manager and nation-builder. These can be operationalized as funding that 
ensures adequate universal access, the creation of national standards for a list of covered 
drugs (formulary) and for patient cost-sharing to limit personal financial risk. Most 
participants wanted private insurance to continue as a significant funder but private 
payers remain marginalized, “outside the tent” in this policy debate. Employers are 
important funders and have not been extensively consulted. Relationships and trust 
among key stakeholders are limited or weak. These are crucial constraints to progress.  
 
Kingdon’s model, explored in Chapter 8, indicates the problem, policy and political 
streams are no longer aligned, so a window of opportunity for universal drug insurance 
has become far less likely. However, the window could re-open with less ideological 
stances by advocates supporting either model. This requires a standing forum for 
constructive and time-bounded dialogue to produce a strategy, funding structure, a 
realistic implementation plan and a modern governance model. Participants 
recommended the federal government play this leadership role. An influential NPh policy 
entrepreneur would energize this work. 
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Related structural changes have recently been proposed to reduce drug prices and costs, 
such as reform of the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, the creation of a new 
Canadian Drug Agency and a strategy for drugs for rare diseases. These financial changes 
are very important, but are not a comprehensive reform and will not in themselves assure 
adequate universal drug insurance. NPh is still needed and must proceed in parallel given 
its complexity and long gestation period.  
 
A carefully designed social drug insurance model that includes a regulated role for private 
drug plans would spread risk among payers, reflect our social values, provide choice in 
coverage and enable access to sophisticated consumer- and patient-focused insurer 
technology that complements public plan expertise in health technology assessment. 
Mitigating financial and political risk is important to governments, and moving to 
implementation is important to patients. 
 
Social drug insurance is still a very complex, multi-year change, meaning careful, 
consultative planning for implementation and transition is crucial. This model could serve 
as a template to achieve universal funding for other core health services, such as long-
term care and community care.  
 
Kingdon notes policy change is more likely if complexity, confounding information and 
financial and reputational risk for governments can be reduced. Rather than a polarized, 
dichotomous and perpetual debate typical of decades of NPh failure, a classic Canadian 
compromise may be possible that allows adequate universal drug insurance to be more 
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“Perhaps the most striking aspect of private insurance in Canada has been the virtual policy 




A brief history of private drug insurance and the industry that provides it is presented. Each 
of seven third-party payers has different mandates, eligibility, plan designs and cost-
sharing. Patients also provide out-of-pocket payments. This fragmented approach creates 
increasingly insufficient access and financial protection even for a large majority who are 
covered by public or private plans.  
 
Most government reports and academic papers propose a public single payer plan to 
achieve universal drug insurance, known in Canada as national pharmacare (NPh). This is 
similar to existing hospital and physician insurance. After many recommendations and for 
various reasons over several decades, this model has failed to launch. This chapter 
introduces social drug insurance as an alternative means to achieve adequate universal 
coverage. 
 
1.1 History and positioning 
Unlike many other OECD countries, Canada has only limited federal government 
involvement in managing health care services, and then only for specific populations such 
as aboriginals, RCMP officers, veterans and active members of the Armed Forces, inmates of 
federal penitentiaries and some refugees. Direct federal health expenditures were forecast 
to be $7.9 billion in 2018, about 3.1% of all health spending (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information (CIHI), 2018a. Table A.2.1). The Government of Canada funds provincial health 
plans primarily through the Canada Health Transfer (CHT), expected to be $38.6 billion in 
2018-19. In addition, the federal government provides nearly $19 billion of equalization 
payments to certain provinces which may also be used to pay for health care.  It funds other 
non-care programs, such as the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research, and the protection and regulation of food and drug products.  
 
The British North America Act (1867) and its successor, the Constitution Act (1982), 
delegated most health services outside marine hospitals and quarantine authority to the 
provinces. The first national form of social insurance was the Employment and Social 
Insurance Act, passed by the federal government in 1935. The first national health 
insurance plan was proposed in 1944 and rejected later the following year because the 
federal and provincial governments could not agree on how to finance it. Certain provinces 
then initiated universal or limited forms of hospital insurance, beginning with 




The federal government passed four important insurance-related Acts over the next 
thirty years to essentially match provincial health funding and spur legislation in all 
provinces (Shah, 1998). 
 
1. The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act was enacted in 1958. Since 
significant (about 50%) funding then flowed to any province with a universal 
hospital insurance plan, five provinces immediately signed on and the rest were 
in place by 1961.  
 
2. Insurance for physician services (as well as some dentistry and chiropractor 
services) followed with the Medical Care Act (1966) which was enacted in 1968. 
Three years later, all provinces had plans in place that were eligible for matching 
federal funds.  
 
3. The Established Programs Financing Act (1977) eliminated the federal 
government’s obligation to provide a completely cash contribution to the 
provinces for health services. The Act replaced part of the former block health 
funding with a roughly equivalent transfer of 13.5 personal and 1.0 corporate 
federal tax ‘points’ to the provinces. The Act’s Extended Health Care Services 
Program also added block funding “on a virtually unconditional basis” (p. 15) for 
nursing home, adult residential care, home health care and ambulatory (out-
patient) care.  
 
4. The Canada Health Act (1984) replaced the hospital and medical care legislation 
and linked funding to provincial support for five principles: public 
administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability and accessibility.  
Sanctions against provinces that allowed extra-billing were added. It did not 
change funding or expand coverage and the Act has not been substantially 
amended since. Federal funding within the Canada Health Transfer is conditional 
and must be used to support the requirements of the Canada Health Act. 
 
Universal drug insurance, now commonly called national pharmacare (NPh), had been 
regularly rejected by the federal government for cost reasons, beginning as early as 1949 
(Boothe, 2013, p. 420) but were to be considered in a future expansion of Medicare (Hall, 
1964). Politicians fear increasing the public’s liability for this high-cost, rapidly growing 
therapy (Boothe, 2013; Macpherson & Kenny, 2009). Absent broad government involvement, 
we have seen the development of many public plans in each province, and the growth of a 





1.2 Impetus for Change: Achieving a universal health care system 
The World Health Organization has defined universal health coverage to mean that: 
 
“…all people and communities can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative 
and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also 
ensuring that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship.  
 
By this definition Canada may not have universal health coverage unless or until it adds 
comprehensive coverage for prescription drugs and enables better access to other types of 
care such as home care, long-term care and dental services. No country offers full coverage 
for all health expenses for all its citizens.  
 
Our single payer model provides first-dollar coverage for hospitals and physicians 
which now comprise only 42% of total system spending, much less than the almost 57% in 
1984 when the Canada Health Act become effective (CIHI, 2018a). The data are dated, 
incomplete and sometimes use a proxy (e.g., cost-related non-adherence) but about 10% of 
Canadians do not have any or enough drug insurance (ten studies are described in Sec 4.12). 
Law et al. (2018) estimated that 8.2% of those who filled a prescription reported some form 
of cost-related non-adherence to drug therapy, and 4.7% could not afford basic necessities 
of life like food and heat because of their drug costs. About 2.5% (731,000) of Canadians 
said they had to borrow money to buy their medicines in the previous year (Kolhatkar et al., 
2018). Most provinces provide inadequate protection from catastrophic drug costs (Table 
4.1). At 21% of total prescription drug spending, out-of-pocket spending is higher in Canada 
than in most countries, including the United States at 14%.   
 
1.3 Private Health Insurance 
1.3.1 History 
Group health coverage has been available since at least 1948 and was described in the 1964 
Hall Royal Commission report. In 1960, about two million Canadians had private extended 
health benefits, but not all included drug coverage. Many included a $50 annual deductible 
(Hall, 1964, p. 357), equivalent to $430 in 2018.  The Commission reported that in 1961, 
total prescription drug costs were estimated at $154 to $164 million (p. 345)  across a 
population of about 18.25 million.  that works out to almost $9 per capita, equivalent to 
$74 in 2018. The Commission stated:  
 
In view of the high costs of many of the new life-saving, life-sustaining and disease-
preventing drugs, of the unequal incidence of the burden of paying for these drugs, of 
the integrated character of health services, and of the fact that market forces do not 
operate effectively to regulate the drug industry…the Commission has concluded that 
prescribed drugs should be included as a benefit of a comprehensive health care 




Controlling drug cost was already an issue, along with other challenges still relevant 
today (Hall, 1964, pp. 344-47). Prescription drugs are covered under medicare only in 
hospitals (“drugs, biologicals and related preparations when administered in the hospital”) 
without direct patient cost under the 1984 Canada Health Act. 
 
1.3.2 Funding and Access 
Traditionally, private drug plans have been sponsored (i.e., heavily or even fully subsidized) 
by employers. In the 1970s private drug and extended health plans were increasingly 
offered to workers to fill the coverage void left when the provinces introduced drug 
insurance only to seniors and those on social assistance. Since 1948 (Hurley & Guindon, 
2008, p. 24), the Income Tax Act has encouraged growth because employer spending on 
health insurance benefits have been non-taxable for employees and premiums are 
deductible business expenses. This remains true today in all provinces except Quebec, and 
is contentious because it provides a large tax subsidy to employees and is a deductible 
business expense to employers. 
 
Employer plans are voluntary: not all employers offer them. Only about half (47%) of 
employers with between two and 100 employees offer a health plan (Manulife, 2013). 
However, they become more prevalent as employer size increases: over 93% of workplaces 
with 100 or more employees offered health benefits in 2005 (Statistics Canada, 2008).  In 
addition to employer-sponsored plans, drug insurance can also be purchased through: (i) 
Individual plans that require initial proof of good health and provide much more limited 
coverage, and (ii) Association plans such as those offered to university alumni or through 
business associations such as the Chamber of Commerce. Most employer plans provide 
larger formularies than public plans (CLHIA, 2018) and require coinsurance: 20% is most 
common (63%) (Telus, 2019, p. 24).  
 
Telus Health (2019) reports that private plan designs are slowly implementing cost 
controls. In 2018, 66% of drug plan beneficiaries received less than 100% reimbursement (p. 
25). Over one-quarter (27%) are covered by a managed formulary (p. 26). One in six (16%) 
had an annual reimbursement limit, half of which were $5,000 or less. (p. 29). The number 
of private plan members with no limit on out-of-pocket costs is not reported, but it is likely 
a large majority. 
 
Employers can eliminate drug plan coverage or change the formulary, eligibility and 
cost-sharing provisions at will unless they are specifically prohibited by collective 
bargaining agreements from doing so. Coverage will terminate upon corporate bankruptcy. 
Part-time and casual workers may not be covered even when full-time employees have 
generous protection.  
 
A lack of coordination with provincial drug plans means there are gaps in coverage. 
Though seniors and those on social assistance generally have good coverage, the provincial 
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safety net for the general public is available only once drug costs are deemed catastrophic 
relative to income (see Section 4.2). Excepting Quebec, there are no legal standards for 
private or provincial coverage, eligibility or cost-sharing. Private health insurance is 
generally supplemental to public coverage, meaning it reimburses eligible products and 
services not provided by a public plan. There is no direct competition between public and 
private health insurance providers.  
 
1.3.3 Insurance Industry 
The largest life insurance companies are domestically controlled and owned by 
shareholders. This thesis focuses on life and health insurers.  
 
Twenty-four private health insurers, including all five Blue Cross organizations in 
Canada, are members of the Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association (CLHIA). 
Together, they administer about 110,000 private drug plans (CLHIA, 2013) covering 25 
million Canadians (CLHIA, 2018).  Insurers were forecast to pay $12.3 billion in prescription 
drug costs, with individuals paying $7.0 billion more (CIHI, 2018a). Drugs that don’t require 
a prescription ($3.6B forecast, 2018) are rarely eligible under benefit plans and so are also 
paid out-of-pocket.  
 
Although these numbers are not broken out by line of business, in total the industry 
reports it employs 156,000 Canadians and has $780 billion invested in Canadian long-term 
assets (CLHIA, 2019). This is a massive source of employment and investment in Canadian 
infrastructure, creating a potentially powerful influence on matters important to its success. 
 
Health insurance is provided by both for-profit and not-for-profit companies (“carriers”). 
Most are for-profit companies, some publicly traded (Including the three largest: Sun Life, 
Canada Life and Manulife). Others remain mutual companies owned by their policyholders 
(Equitable) or cooperatives (Desjardins). Blue Cross organizations and Green Shield Canada 
are not-for-profit. While aggregate drug plan revenues are clear, drug insurance profitability 
is not. It is this latter metric that may determine how strenuously the industry fights to 
retain its market in the face of calls for a single payer national pharmacare plan.   
 
More extensive information on private health insurance is in Chapter 4. 
 
1.4 Drug insurance today – Cost and value 
Like most hospital and physician services, prescription drugs are a medical necessity. In 
1946, the World Health Organization Constitution declares health to be “one of the 
fundamental rights of every human” (p.1) and its Leadership Priorities call for equitable and 
universal access to health care and pharmaceuticals.   
 
Kesselheim et al. (2015) examined 23 American studies in their systematic review of the 
effect of drug insurance on health outcomes. They described the studies as high quality but 
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there were no randomized trials so several quality assessments could not be done.  They 
found generally positive health effects from access to prescription drugs, reductions in out-
of-pocket health costs, and better patient quality of life. They also noted the importance of 
sustained access to insurance as key to avoiding cost-related treatment non-adherence and 
achieving and sustaining health outcomes. Studies reported that additional costs for drugs 
were offset by lower costs for hospital care and overall health system spending. 
 
Drug insurance is presently funded through a combination of public and private payers 
in Canada, as is social insurance in Quebec and other countries. Since the 1970s, each 
province has offered a public drug plan with different eligibility criteria, different 
formularies (lists of covered drugs), and different out-of-pocket costs. In all provinces, 
seniors and social assistance recipients are covered – also to varying standards – and most 
provinces offer coverage for those under age 65 with drug costs that are significant relative 
to family income (Table 5.1). There is no national drug coverage standard in Canada to 
address access (other than as a hospital inpatient), quality or cost (i.e., personal 
affordability, system sustainability). The result has been significant and persistent variation 
in provincial drug plan design and coverage, and continuing variation in time-to-listing for 
new drugs (Applied Management 2001; Coombes et al., 2004; Demers et al., 2008; Gamble et 
al., 2011; Daw & Morgan, 2012; Handren 2015; Milliken et al., 2015). Private drug plans also 
have a wide variety of designs, eligibility and funding arrangements (CLHIA, 2018; Telus, 
2019). 
 
In the 1990s, better drugs began to displace spending for certain common conditions 
that would have previously required surgery (ulcers) or hospitalization (depression, heart 
attack, cancer).  An explosion of blockbuster medicines, defined as each having global 
annual sales exceeding US$1 billion, began to enter the market at that time. In 2005, 
blockbuster drugs accounted for 36% of global pharmaceutical sales, and 94 products 
qualified for this label (Cutler, 2007). Total drug costs exceeded the cost of physicians by 
1997 and remain second only to hospital costs (CIHI, 2018).  Despite opinions to the 
contrary, blockbuster drugs remain important. There were 121 drugs with global sales 
exceeding US$1 billion in 2014 (Special tabulation, IMS Brogan (now IQVIA), 2014). 
 
In addition to traditional chemical drugs, specialty and personalized medicines have 
emerged that can cost a patient hundreds of thousands of dollars every year. The cost of 
medicines is highly concentrated among relatively few citizens, and out-of-pocket costs can 
be high relative to income. For example, CIHI (2018b) reported that 2% of patients had 
annual drug costs exceeding $10,000 and they accounted for 37% of drug spending. In 
general, the risk of inadequate or unattainable coverage is low for Canadians but the 





1.4.1 Payer Types 
Currently, there are nine payer types in Canada for prescription drugs: 
 
1. The federal government for First Nations and Inuit Health Benefits and other 
specified segments as noted earlier. 
 
2. Provinces for seniors (sometimes only those with low incomes) and welfare 
recipients, and certain other population segments which vary by province. Most now 
include coverage for catastrophic expenses. 
 
3. Hospitals when drugs are prescribed for in-patients. 
 
4. Employers for employees and families, but often only for employees designated 
permanent and full-time, and much more frequently in large and unionized 
workplaces than small ones (Statistics Canada, 2008). Note that all levels of 
government and the broader public sector (schools, post-secondary institutions and 
health care organizations) are all employers and provide private insurance benefits 
to their employees. 
 
5. Unions, either independently (e.g., asrTrust operated by Unifor, see Sec 7.3.2) or 
jointly managed with employers (e.g., the federal government’s Public Service Health 
Care Plan.) 
 
6. Workers’ Compensation Boards for drugs following workplace injuries or 
disabilities. 
 
7. Pharmaceutical companies through patient support programs, generally for 
otherwise uninsured patients when drug costs are high relative to personal income. 
 
8. Patients who are without any insurance, or through co-pays and premiums (either 
employer, association or individual policies, or certain provincial governments, e.g., 
Ontario), or when their insurance provides inadequate coverage (e.g., annual or 
lifetime caps on coverage, restricted formularies).  
 
9. Individual health insurance policies may be purchased conditional on evidence of 
good health as determined by insurance companies.  
 
Such a patchwork approach is fraught with inefficiencies, leading to higher costs and 
inequitable coverage depending on many factors beyond citizenship. As Oberlander (2003) 





1.4.2 Introduction to social insurance 
If the goal of implementing single payer drug insurance cannot quickly be achieved, an 
alternative is timely and important. Kutzin (2001) states that countries ought to use their 
own experience and culture to shape their health insurance. Other research notes that many 
nations have gradually evolved their Bismarckian or Beveridge systems to hybrid models of 
coverage (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2006; Tuohy 2012; Schoen et al, 2010). “Although private and 
public insurance are often discussed in terms of extremes, the most common arrangements 
are actually found in the centre” (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2006, p. 360).  
 
Social health insurance achieves universal coverage in many other countries at lower 
cost than in Canada. Some have proposed social drug insurance as an alternative. 
Unfortunately, this model has not had much traction in recent years even though these 
works are rigourous and practical (Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, 2008; Allin, Stabile & Tuohy, 
2010; Blomqvist & Busby, 2015). Other studies have used social insurance pension models 
(i.e., CPP/QPP) to propose pre-funding post-65 drug benefits but these are more narrow in 
scope (Stabile & Greenblatt, 2010; Busby & Robson, 2011). 
 
However, social insurance is not a well-understood term among the industry, patient 
and professional groups that want to retain private insurance. Instead, “fill the gaps” is 
presented as an alternative to a single payer plan. Their argument is that because only 1.8% 
of Canadians are uninsured (Sutherland & Dinh, 2017, p. 8).  the federal government should 
limit and target its funding to expand provincial coverage to just the uninsured. However, 
“fill the gaps” is not a plan, only a narrow advocacy argument against a single payer model. 
It does not propose standards or address the wide variation in public and private coverage. 
A social drug insurance model retains private insurance in a structured and regulated role 
that is deliberately integrated with public insurance. As such it is the logical proxy term and 
will be used throughout this thesis.   
 
Bodenheimer and Grumbach (1992) describe four characteristics that make social 
insurance affordable: 
 
1. Broad risk spread, ensured through mandatory coverage. Only those who pay 
premiums or are officially exempted receive coverage. This is the “contributory 
principle”. 
 
2. Employer subsidy of health system costs; 
 
3. Administration through non-profit, low-cost public or quasi-public institutions;  
 
4. Income redistribution towards lower income individuals and families. Like social 
assistance schemes, social insurance provides social security. 
 
Taxes and premiums are not discrete choices but have seven features operating along a 
continuum (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1992). In most social insurance systems, primary 
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funding comes from payroll taxes paid by employers and workers to governments, with 
much smaller contributions from general tax revenues to pay for children, the unemployed 
and those not in the workforce (e.g., retirees). The payroll tax used elsewhere is similar to 
premiums now paid by Canadian employers (usually with employee contributions) to 
private insurers. 
 
There are other reasons for considering an alternative to a single payer approach. 
 
1. While employer-sponsored drug plans are not ideal in terms of equity or efficiency 
they have reduced the risk and liability to public plans. They are well-established 
and popular with plan members. 
 
2. Most Canadians already experience two or three payers for their health services 
because medicare leaves so much care uncovered or partially covered, including 
drugs, dental and vision care, and services of many health professionals such as 
physiotherapists and psychologists. The source of payment is not as important as 
the need for payment or at least a cost subsidy. 
 
3. Even though health spending usually grows faster than GDP per capita, governments 
have been very reluctant to raise income or corporate tax rates despite regular 
deficits and growing debt burdens. A single payer plan would likely require a tax 
increase to fund the transfer of up to $19 billion in prescription drugs now paid by 
private insurers and individuals.  A social insurance model likely reduces this 
necessity, though some redistribution of costs and benefits is both inevitable and 
welcome for social solidarity. General tax revenues will still be necessary, but at 
much lower levels (Allin, Stabile & Tuohy, 2010). 
 
4. Continuing technological and demographic changes in health services are likely to 
place additional strain on provincial government resources. One way to manage 
these risks is to reorganize financing in a planned and deliberate (integrated) 
manner: “Accordingly it is important to integrate the various current sources of 
finance for healthcare – public revenues, private out-of-pocket payments and private 
insurance – in a way that preserves and enhances the quality and accessibility of 
health care” (Flood, Stabile & Tuohy, 2008, p. 11). 
 
5. We can learn from other countries even though their health systems in whole are 
“not readily transportable to the Canadian context” (Allin, Stabile & Tuohy, 2010, p. 
23).   
 
Developing a social insurance model requires private payers be included in policy 




1.5 Defining Terms 
1.5.1 Universal Coverage 
As noted earlier (Sec 1.2), the World Health Organization has defined universal health 
coverage to mean that: 
 
…all people and communities can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative 
and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also 
ensuring that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship.  
 
Private insurance is forecast to pay more for prescription drugs in 2017 and 2018 than 
provincial governments (CIHI, 2018a). Universal coverage can be achieved by either a single 
payer or a social insurance system. Savedoff et al. (2012) note the evidence supports 
universality as a means to a better health system and to underpin social solidarity. 
 
1.5.2 Social Insurance 
Bodenheimer and Grumbach (1992) credit Lubove (1968) in defining social insurance as “a 
compulsory program of payments to insure against (i.e., to provide financial assistance for) 
interruption or loss of earning power due to retirement, unemployment, disability or other 
causes” (p. 447). They note health issues can cause interruptions in wages and have 
therefore always been insurable.  
 
A more specific and operational definition is credited to Norman and Busse (2002), cited 
in Jost (2008): “Social health insurance funding occurs when it is legally mandatory to 
obtain health insurance with a designated (statutory) third-party payer through 
contributions or premiums not related to risk that are kept separate from other legally 
mandated taxes or contributions (p. 170). The underlining (added) highlights important 
characteristics: coverage is mandatory, coverage is provided regardless of individual risk, 
and contributions are held in a separate fund, not comingled with general government 
revenues. 
 
1.5.3 Public coverage 
It is important to define “public” health insurance when looking at funding. Consistent with 
other national and international organizations (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2006), CIHI counts 
premiums for Quebec’s social drug insurance as public funding because they are mandated 
by government even though the funds are paid by private citizens. Public funding also 
comes from general and dedicated taxes (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1992). Private 
insurance requires beneficiaries to pay premiums directly to insurers, either directly 




But there are few absolutes in health care and insurance. “It should also be borne in 
mind that compulsory social insurance contributions paid by employers in other countries 
are counted as public expenditure, while premiums paid voluntarily by employers for health 
insurance coverage in the United States [and Canada] are classified as private spending” 
(Docteur, Suppanz & Woo, 2003. p. 20). This commonality is often blurred when reading 
about the unusually high amounts of private spending in Canada and the US. 
 
1.5.4 Adequate, universal coverage 
This phrase is repeated throughout this thesis. Coverage will be adequate when it provides 
access to a broad formulary of medicines at an affordable level of out-of-pocket cost 
according to medical need. Coverage is universal when all Canadians have access to 
necessary medicines. Adequate and universal coverage can be achieved by both single payer 
and social insurance systems. 
 
Principles are described in Sec 2.2 and are equally important for the good governance 
and management of the drug and health systems. However, similar principles are likely to 
apply regardless of the model used (single payer, social insurance or hybrid).   
 
1.6 Chapter Summary 
Canada is a wealthy and advanced industrial nation, but does not include prescription drugs 
in its public single payer medicare plans. This makes it unique among OECD members and 
at odds with the World Health Organization’s definition of universal health coverage and its 
declaration that health is a fundamental human right. Our claim to universal health care 
becomes tenuous without comprehensive coverage for prescription drugs, among other 
services.  
 
Since the 1970s, the absence of public coverage led to the growth of a complementary 
private drug insurance alternative that now covers a majority of Canadians. Other payer 
types each fill part of the gap. Still, a significant number of Canadians are financially 
vulnerable to high-cost drug claims, even those with provincial or private insurance. Drug 
costs vary according to where we live or work based on arbitrary policy and independent of 
need.  
 
Adding prescription drugs to medicare has been recommended over several decades, 
but it has yet to occur mostly due to government concern about large and rapidly growing 
costs. As the market changes and health deteriorates, the need for better coverage grows. 
This thesis argues that a social drug insurance model is a feasible alternative. It improves 
on private insurance and may allow adequate universal drug insurance to be introduced 





Theory Base and Key Principles 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents foundational elements for this thesis and for supporting a social drug 
insurance model as an alternative to a single public payer approach. Theories can be used to 
explain what has happened and may help predict future developments. They are used to 
interpret relationships and processes among people, organizations and institutions. 
 
John Kingdon’s three streams theory is used to better understand – explain, interpret 
and perhaps predict – drug insurance problems, policy and politics as we consider how to 
implement universal coverage. A set of principles is proposed to provide governance and 
accountability for social drug insurance. Introducing and sustaining change has proven to 
be extremely difficult in drug policy and programs so a brief review of how to encourage 
more robust assessment (and potentially adoption) of social insurance is presented. 
 
2.1 Theory Base 
My research paradigm is pragmatism, focusing on practical solutions to real-world 
problems. This approach is “value-based [and] action-oriented” (Creswell, 2009, p. 66).  
 
Theory provides a way to assess and act on real-world events and issues. Theories can 
explain and may help predict the current and potential future states of drug insurance 
policy and programs in Canada. Private health insurance spending is an important and 
understudied channel of access to prescription drug therapy. As points of distributive 
(equitable sharing) and procedural (fair process) justice, including the perception of 
fairness, one would expect governments to directly involve important stakeholders in 
deliberations that concern them. An important question is whether private payers have 
missed an important opportunity to influence how Canada may achieve adequate universal 
drug insurance.  
 
2.1.1 Kingdon’s Three Streams Theory 
John Kingdon’s “three streams” theory (2011) of problems, policy and politics focuses on 
assessing the conditions within government politics and bureaucracy that precede a window 
of opportunity for change. Since funding has been described as an important barrier to 
implementing adequate universal drug insurance (Hall 1964; Boothe 2015), Kingdon’s focus 
on the “special problem” (p. 105) of budgets may help explain why progress towards 
universal coverage has been slow. Kingdon also describes regulation of private insurers as a 
low cost and feasible alternative to eliminating them. Social health insurance regulates 




Kingdon sought to describe and even predict how issues rise and fall in favour among 
various parties within or connected to the American federal government. Much of his work 
on agenda setting appears applicable to both senior levels of Canadian governments and 
may shed light on why NPh has not gained traction with political and bureaucratic leaders. 
Kingdon’s theory may also help suggest a way forward by assessing and overcoming those 
objections. 
 
Kingdon’s work rests on three processes that can either advance or constrain policy: 
 
1. Problem recognition: Among the plethora of issues facing government, a select few 
are elevated to become problems that attract the attention of bureaucrats and 
politicians. 
 
2. Policy proposal development: In addition to pressure and influence tactics, Kingdon 
focuses on ideas, shaped by knowledge, perspectives and values, that may either 
spring to prominence, or be developed and diffused gradually. Feasibility, budget 
room and political support are crucial for ideas to flourish. 
 
3. Politics: Problems and potential solutions are affected by elections, ideology, public 
opinion, advocacy and bureaucratic change. Kingdon portrayed politicians as 
generalists who combine information from several sources: “…the substantive and 
the political, the academic and the pressure group information, the bureaucracy and 
the constituency” (p. 37). They have the greatest influence on agenda-setting. 
Bureaucrats use their career longevity, expertise and relationships to influence 
politicians, generate policy alternatives and implement decisions. 
 
Each process can develop on its own but may converge at “critical junctures” to allow 
change to occur. These three “streams” may or may not be independent of each other.  
 
While agendas may change quickly, Kingdon found that alternative approaches 
conceived mostly by the bureaucracy tend to occur in smaller steps. “As policymakers 
consider the alternatives from which they will choose, they repair to ideas and approaches 
with which they are already familiar” (p. 82). Boothe (2015) points out that incremental 
change is more likely to frustrate major change and perhaps enable stalling (p. 83). 
 
As noted, Kingdon recognizes the special problem of budget headroom, a key issue that 
has stalled progress on a universal pharmacare program for decades (Boothe, 2013). 
Budgets may constrain or promote changes, but in health care may be more likely to 
frustrate change because the amounts are so high ($33.7 billion in prescribed drugs: CIHI, 
2018a) and they have historically increased at rates well above the Consumer Price Index, 
population growth and aging.1  Governments perceive regulation as an inexpensive 
 
1 Average annual rates of increase in prescription drugs were 9.2% (1990-99), 9.3% (2000-09) and 3.5% between 2010 and 
2018 (forecast) (Author’s calculation based on CIHI, 2018). By comparison, Statistics Canada (op cit.) reported average 
annual increases in the Consumer Price Index of 1.9% (1990-99), 2.0% (2000-09) and 1.6% from 2011 through 2018. Aging 
 
 14 
administrative program, and even more attractive if it aims to control cost when budget 
constraint is severe.  
 
While noted occasionally in this thesis, application of Kingdon to the implementation of 
universal drug insurance is considered in Chapter 8. 
 
2.2 Key Principles 
Theories are important to help explain what has happened or why, but they do not fully 
identify the principles or values that should underlie change, or how to implement changes.  
 
For example, inequity is one principle that helps justify the need for adequate universal 
drug insurance. In the 2003 First Ministers Health Accord, federal and provincial first 
ministers declared that: “No Canadian should suffer undue financial hardship for needed 
drug therapy”2,  3 This statement was essentially repeated in the 2004 First Ministers’ 10-
Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care: “First Ministers agree that no Canadians should suffer 
undue financial hardship in accessing needed drug therapies. Affordable access to drugs is 
fundamental to equitable health outcomes for all our citizens.”4 
 
2.2.1 The Kutzin Contribution 
Joseph Kutzin (2001) provides a framework to examine and compare reform efforts in 
national health insurance systems. He proposes that health care reform in any country 
should aim to enhance the insurance function, which he defines as “access to care with 
financial risk protection” (p. 172). Relevant to reforming Canada’s drug insurance 
patchwork, he suggests two principles:  
 
1. Reforms should aim to achieve specific policy objectives. 
 
It is not at all clear what Canadians should expect in terms of outcomes (e.g., quality, 
equity, timeliness, comprehensive care, transparency, cost effectiveness) relative to 
inputs, such as taxes, premiums, and opportunity costs at both personal and system 
levels. How will those outputs be evaluated and prioritized? Put another way, what 
problem(s) are we trying to solve? Policy objectives for drug insurance must be clear. 
 
2. Reform should respect a nation’s existing structure.  
 
 
accounts for an annual increase of about 1% (CIHI) in health costs and the Canadian population has grown steadily 
throughout this period. 
2 See: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/fptcollab/2003accord/pharma-eng.php.  
3 Section 5.9 includes a list of recent commissions and similar reports calling for comprehensive reform. 
4 The 10-Year Plan is available at: http://healthycanadians.gc.ca/health-system-systeme-sante/cards-




Given Canada’s historic multi-payer model (sec 1.4), a principled approach may 
include private funding of drug insurance: “…the starting point for change in any 
country is the existing organizational and institutional arrangements of its health 
care system. Hence, an adaptable framework rather than a ‘blueprint’ is needed…” 
(p. 172). 
 
Later, he elaborates: 
 
“In countries in which multiple (often private) insurance funds exist, the appropriate 
and realistic role for government is to improve its regulatory framework and ability, 
rather than to try and dismantle the insurance industry. …given the existing market 
structure, what is the appropriate direction for policy changes that will facilitate active 
purchasing that is publicly accountable, or at least accountable to the population 
covered by each purchaser?” (p. 186) 
 
These statements are not meant to prefer social or private insurance but neither should 
be dismissed out-of-hand. Some parts of our health system are nearly 100% publicly funded, 
but other essential spending is from mixed sources, including medicines, dentistry, long-
term care and community care. After decades, a multi-funder approach has become 
institutionalized but not optimized. Since other advanced countries have used social 
insurance to create their health systems, and social insurance is the foundation of our 
pension and Workers’ Compensation systems, it is reasonable to examine as a principled 
means to adequate universal drug insurance. 
 
2.2.1.1 System Functions 
Kutzin describes four system functions for all types of health systems – revenue collection, 
pooling of funds, services purchase, and service provision. Hussey and Anderson (2003) 
also use the first three but substitute social solidarity as the fourth function. Focusing on 
these universal functions can broaden the debate about which institutions and 
organizations should fund services. The goal of reform then becomes organizing an 
effective insurance system that can deliver its particular strategy. This is an obvious 
challenge in Canada and elsewhere.  
 
The payment mechanism offers incentives to product and service providers, so system 
performance is significantly affected by whether payers are “passive” intermediaries or use 
their monopsony purchasing power to create or incent quality in service or outcomes, 
efficiency or value. Competition may enable insurers in multi-payer systems to innovate 
with provider incentives or control mechanisms that mitigate over-treatment (fee for 
service) or under-treatment (capitation, especially when not risk-adjusted). Better 
performance requires management skills and information technology to monitor and adjust 
the financial incentives that can influence provider costs, quality and outcomes. This is 




Neither provincial nor large private drug insurers in Canada use the full array of 
interventions noted to manage spending and patient outcomes, although public plans are 
far more invested in health technology assessment. The tools in use are rarely evaluated 
against such goals.  
 
Under service provision, Kutzin explains how countries need to choose whether their 
health systems: (i) ought to be structured as monopolies or encourage competition, (ii) 
should provide certain degrees of autonomy to institutional providers and health 
professionals, (iii) and how providers and equipment resources are distributed to meet 
patient needs for timely access. On the first point, Kutzin states: “[Reform] should not be an 
ideological question but rather one based on an assessment of the specific mix of 
approaches that is most likely to yield improvements in efficiency, quality, and equity.” (p. 
188)  
 
Kutzin notes competition between multiple (private or social) insurers may improve the 
fit between consumer preferences, purchasing and scope of coverage, and incent innovation 
but this is not guaranteed. Government systems in general can be bureaucratic, 
unresponsive to citizen needs, and fail to take advantage of their advantages of scale to 
ensure high quality, reasonable access and the lowest possible costs. This need not be the 
case. Ideological arguments, each with evidence for and against, are often used to justify 
‘public vs. private.’ While the policy choice of single or multiple payers provides different 
processes and outcomes across nations, the number of payers is likely not the pivotal 
consideration in system design. 
 
In summary, Kutzin provides a rational and practical set of principles that could be 
used by Canadian policymakers to improve the existing drug insurance system. Very likely, 
either a single payer or a social insurance system can successfully achieve policy goals once 
they are articulated, but neither should be considered superior without appropriate 
evidence. Neither provincial nor private insurers are taking advantage of their present scale 
and capacity to incent material improvement in system performance. “The challenge for 
governments is to create the conditions for schemes to contribute to system objectives” (p. 
200).  
 
Policymaking should be deliberate, use evidence and not privilege theoretical arguments 
over practical issues such as our ability to actually implement them (Pomey et al., 2007). 
 
2.2.2 Proposed Principles 
A reform strategy must have principles (Macpherson & Kenny, 2009). A principle can be 
defined as: “A fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system 
of belief or behaviour or for a chain of reasoning” (Oxford Dictionaries).5 Principles provide 
 
5 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/principle.  
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guidance to program development and decisions and help ensure consistent and effective 
governance, management and communication.  
 
Beyond the five principles noted in the Canada Health Act, principles have been 
proposed by several authors to frame and direct our drug insurance debate. They apply to 
both social insurance and single payer models. 
 
Macpherson and Kenny (2009) discovered just four common principles – equity, 
accessibility, safety and effectiveness – after reviewing six independent policy papers 
focusing on the National Pharmaceutical Strategy.  
 
Morgan et al. (2016) advanced arguments for universal access, appropriate prescribing 
and use, value for money and patient safety. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Possible Principles for National Pharmacare 








Sources: As described in Sec 2.2.2. 
 
The CLHIA (2013) produced a drug policy document which includes five principles: 
accessibility, affordability, sustainability, patient safety and education and fairness (p. 3).  
 
There are two common themes, expressed slightly differently. The third common and 
consistently linked health tenet – quality – is not mentioned by any party 
 
• The first is Access and related principles of Affordability (CLHIA) and Equity 
(MacPherson & Kenny) or Fairness (CLHIA). This is a person-centred principle. 
 
• The second is lower drug costs related to Affordability and Sustainability (CLHIA), 
and to Value (Morgan et al.). This principle is focused on financing. 
 
Unique to the CLHIA is a market perspective that values diversity in approaches and 
decisions, which allows competition and choice across private health plans. Its fairness 
principle is more narrow than traditional definitions of equity. By fairness, the CLHIA wants 
drugs available at the often-lower government price to private drug plan members and to 
non-insured individuals. While noting that “patient safety is paramount”, it defines 
Education as enabling “Canadians to make informed decisions” (p. 3). 
 
Principles in the Literature 
1. Access (universal)   6.   Equity, fairness 
2. Affordability    7.   Patient safety 
3. Appropriate prescribing and use 8.   Sustainability 
4. Awareness, education   9. Value for money 
5. Effectiveness      
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Provinces and private insurers routinely speak about the need for a sustainable health 
system and specifically note pharmaceuticals. Cost-related concerns are the most cited 
reason why governments have not implemented national drug insurance. A principle of 
Integration is not explicitly mentioned elsewhere, though it is implied by the CLHIA under 
Fairness (“All Canadians should have access…” (p. 3). 
 
Lower prices have been achieved by leveraging the buying power of government plans 
and their willingness to delay or deny access to certain drugs usually on the basis of price 
and poor cost-effectiveness. Similarly, Morgan et al. (2016) in focusing on a single payer 
plan, do not consider private insurers or plan members. The CLHIA policy anticipates both 
public and private plans, likely recognizing the primacy of government policy and its power 
to control targeted parties like brand and generic drug manufacturers, the pharmacy 
industry, and health professionals.  
 
Principles can be one point of agreement among those promoting different universal 
drug insurance models. None of the principles suggested are in opposition; none create a 
divide between provincial and private payers (e.g., improving access and lowering costs). 
The art of policy and program development will be in assessing priorities and providing 
appropriate balance, e.g., between bureaucratic rigour and market responsiveness.  
 
Beyond the Canada Health Act and specifically for universal drug insurance, the 
following six principles are proposed: 
 
1. Affordable: Personal drug costs must be capped at a reasonable percentage of 
household income, defined here as 3%.6 
 
2. Effective: Administration must provide timely insurance protection and access to 
drugs that meet the medical need. 
 
3. Efficient: New investments in information technology (IT) are needed to enable 
better prescribing and dispensing, and less redundancy and duplication in 
procedures. Any new model should be minimally disruptive to stakeholders 
especially at implementation and through a transition period. 
 
4. Equitable: Progressive, income- and needs-based approach to funding insurance, 
shared among governments, employers and citizens. 
 
5. Integrated: A national medicines strategy, policy planning and system-level tactics 
cover all beneficiaries, allowing a whole-market view. This includes upstream (e.g., 
social determinants of health and prescribing) and downstream (e.g., collection of 
 
6 In some provinces the threshold is far higher, e.g., MB, NL, NS, PEI and it may be in QC since its flat deductible ($1,087) is 
3% or less for those earning over $36,200. Note there are federal personal income tax rebates when qualifying medical 
expenses (such as prescription drugs) combine to exceed the lesser of $2,302 (2018) or 3% of net annual income. The 3% 
cap is meant to be consistent with and replace the existing tax credits which may be fulfilled in whole or in part by 
prescription drug expenses. 
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post-launch data and real-world evidence), as well as lateral (rest of the health care 
system) factors. 
 
6. Sustainable: At a system level, drug insurance must be financially managed so that 
costs do not increase faster than the country’s ability and willingness to pay. An 
acceptable rate of increase should be defined.7  
 
Careful consideration will also be given to the place of competition and the need for much 
improved governance through the balance of this thesis. 
 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
John Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (2011) provides the theory base to 
consider the likelihood of change to the current mixed funding of drug insurance. Joseph 
Kutzin’s work is valuable as a complementary set of inputs, in part because he frames 
health systems as insurance, and because he takes a more global perspective. He also sets 
up work to explore relevant, modern principles applicable to prescription drugs within a 
broader health system. Six new principles are proposed to reflect the need for a new 
structural framework and set of decision filters.  
 
Universal drug insurance in Canada exists only in Quebec. A policy entrepreneur 
(described similarly by Rogers as “informed intermediaries” – see Appendix 1) is needed to 
bridge differences and forge a made in Canada approach. Social insurance is familiar to 
Canadians and it is compatible with well-established health system values. Kingdon also 
notes the importance of value acceptability, which in the case of social insurance should 
transcend left-right ideological boundaries and easily pass through filters for equity and 
affordability. Its main weakness is likely economic efficiency – multiple private insurers, 
even well regulated, are likely to cost somewhat more to administer than a single payer 
system with a one-size-fits-all approach. However, administrative cost is just one 
consideration. 
 












Research Questions and Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter presents two research questions and the methodology that reflects the three 
major information sources for this thesis: a literature search, exploration of comparative 
models and opinion leader interviews. The qualitative sections use inductive reasoning to 
identify and assess themes arising from the interviews. Participant questions are listed. 
Finally, potential biases in the qualitative methodology and approach to mitigating them are 
identified. 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
A better fit between problem – lack of adequate universal drug insurance – and potential 
principled solutions could lead to wider acceptability of the need to change and therefore a 
greater likelihood of moving change ideas to implementation. The following two questions 
explore new empirical information and expert opinion from those with deep, senior-level 
experience in planning and administering public and private drug insurance plans. 
 
Research Question 1 
Could a social insurance model that includes employer-sponsored private insurance be a 
more feasible way to achieve adequate universal prescription drug insurance?8 Feasible 
means probable, with faster and less disruptive implementation. 
 
a. Social insurance: What are the experiences, characteristics and advantages and 
disadvantages of drug insurance in Germany, the Netherlands and Quebec and could 
those jurisdictions provide guidance for a similar universal model across Canada? 
 
b. Private insurance: What are the advantages and disadvantages of employer-
sponsored drug plans as a complementary channel to fund prescription drug 
coverage? 
 
Research Question 2  
What advantages and disadvantages of our current shared-funding model are recognized by 
private and public drug plan opinion leaders?  
 
a. What are optimal roles for the federal government to play in achieving adequate 
universal drug coverage? 
 
8 Adequate, universal coverage is defined in Sec 1.5.4: Coverage will be adequate when it provides access to a broad 
formulary of medicines at an affordable level of out-of-pocket cost according to medical need. Coverage is universal when 




b. Is private drug insurance acceptable and should it be included in national 
pharmacare policy?9  
 
Kingdon’s theory, assessed in Chapter 8, will be used to consider whether current or 
near-future conditions create a “critical juncture” – convergence of the problem, policy and 
politics streams – that could lead to adequate universal drug insurance.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Literature search for Research Question 1  
The search goal was to identify high quality studies that were current and relevant to my 
general topic and the research questions. In July 2015, a scoping search was conducted in 
English using PubMed and MeSH terms “drug costs” and “insurance, pharmaceutical 
services”. Publication dates from January 1, 1990 through June 30, 2015 were input, as were 
the following article types: Case Reports, Comparative Study, Editorial, Government 
Document, Journal Article, Historical, Meta-Analysis, Review and Systematic Reviews. 
 
The following MeSH sub-fields were included: “drug costs”, "insurance, pharmaceutical 
services" [MeSH Terms] OR ("insurance"[All Fields] AND "pharmaceutical"[All Fields] AND 
"services"[All Fields]) OR "pharmaceutical services insurance"[All Fields] OR ("drug"[All 
Fields] AND "insurance"[All Fields]) OR "drug insurance"[All Fields]) AND 
("1990/01/01"[PDAT] : "2015/06/30"[PDAT]. 
 
There were 13,852 entries. The entries were manually reviewed until the displayed 
studies became too distant from the search goals and too dated to be relevant. After 
reviewing titles, 31 of the first 300 abstracts were selected for reading.  
 
A more focused search was then undertaken using “drug costs” and “social insurance”. 
Titles of 664 entries were reviewed. All relevant articles were saved on PubMed after reading 
the abstract. Of those, I selected 27 articles for full reading because they pertained to the 
research questions. 
 
That search returned a number of articles that were not solely focused on social 
insurance but are relevant for context, including some that were useful for international 
experiences (Germany, Netherlands, UK, USA). These were supplemented by other 




9 Drawing from the literature, government opinion leaders, primarily senior bureaucrats responsible for provincial drug 
plan administration, have the tenure, organizational knowledge, network, and subject matter expertise to identify a 
suitable model(s) and exert significant influence on implementation. Similarly, private payer opinion leaders included also 
have the tenure, expertise, authority and network to effectively advocate for change and influence implementation. 
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Some literature examined social insurance using economic theory, sometimes with a 
specific focus on the efficiency of private insurance. These publications are highly technical 
and require a strong grounding in economics. They are outside the primary focus of this 
thesis.  
 
A review of the search strategy and advice to improve search effectiveness were 
provided by a University of Waterloo librarian in August 2015. 
 
Many articles and studies were located from reference lists in the studies located 
through the original search (a snowball strategy). Ad hoc searching occurred, e.g., using 
“Canada” as a search term. Ongoing reading has discovered many newer and specialized 
articles in both peer-reviewed and grey literature. In particular, two recent federal reports 
(HESA, 2018; Advisory Council 2019b, see Sec 4.3.2) are central to current deliberations on 
national pharmacare. 
 
3.2.2  Comparative Country Analyses 
A description and comparative analysis was undertaken of health and drug insurance 
systems in Germany, the Netherlands and Quebec. The goal was to compare and contrast 
other social health insurance systems and the Canadian drug insurance model.  
 
Relevant and comprehensive reports were found from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Commonwealth Fund and the World Health 
Organization. These included relatively current reviews of the German and Dutch health 
systems. Both the German and Dutch governments also publish significant information in 
English, although often less frequently and in less detail than in their national languages. 
 
Table 5.5 compares features of the German and Canadian drug insurance systems. It 
was reviewed by Neil Grubert10 for accuracy and completeness in April 2019. 
 
3.2.3  Qualitative Interviewing11 
My theory base suggests that health policymaking is an art, with considerable emotion, 
politics, logic, chaos and an important ethical dimension. Research, evaluation and 
implementation of policy do not often follow a linear (or logical) path and may be highly 
politicized. Personalities intervene and influence. For these reasons it is crucial to consider 
the opinions of leaders in several segments with a vested interest in health services 
 
10 Neil Grubert is a multilingual pharmaceutical market access specialist with 29 years of experience based in London, 
England. He has written more than 150 reports covering 20 mature and emerging markets, multiple therapeutic areas and 
many industry issues. He has chaired international events and spoken at conferences, seminars and training workshops, 
including bespoke programs commissioned by senior pharmaceutical company executives. More information is available 
at: https://www.linkedin.com/in/neil-grubert-1658381b/?originalSubdomain=uk.  




generally and drug insurance in particular. No previously published research was found that 
used a formal qualitative methodology to approach this community. Interviews reflected a 
pragmatic paradigm. 
 
A distinguishing feature of qualitative research is context, and the ability to provide 
perspective, history, and detail on people and processes. Researchers may evolve their 
questioning to reflect emerging ideas from the interviews. Research Question 2 uses 
thematic analysis and inductive logic to understand what participants think about the need 
for universal drug insurance and whether social insurance could provide a feasible 
approach to achieving it. The aim is to contribute a better understanding of the policy, 
processes and relationships that may influence whether and when universal drug insurance 
may be introduced.  
 
3.2.3.1 Procedures 
Twenty-six semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted with opinion leaders 
including provincial drug plan directors and senior policy experts, leading private drug plan 
experts, and others (Sec. 3.2.3.3) to identify their views on drug plan sustainability, interest 
in shared provincial-private drug policy development, and their major challenges to ensure 
access and control cost. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show how many were interviewed from each 
category. Interviews were scheduled from February to August 2017. Each was at least one 
hour’s duration. This phase was to identify context and process dimensions that need to be 
considered in order to adopt a feasible solution. (Sec 3.1, research question 1.) 
 
Interviews recorded perspectives on the sustainability of drug plans and the need for 
change, the conditions necessary for change to occur, willingness to change, and 
perceptions of other payers. They were asked about key features of social insurance, the 
value and type of regulation and how minimum coverage standards may be negotiated. 
These topics were derived from the literature review and are key to relationship building, 
establishing common ground, and introducing the idea of more integrated strategy, policy 
and programs. 
 
Interview procedures and questions were reviewed by my committee and revisions were 
made. The questions were then tested with one private insurer and one provincial 
government leader for relevance, feasibility, clarity and the ability of these interviews to 
answer my research questions (Sec 3.1).  
 
Some elements of participatory action research (Minkler, 2000) are used to strengthen 
my understanding of participants’ responsibilities, authority, influencers, boundaries and 
constraints.  
 




1. Drug insurance opinion leaders in the federal and provincial governments, private 
payer community, and selected other groups were identified and contact 
information obtained. The “other groups” include unions and health professional 
and industry associations and were selected for their ability to influence payers. 
 
2. Opinion leaders were telephoned with an invitation to participate in a 60-minute 
interview. There was at least one telephone or email follow-up for any prospect who 
had not responded after one week. 
 
3. A description of the project and the approved consent letter was provided to each 
person who expressed interest. Interview questions were provided in advance. 
Prospective participants were advised the study had received ethics clearance 
through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE #21908). They 
were asked to carefully read, sign and return a consent form and interview times 
were then arranged. 
 
4. All interviews were conducted by telephone. Email reminders were sent one day 
prior. It was noted again that the discussion would be recorded but that no 
attribution would occur without the participant’s express written consent. Interviews 
occurred as quickly as possible and continued until thematic saturation was 
achieved. 
 
5. Participants were thanked for their time and invited to provide additional 
comments. As noted in the consent letter, follow-up contact could be made to 
confirm previous discussion points or to ask follow-up questions. This is consistent 
with typical qualitative methodology. 
 
6. A synopsis of major aggregate findings from all participants will be provided to each 
participant following the thesis defense. 
 
Interview questions are listed in section 3.2.3.4. The following sub-sections cover 
sensitizing concepts, participant selection, interview questions, personal influences and 
data protection. 
 
3.2.3.2 Sensitizing Concepts 
Bowen (2006) describes sensitizing concepts as “interpretive devices and as a starting point 
for a qualitative study (p. 14).” He cautions that naming some concepts presents a risk that 
others not initially identified will remain hidden. These concepts may also be useful again in 
identifying themes during the constant comparison of data and once interviews have been 
completed.  
 





1. Ideology: often “political”, e.g., public vs. private funding; the role and degree of 
regulation. 
 
2. Principles and Standards: universal access; fairness; adequacy; inclusive 
policymaking; program integration; accountable governance. 
 
3. Sustainability: of funding pharmaceuticals and cost control at a system level. 
4. Affordability: of a drug or financial accessibility by a patient. 
 
5. Goals tension: making “tough choices”; balancing cost, value and health impacts of 
drugs. 
 
6. Pace of change: dramatic and large-scale or cautious, defensible action; delay 
tactics; choosing not to act. 
 
7. Problems, policy and politics (Kingdon): identifying the key problems, decision 
agendas, policy entrepreneurs and potential windows of opportunity. 
 
Table 3.1 joins the research and interview questions with these concepts and Kingdon’s 
theory. 
 
Table 3.1 – Links between Sensitizing Concepts and Participant Questions 
Research Question 2:  
What advantages and disadvantages of our current shared-funding model are recognized 
by private and public drug plan opinion leaders?  
a. What are optimal roles for the federal government to play in achieving adequate 
universal drug coverage? 
b. Is private drug insurance acceptable and should it be included in national 
pharmacare policy? 
Sensitizing Concept Supporting Interview Questions 
1. Ideology: often “political”, e.g., public vs. 
private funding; the role and degree of 
regulation. 
Q5, Q6, Q7, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q15 
2. Principles and Standards: universal access; 
fairness; adequacy; inclusive policymaking; 
program integration; accountable governance. 
Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7, Q8, Q10, 
Q11, Q12 
3. Sustainability: of funding pharmaceuticals 
and cost control at a system level. 
Q4, Q5, Q11, Q12, Q13 
4. Affordability: financial access at a patient 
level. 
Q8, Q11, Q12, Q13 
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5. Goals tension: making “tough choices”; 
balancing cost, value and health impacts of 
drugs. 
Q4, Q9, Q13, Q15 
6. Pace of change: dramatic and large-scale or 
cautious, defensible action; delay tactics; 
choosing not to act. 
Q4, Q5, Q6, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q14, 
Q15 
7. Problems, policy and politics (Kingdon): 
identifying the key problems, decision 
agendas, policy entrepreneurs and potential 
windows of opportunity. 
Q1, Q2, Q2b (for gov’t only), Q7, 
Q8, Q9, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, 
Q15 
 
3.2.3.3 Participant Selection 
The key respondents are senior-level payers (Table 3.2) with many years of experience who 
govern and direct public and private drug plans. Those payer roles are significantly 
influenced by other groups so smaller samples of benefit and policy advisors, business 
leaders, academics, unions, the insurance and pharmaceutical industries and pharmacy 
were included and asked a subset of the questions posed to payers (Table 3.3).  
 
A purposive sampling technique was used since the number of potential respondents 
with suitable knowledge and experience is limited. Those contacted were initially derived 
from the researcher’s personal network and others known to him, and were asked to refer 
others who may also be interested in participating. One name was proposed (and eventually 
interviewed) who had not been previously considered by the researcher, indicating the 
prospective participants were likely representative of those known to have insight on 
private payer perspectives. Time, research scope and the need to effectively balance the 
range of data collected put limits on the ability to follow up on all leads provided. After 26 
interviews, sufficient thematic scope and depth was achieved. I believe participants are 
generally representative of the sectors they represented, based on my assessment of the 
professional reputations each had inside and external to their communities.  
 
Initially, 43 prospective participants were identified and 26 were interviewed (Tables 3.2 
and 3.3). Seven did not respond after follow-up and one declined. Nine others on the 
contact list were not approached because their roles were well-covered by other 
participants. The refusal was from an insurer. The seven non-responses were an MP, an HR 
consultant, a provincial manager, a provincial Minister’s office, an insurer, an academic and 
a business organization. Not all were expected to participate, in particular, provincial health 
ministers. 
 
The researcher had no special influence over anyone contacted. Twenty percent didn’t 
even respond. None has ever been a client. While three could be called regular professional 
contacts, and two more occasional, the researcher had never spoken to nine participants 
and had only distant or extremely limited episodic contact with 12 others who agreed to 
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participate. For example, one was a temporary supervisor of mine almost 20 years ago. They 
were selected to provide regional representation and to cover a wide range of past and 
current professions.  
 





Provincial health ministers 3 0 
Provincial drug plan managers 5 7 
Insurers and benefit advisors 14 7 
Business leaders 3 1 
 
While only five provincial managers were originally identified, two were substituted 
(same province) and two were added to increase the scope of experience and insights 
collected.  
 
Six influencer groups were generally asked questions 3-8 and 12-16 (Section 4.2.5): 
 





Academics 6 1 
Labour representatives 2 3 
Pharmaceutical industry association 2 1 
Federal government12 1 4 
Health professional association 2 1 
Others 2 1 
 
The views of all six academics who had published on this broad topic are well known. 
One was recruited and a second was contacted three times with no response.  
 
3.2.3.4 Participant Questions 
The following questions arose from the literature review that responded to Research 
Question 1 and the sensitizing concepts (Section 3.2.3.2, Table 3.1) derived from it. These 
questions were deemed relevant to the participant groups and key to relationship building, 
establishing common ground, and introducing the idea of more integrated strategy, policy 
and programs. The qualitative methodology and semi-structured approach allowed 
 
12 I had not originally considered asking federal politicians but one expert policy participant suggested I do so. Members of 




significant latitude to adjust, add or delete questions or return to participants if needed. 
The questions were revised as interviews proceeded to reflect accumulating knowledge. Not 
all participants answered all the questions, most often due to time constraints but also 
following the researcher’s judgement of their suitability. Questions also evolved as more 
interviews were conducted. 
 
1. What major problems are you and others in the health ministry [insurance industry] 
most concerned about these days? Why?  
 
2. Of these major problems, which have the highest priority now and for the next three 
to five years? Why?  
 
For government participants only. 2 b) Do the priorities vary between political leaders 
and senior civil servants? Is one group more likely to support or frustrate universal 
drug insurance? 
 
3. Do you have any (personal or institutional) preference for how prescription drug 
coverage is structured, administered and funded? (If needed, probe single payer, 
shared funding, or something else) Why do you think that? 
 
4. How important is the general concern about the sustainability of provincial and/or 
private drug programs? Does progress towards universal coverage mostly depend on 
budget, politics, or what else?  
 
5. Why do you think Canada does not have prescription drug insurance like it has for 
hospitals and physician services? (scale of changes needed; probe incremental vs. 
large-scale)  
 
6. Some believe private drug insurance should be eliminated, others find it acceptable 
but not optimal, and others think it is necessary and beneficial. How do you see 
private drug insurance? 
 
7. Do you think private drug insurance is effectively regulated by federal and 
provincial governments? [Note this question was eventually dropped because no 
participant admitted to any expertise in this area.] 
 
8. Do you have a sense Canadians have important unmet needs for drug insurance? 
Which Canadians? How big is the need for that group(s)? 
 
9. Use your experience to consider a major recent change to a provincial drug 
insurance program [private drug plan design (formularies, cost control, contracts)]. 
How did this major policy and program change get navigated through government 
[insurance company/industry]? How long did this process take? Would this process 
and timing apply to the introduction of a social insurance model? [Note this question 




10. How would you describe the current connections between provincial drug plans and 
private workplace drug insurance? (probe independent / inter-dependent) Between 
drug insurance leaders in both sectors?  
 
11. Is there an immediate or near-term opportunity for substantive collaboration 
between provincial governments and private insurers and employers to improve the 
quality and scope of drug insurance? Specifically, could common coverage standards 
be developed, or out-of-pocket cost be harmonized?  
 
12. Can we learn anything from Quebec’s drug insurance model? Are you familiar with 
other national drug insurance systems that could inform us? [Note this question was 
asked but only one participant had significant knowledge of the Quebec model.] 
 
13. Two potential scenarios follow. Can you suggest how governments, insurers and 
employers might respond to:  
a. The transfer of all private drug insurance in Canada to provincial 
governments with a commensurate tax increase, or  
b. Heavier regulation of private drug plans, minimum coverage standards that 
apply to all drug plans, and an employer mandate to provide drug insurance? 
 
14. Are there organizations or people – inside or outside government and the insurance 
industry – who might be willing and able (credible, powerful, connected) to 
champion this issue?  
 
15. Are there critical, looming issues on the horizon that could open a window of 
opportunity – inside or outside government and the insurance industry – to achieve 
universal drug insurance?  
 
16. Is there anything else we haven’t discussed that is relevant to achieving universal 
drug insurance? Is there anyone else I should contact about this issue? 
 
3.2.4 General Information 
3.2.4.1 Personal Influences 
My work background includes 18 years in underwriting, reinsurance, sales, sales 
management and business development in the insurance industry and 20 more years as a 
self-employed health consultant focusing on workplace health strategy and drug insurance. 
As such, I have a broad background and an extensive network within the broader private 
payer community (insurers, benefit advisors, pharmacy benefit managers, employers) as 
well as a smaller number of contacts in government, government relations and the 
pharmacy and pharmaceutical industries. Several participants had prior work relationships 
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with me, none subordinate. My experience presents certain biases in my perspective: the 
need for change, my views of “what works” and how change occurs in private insurance.  
 
An important bias is my view that governments have not played a proactive or 
innovative fiduciary role in providing universal drug insurance. I also believe private 
insurance is too narrow in its self-interest to adequately consider the needs of all citizens. 
Its mandate in offering health insurance has always been to supplement public coverage. I 
contend there is a mutual dependency between these two payers, but outside Quebec, this 
has not yet resulted in drug policy or programs that are deliberately co-managed or 
integrated.  
 
My personal experience influences how I frame, investigate, apply and discuss my 
research. I believe this experience is also an asset to provide better real-world insight on 
how problems may be identified and policy may be changed within each payer community, 
and the interaction effects between the two payer groups. I have no direct experience with 
those in the political stream and limited experience with those who can lead or build 
coalitions among important actors. I acknowledge that social desirability bias may be a 
factor to the extent any participant does not accurately or completely state his or her views 
during the interview. 
 
3.2.4.2 Data Analyses and Quality Assurance 
Each interview was digitally recorded and later transcribed using Dragon Professional 
Individual Version 15 (Nuance Communications Inc.). Notes were taken as interviews were 
recorded as a back-up and to record ideas outside the specific conversation. The 
information collected was first read and manually coded with notes, categorized and 
assessed for themes and for similar and conflicting perspectives. Next, all 26 interviews 
were uploaded to NVivo 12 (QSR International Pty. Ltd.). Interviews were re-read and salient 
passages were organized in 26 Nodes, a number eventually reduced to 23 as comments 
were reviewed and consolidated. All interviews were iteratively searched for certain key 
words during writing, such as “fund” and “facilitate.” 
 
Data validity started with clear research questions and careful selection of participants. 
Questions were revised in late stages of writing to better reflect interview content. Quality 
was reinforced by generally comprehensive descriptions of the process and the participants, 
line-by-line coding, constant comparison, negative/dissenting case analysis and personal 
notetaking (particularly about changes in procedures or questioning). Emerging themes 
were compared to Kingdon (2011). Reliability was reinforced through consistent use of 
NVivo categories across all interviews. Credibility was reinforced by establishing clear 
linkage between data, categories, thematic findings, interpretations and conclusions. 
 
Nodes with the greatest number of comments and the researcher’s judgement of their 
relevance were used to select three topics. Consideration was given to the current 




The following three topics have among the largest number of relevant quotes (NVivo) 
and where the participants have provided thoughtful input.  
 
1. The federal role  
2. The role of private insurance  
3. Relevancy of the social insurance models in Quebec, Germany and the Netherlands 
to current deliberations on national pharmacare. 
Participants may help disseminate the research findings. (An insurance industry 
executive has made this offer.) Their participation can help create a sense of ownership and 
potentially extend the researcher’s ability to influence policy.  
 
The interviews complement the narrative review and quantitative data and the 
comparative country analyses, and have provided new insight and context on the goals and 
process of improving access to prescription drugs. 
 
3.2.4.3 Confidentiality, Privacy and Protection of Data 
I promised confidentiality and anonymity to all participants. By confidential, I mean I had 
written authorization to use and quote (anonymously) the content of my interviews. If a 
participant chose to be identified (none did.), the participant would no longer be 
anonymous, but the contents of our interview would have remained confidential.  
 
No personal identifying information appears in the transcripts or the thesis. No remarks 
were directly attributed to a participant in any public document. Quotations were used in 
the research report or a presentation but were attributed only to a cohort, such as 








Literature Review: Drug Insurance for Canadians 
Research Question 1 
 
Could a social insurance model that includes employer-sponsored private insurance be a 
more feasible way to achieve adequate universal prescription drug insurance?13 Feasible 
means probable, with faster and less disruptive implementation. 
 
b. Private insurance: What are the advantages and disadvantages of employer-





This chapter provides findings from the original literature review and has been updated 
with relevant information through September 2019. New information is added about private 
drug benefit plans and current levels of protection from catastrophic drug insurance costs 
that are provided by provinces to their general population. The very significant and 
inequitable differences in protection suggest the need for national standards that provinces 
alone have been unable or unwilling to implement. Eight possible reasons for drug policy 
inertia are identified and explained. Regulation is briefly described because it is commonly 
used in social health insurance systems to ensure private insurers operate in the public 
interest. The potential costs of different insurance models are discussed based on a review 
of 16 recent studies. Out-of-pocket costs from eight different sources are described. 
 
This chapter identifies the serious and long-term limitations of Canada’s historically 
fragmented “patchwork” approach to providing drug insurance. Generally, public drug plan 
designs and patient eligibility and cost-sharing have become institutionalized. Private drug 
benefit plans remain essentially unchanged since the 1970s. Important changes will be very 
difficult to make even though inequitable and inadequate coverage persists and the pace of 
technological change is accelerating. The federal government and regulated private insurers 
could play a larger, complementary and more integrated role with provincial drug plans. 




13 Adequate, universal coverage is defined in Sec 1.5.4: Coverage will be adequate when it provides access to a broad 
formulary of medicines at an affordable level of out-of-pocket cost according to medical need. Coverage is universal when 
all Canadians have access to necessary medicines. 
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4.1 Current Issues 
4.1.1 Private Drug Insurance Plans 
Private health insurance is contractually provided by an insurer to a covered “person”, 
usually either an employer (group) or an individual.14 In Canada, associations (professional, 
alumni and business), unions or labour-management trustees also offer group plans.15 
Eligible expenses are based on the Income Tax Act and conditions of coverage are specified 
in the contract, as are limits and exclusions. All private extended health care (EHC) plans 
include coverage for prescription drugs which account for about 65% of all EHC costs 
(CLHIA, 2018).16 
 
The cost is reviewed annually and set according to either the claim patterns of the 
insured person (experience-rated or self-insured contracts17) or the cost may reflect the 
aggregate claims of many persons (pooled or fully insured). Insurers require employers to 
pay at least 50% of the premium cost and sometimes the full cost of the benefit plan. Plan 
members often pay a small (10% or 20%) share of their claims but some pay zero.  
 
Health insurance premiums are usually set using single and family rates (and sometimes 
a couple rate) that are unrelated to income. That makes private health insurance premiums 
regressive since low- and high-income earners pay the same premium and the same share 
(deductible or coinsurance) of each claim. However, much of that inequity is corrected in 
the broader context of a progressive income tax system.  
 
Enrolment is usually compulsory for all eligible employees except in specified situations 
such as a spouse with coverage elsewhere. This rule provides adequate risk spread between 
healthy and less healthy plan members. Some classes of employees are typically excluded, 
such as part-time, contract and casual workers.  
 




14 Individual policies provide limited coverage for those young and healthy enough to pass medical underwriting and who 
can pay monthly premiums without subsidy. 
15 A description of private insurance types and a high-level outline of insurance in various countries is available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Table-of-Content-Metadata-OECD-Health-Statistics-2018.pdf. See page 6, Social 
Protection, Private Health Insurance. 
16 Dental coverage is a separate line of private benefit plans, excluded from Extended Health Care. 
17 Self-insured contracts mean the employer accepts the full risk of claim costs and an insurer provides Administrative 




Table 4.1 – Description of Public and Private Drug Insurance Criteria 
Criterion Public Drug Plans Private Drug Plans 
Sponsor Government Employer, union, trust, individual 
Funding source General taxation, patient Employer, employee / personal 
Legal structure Legislation, regulation – 
entitlement program  
Voluntary contract encouraged by 




Budget-based cost control, 
formulary access based on 
clinical and economic review, 
political oversight 
Employee satisfaction, cost control, 




Defined and/or voluntary 
populations within each 
jurisdiction  
Defined employee segments and 




Some Canadians are eligible for both provincial and private plans, including some 
retirees. Provincial drug plans integrate with private plans in different ways. Some provinces 
are first payer18 (e.g., ON non-Trillium) and some are second payer (e.g., Atlantic Canada). 
Some allow private insurance to pay for the public plan deductible and coinsurance (BC, MB) 
and some do not (ON Trillium). Quebec requires private insurance to pay first if a patient 
has private coverage but if a business does not offer a health plan, the province insures that 
employer’s employees and family members.  
 
4.1.2 Private Plan Advantages 
Employees are very satisfied with their private plans. Sixty percent of 1,505 private plan 
members included in a 2019 national survey said their health benefit plan met their needs 
extremely or very well and 54% rated the quality of their plan as excellent or very good 
(Sanofi 2019, p. 10).  
 
Private drug plans typically have much larger formularies and list new drugs faster than 
provincial plans (CLHIA, 2018). Patients may support private insurance because they are 
concerned about losing coverage or paying more out-of-pocket (Pollara 2018).19 The CLHIA 
 
18 Sometimes a plan member is eligible for coverage under more than one plan, typically an employer plan, a spousal plan 
and sometimes the provincial drug plan. The order of private claim payment is defined by the CLHIA. Each province 
determines when their plan will pay if a beneficiary also has private drug plan. 
19 For example, the PBO cut $3.9 billion from its single payer pharmacare model by delisting drugs that would no longer be 
reimbursed according to the Quebec formulary. With over 8,000 drugs, QC has the largest provincial formulary in Canada 
however it covers fewer drugs than most private drug plans (10-12,000 DINs – CLHIA 2018). The drugs no longer 
reimbursed in the PBO model were eligible under private plans. A smaller formulary would lead to greater out-of-pocket 
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(2018b) estimated that 7.7 million Canadians are taking brand and generic drugs not 
currently covered by their provincial plans, with an estimated value in 2020 of $1.1 billion. 
Patients would then either have to pay out-of-pocket for these drugs, or they would have to 
switch to a different drug of hopefully similar efficacy in order to be reimbursed. Even 
using a comprehensive public coverage model (under which private plan eligibility would be 
reduced), “…this may leave 60% of Canadians with private coverage [today] worse off for 
access to some medicines” (Law, Clement and Dinh, 2018, p. 15). It is not clear if union 
members support bringing drug insurance under the Canada Health Act20 or prefer to retain 
the added coverage available in private drug plans. The Sanofi survey (2019, unpublished 
data) indicates union members are more likely than non-union employees to rate the quality 
of their private health benefit plan as excellent or very good (58% union, vs. 51% non-union). 
 
Even in provinces which are notionally first payer (BC, AB, SK, MB, ON non-Trillium), 
private plans reimburse eligible claims up to the provincial deductible. Private insurance 
also limits the liability of provincial drug plans and may reduce pressure on public plans to 
reimburse thousands of drugs not on their formularies.  
 
4.1.3 Contentious Issues 
Academics have focused on three drawbacks of Canada’s approach to private insurance. 
First, most insurers operate in the interest of their shareholders or policyholders and not 
necessarily for the good of society. Insurers (and all businesses) are primarily responsible to 
shareholders unless otherwise directed by legislation or regulation.  
 
Second, premiums are tax-deductible by the employer and benefits received by plan 
members are not taxed except in Quebec. The federal Department of Finance (2018) 
estimates the value of “Non-taxation of benefits from private health and dental plans” at 
$2.84 billion for 2019, of which about $909 million (32%) is accounted for by drug plans 
(Author’s calculations using CLHIA, 2019).21  According to Finance, the tax-favoured status 
of employee benefit plans has three stated purposes: (1) To achieve a social objective, (2) To 
encourage employment, and (3) To improve access to supplementary health and dental 
benefits.22 This is regressive because a larger benefit is provided to higher income 
Canadians for a given eligible medical cost.  
 
 
cost in the absence of private insurance, e.g., ON has just 4,400 “drug products” that include nutrition products and 
diabetic testing agents. 
20 The Canadian Labour Congress launched their campaign supporting public single payer national pharmacare in late 
2017. 
21 Department of Finance, Canada. See: https://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2018/taxexp1806-eng.asp#Non-taxation-of-
benefits-from-private-health-and-dental-plans. This amount covers $34.7 billion paid for extended health, dental and 
disability claims in 2018 (CLHIA, 2019). Of that amount, 32% ($11.7 bn) was for drug insurance, so about $909 million of 
the foregone federal tax could be eliminated if private drug insurance converted to a public single payer plan. 




Third, private insurance has higher costs for drugs, administration and pays higher 
amounts to pharmacies than do provincial plans. In part, multiple for-profit insurers 
provide perhaps hundreds of different plan designs. Choice costs more to plan and 
administer which has led to claims of inefficiency and wasted resources (Gagnon & Hébert, 
2010; Law et al., 2014). Morgan, Daw and Law (2013) estimated excess administrative costs 
for private health insurance at $1 billion (p. 16), but did not show a calculation. In that 
report, “health insurance” covers several benefits, some of which have highly automated 
administration (drugs) and some with more manual and personalized processes (long term 
disability). The authors did not identify premium, sales, income or other taxes paid to 
governments23 as part of the higher cost of private health insurance administration, nor the 
different services provided to clients and beneficiaries by each payer group.  
 
Law et al. (2014) examined the insurance industry’s (CLHIA) own health claim reports 
between 1991 and 2011 and concluded that medical insurance margins (including coverage 
for hospital and drugs) had significantly increased between 1991 and 2011. “Margin” was 
defined as premiums less claims. Margins vary by type of insurance, claim experience, and 
size of employer. For example, Law et al. calculated that insured plans, generally purchased 
by smaller employers, generated a margin of 26% of medical premiums after paying all 
claims. In contrast, Law et al. noted that insurers retained just 5% of non-insured medical 
premiums purchased by larger employers. In 2018 the industry retained 13% of total EHC 
and dental premiums for administration (7%), taxes (3%) and profit (3%) (CLHIA, 2019, p. 
17).24  
 
Plan cost is just one of several considerations in determining value. Private insurers 
offer many plans with different coverage levels and costs, and they usually provide access 
to leading-edge consumer technology that is not offered by provincial health plans. Various 
media platforms, i.e., web, smart phone, telephonic and call-centre, are available 24-7 to 
serve plan members. Services include education on adherence to therapy, health promotion, 
pharmacy locators and internet-based cognitive behavioural therapy. 
 
Insurers have not always closely adhered to their fiduciary role in spending their clients’ 
funds. Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmacies very often take advantage of fewer 
and less stringent cost controls in most private drug plans by charging higher prices to 
private plan members. In part, the drug and pharmacy industries support private insurance 
to minimize threats to their revenue and profits. Many private plans still lack the cost 
controls used by provincial plans.  
 
Single payer national pharmacare creates potentially important quality, access and cost 
uncertainties for patients because it could eliminate private drug benefits or make them 
 
23 CIHI (NHEX, 2018. Methodological Notes, p. 17) calculates private administration cost as the difference between 
premiums and claims. This cost includes collection of premium, capital, sales and other taxes paid by insurers. The CLHIA 
(2018a, p. 18) reports $4.1 billion in taxes paid by its members, plus $3.6 billion in sales and payroll taxes paid to 
governments on behalf of employers and employees. 
24 The CLHIA does not identify drug administration costs separately. 
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uneconomic.25 It also creates costs or lost revenue and perhaps profitability for employers, 
insurers, pharmacy benefit managers and benefit consulting firms. It may also affect 
governments by not only increasing their share of all prescription drug spending, but also 
reducing their tax revenue as premium and sales taxes would no longer be paid on private 
drug plans. The CLHIA has estimated these lost revenues to provincial treasuries at $1.1 
billion.26 
 
4.1.4 Other Considerations 
Chronic disease now accounts for about two-thirds of all drug claim costs (Express Scripts 
Canada (ESC), 2014). Here too, new drug products are entering the market for common 
conditions at multiples of current product pricing. For example, Repatha® is a newer drug 
for certain cases of high cholesterol that costs between $8,000 and $10,000 annually, versus 
less than $400 for traditional statin therapy.27  
 
Specialty drugs, generally biologic in nature rather than chemical, are now common in 
lists of top ten sales. Annual costs for those products often average tens of thousands of 
dollars per patient, but account for only about 2% of the number of privately-paid scripts 
(ESC, 2019). For specialty products in 2013, ESC reported average cost per claim was $1,270 
versus $45 for traditional drugs (2014, p. 16). Drugs for rare diseases commonly cost 
US$240,000 to US$400,000 annually in the American market.28 With increasing utilization, 
specialty products29 now account for 33% of employer drug plan costs in Canada, up from 
15% in 2008 (ESC, 2019).  
 
Personalized medicine is emerging, where the patient’s own genetic profile guides 
diagnosis and treatment. Prices per patient will consequently be very high because 
development costs must be recaptured over small populations or sub-populations. Over 100 
drugs in the United States already have labels that include information on genomic 
biomarkers.30 Evans (2007) predicted that new drugs based on an individual’s genetic profile 
will be extremely disruptive to the traditional financing model. The new drugs for rare 
 
25 Insurers require an adequate spread of risk to price their products. Employers generally reimburse high-cost specialty 
drugs and DRDs because most plan members make much smaller and predictable claims, or do not claim at all. For 
example, just 2% of claimants generated 33% of total plan costs from specialty drugs (ESC, 2019). 
26 Personal communication, CLHIA, July 22, 2019. 
27 Source: Aon Hewitt Information Bulletin, October 20, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.aon.com/canada/attachments/thought-leadership/infobulletin/pub_aon_InfoBulletin-Repatha-102115.pdf. 
Repatha has restricted access under virtually all drug plans. 
28 Elsevier Business Intelligence, 2013. Hyperion pricing on Ravicti will test premium for convenience on orphan market. 
February 8. Available at: http://www.reimbursementintelligence.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Hyperion_Pricing_On_Ravicti_Will_Test_Premium_For_Convenience_In_Orphan_Market.pdf.  
29 Specialty drugs can be defined as “Medications used to treat chronic, complex conditions such as severe rheumatoid 
arthritis, multiple sclerosis and cancer. Specialty medications include injectable and non-injectable drugs and have one or 
more of the following qualities: frequent dosing adjustments and intensive clinical monitoring; intensive patient training 
and compliance assistance; limited distribution; and/or specialized handling or administration (ESC, 2019 p. 7).”  




diseases and even some for common conditions (e.g., Hepatitis C) have extraordinarily high 
treatment costs, most of which are annually recurrent. Genetic testing will undoubtedly 
reveal that we all have genetic flaws, and in insurance language, “pre-existing conditions” 
(Evans, 2007, p.2671). With such a huge and expensive risk pool, the only solution will be to 
spread that risk across national populations (Evans, 2007). Though patients will benefit, 
governments and private health insurers all face a serious funding threat, one mitigated 
though progressive policy that includes aggressive and coordinated negotiations on price, 
cost and outcomes. This is possible in either single payer or social insurance models.  
 
To manage recurrent high-cost claims in some private drug plans, the Canadian Drug 
Insurance Pooling Corporation (CDIPC) was established in 2012 by the CLHIA. Participation 
is mandatory for all fully-insured employee drug plans issued by all CLHIA members 
operating in Canada.31 CDIPC members paid recurrent prescription drug claims for over 
22,200 “certificates” (employee and all family members) that cost more than $10,000 in 
2017.32 Several claims exceeded $500,000 and the highest claim was for $1.2 million.33 
Private drug plans have assumed significant risk which reinforces their important role. 
Claims of this scale also weaken arguments of “cream skimming” by private insurers, as 
asserted by Gagnon (2010). 
 
In addition to reports from the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health 
(HESA, 2018) and the Advisory Council (2019b), discussion papers from various policy 
forums rarely include a solid understanding of either social or private drug insurance, if 
these models are assessed at all.34 The financial implications of changing to a single payer 
plan are very significant for employers, insurers, pharmacy benefit managers and benefit 
consulting firms. Not surprisingly, insurers, the pharmacy and pharmaceutical industries 
and patient coalitions advocate retaining the more generous coverage of private drug plans. 
Provincial drug plans have smaller formulary lists than most private drug plans and take 
much longer to review and list new drugs.  
 
Allin, Stabile and Tuohy (2010) caution that: “Social insurance as a method of financing 
health care will not guarantee financial sustainability” (p. 23). Every health system – public, 
private and international; single payer and social insurance – has cost control challenges 
that will require multi-faceted strategies. 
 
31 The CDIPC industry-level pool does not include drug plans that are experience-rated or those operated under 
Administrative Services Only contracts, so most employer drug plans covering more than about 50 employees are 
excluded. The pool also excludes single, large amount drug claims. Each insurer sells pooling protection against large 
claims.  
32 News release, December 17, 2018. More Canadians benefitting from private insurance drug pooling system. Available at: 
http://cdipc-scmam.ca/cdipc-information/.  
33 Presentation by Shirley Leong, Executive Director, CDIPC at Connex event, Burlington. October 2, 2014. 
34 Other recent examples: (1) Hartmann E, A Davidson, K Alwani, 2018. Prescribing Federalism. Mowat Centre (September). 
Available at: https://mowatcentre.ca/prescribing-federalism/. (2) Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy, 2018. National 
Pharmacare in Canada, Choosing a Path Forward. Available at: http://www.ifsd.ca/en/rapports-reports. (3) Flood CM, B 





4.2 Defining Catastrophic 
There does not appear to be a standard definition of catastrophic. Globally, WHO has 
proposed that catastrophic health expenditure occurs when costs exceed 40% of a 
household’s “non-subsistence income, i.e. income available after basic needs have been met” 
(p. 2).35 The (Romanow) Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (2002a) 
proposed the federal government cover 50 per cent of the cost of drug claims exceeding 
$1,500 per person per year. The Senate of Canada report (2002) recommended the federal 
government cover 90% of annual drug costs in excess of $5,000 for qualifying drug plans.36 
Public plans would cap personal drug costs at 3% of family income while private plans 
would limit personal drug costs to $1,500.  
 
Today, most provincial drug plans have implemented varying levels of catastrophic 
protection, although there is no cap on public drug costs in Alberta and New Brunswick and 
NL residents with personal or family incomes over $150,000 have no limit on out-of-pocket 
expenses under the province’s Assurance Plan (Table 4.2). In its focus on a future single 
payer system, the Advisory Council (2019b) had no advice on creating protection from 
catastrophic drug claim costs for the interim period until a comprehensive plan is 




35 World Health Organization, 2005. Designing health financing systems to reduce catastrophic health expenditure. 
Technical Briefs for Policy-Makers (2). Available at: https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/pb_e_05_2-
cata_sys.pdf.  




Table 4.2 – Provincial Drug Plan Maximum Out-of-Pocket Cost for the General 
Population 
Province 
Drug costs exceeding a percent of family income 
and/or a dollar threshold 
British Columbia 
$100 (0.7%) > $13,750 up to 4.23%. $10,000 cap > 
$250,000 net income 
Alberta 30% up to $25 per drug. No limit on personal drug costs 
Saskatchewan 3.4% of gross income 
Manitoba 3.17% to 7.15% of gross income 
Ontario 4% of net income plus $2 per prescription 
Quebec $1,187 (2018-19; adjusted annually) 
New Brunswick 
30% up to between $5 and $30 per drug based on gross 
family income. No limit on personal drug costs 
Nova Scotia 
After a 20% coinsurance, 80% satisfies a deductible based 
on gross family income. Full coverage above the threshold 
of 5% to 35% of income. 
Prince Edward Island 3%, 5%, 8% or 12% of net income 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
5%, 7.5% or 10% of net income. No limit when income > 
$150,000 
Sources: Provincial websites, current at May 2019. Notes: (1) Most provinces adjust 
thresholds for family size. (2) For citizens with private drug insurance, the province is the 
second payer in all provinces east of Ontario. In ON, the Trillium program is second payer. 
(3) Gross means before tax. Net means after tax. (4) The lack of an overall cap in NB and AB 
could be material for those with low incomes and multiple prescriptions. ESC (2019) 
reported the top 20% of its private plan claimants had on average 8.6 unique medications. 
 
4.3 Considering social insurance in Canada 
While social insurance has been explored by Canadian academics (Sec 1.4.2), it has yet to be 
widely discussed and was not recognised in important government studies such as those 
issued by HESA or the Advisory Council. A brief review of three key studies is provided 
below to frame the detailed descriptions of social insurance systems in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Quebec. 
 
4.3.1 Flood, Stabile and Tuohy (2008)  
These three Canadian academics served as editors of the only comprehensive, multi-author 
volume found on financing social health insurance. After considering the international 
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perspectives of ten authors, some cited elsewhere in this thesis, their final chapter presents 
their prescription for “moving forward” (p. 266). They conclude that combining public and 
private sources of finance is optimal but that theory and evidence indicates than in Canada, 
mixed financing is best suited to out-of-hospital drugs because private insurance is well 
established and there is no universal coverage. A new universal social drug insurance plan 
with improved benefits is proposed to gradually replace existing public programs. It would 
require out-of-pocket contributions and exist as a complement to a newly-regulated private 
insurance system. Five principles are proposed: 
 
1. Private insurers would become partners in achieving universal coverage. They would be 
regulated and required to offer a minimum standard formulary using community rating. 
Supplementary plans would be allowed. Risk selection would be carefully monitored. 
 
2. Individual and employer coverage mandates would be introduced to ensure universal 
coverage, avoid adverse selection and ensure wide risk pooling. 
 
3. A progressive funding mechanism would be introduced. They suggested a refundable 
tax credit and a risk-sharing pool, presumably national in scope. The tax deductibility of 
private drug insurance would probably be eliminated. 
 
4. A separate administrative body would be created, isolated from the general tax system, 
with funding from both employers and employees. This body could undertake 
formulary design and drug price negotiations. 
 
5. A new retirement benefit would integrate and finance generally predictable costs from 
pension, drug insurance and long-term care coverage. 
 
Flood, Stabile and Tuohy did not pass judgement on competition, transition, or whether 
there ought to be patient cost-sharing. 
 
4.3.2 Allin, Stabile and Tuohy (2010) 
Financing new social insurance systems for drugs and long-term care could address access, 
equity and sustainability concerns, and complement Canadian medicare. This paper 
reviewed the design and funding characteristics of social drug insurance in Quebec, a 
broader universal state insurance system for working-age adults in Massachusetts, and 
drugs inside the broader health systems in Germany and the Netherlands. The importance 
of regulation, scope of coverage, cost-sharing and risk adjustment pools was noted.  
 
Acknowledging the different historical and institutional contexts in each jurisdiction, 
the authors recommended that Canada have a broad tax base for employer and employee 
contributions (beyond just payroll taxes) and introduce a robust approach to risk pooling. 
Like Flood, Stabile and Tuohy (2008), they state that diverse sources of financing (not just 
public or just private) may increase the public’s willingness to pay in part because they can 
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more easily connect contributions with services provided. The financing flexibility of social 
insurance means a carefully designed model could align with existing Medicare hospital and 
physician services and satisfy conditions in the Canada Health Act. Once launched, it would 
be important to effectively integrate the two systems to ensure continuity of care, manage 
incentives and ensure financial sustainability. 
 
4.3.3 Blomqvist and Busby (2015)  
While the authors did not propose a social drug insurance plan by name, they included 
tactics that are consistent with one. They proposed the federal government provide funding 
to the provinces to achieve universal coverage by: (i) Limiting out-of-pocket spending to 3% 
of net family income, (ii) Establishing a minimum national formulary, (iii) Extending 
negotiated drug prices to private insurers, (iv) Financing drugs for rare and high-cost 
diseases, and (v) Incenting better prescribing. Federal government costs were estimated at 
$2.8 billion annually. 
 
They recommended provincial administration continue in exchange for meeting these 
five conditions. As in Quebec, each provincial drug plan would cover anyone without private 
drug insurance. The tax credit for private drug insurance would be eliminated. They noted 
that continued private insurance funding reduces the amount of new public funding 
required, and favoured “some degree of competition between public and private plans” (p. 
10). 
 
4.3.4 Summary: Social drug insurance for Canada 
These reports come to similar conclusions about the viability and feasibility of introducing 
a social drug insurance model to improve on the patchwork of existing public and private 
coverage. As a minimum, social insurance provides superior equity, access, and cost control 
relative to private insurance. Goals and tactics are consistent with needs identified earlier.  
 
Several observations can be made. Social insurance is not a singular panacea for 
concerns about system sustainability because the public must be willing to adequately fund 
any model that would achieve national goals (Allin, Stabile & Tuohy, 2010). Neither social 
insurance nor single payer models will automatically fix important shortfalls in standards 
of coverage and responsive governance. Similarly, competitive markets alone will not 
contain costs without purchasing reforms that include price, volume and quality (van 
Ginneken & Swartz, 2012). Historical, political, social and institutional contexts are very 
important and not easily transferred from one country to another (Boothe, 2015; Allin, 
Stabile & Tuohy, 2010).  
 
All these works provide helpful and practical insights, as part of the much greater depth 




4.4 Recent Developments  
4.4.1 1997 through 2009 
National pharmacare in different forms has been proposed and studied many times in the 
last several decades. In more recent times, the National Forum on Health37 in 1997 called for 
universal, first-dollar drug coverage. Five years later, the Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada (2002a) and the Senate’s Standing Committee on Social Affairs, 
Science and Technology (Senate of Canada, 2002. Vol 6, Chap. 7) called for protection from 
catastrophic drug expenses.  
 
These federal reports were followed by the 2003 Health Accord which stated: 
 
First Ministers agree that no Canadian should suffer undue financial hardship for 
needed drug therapy. Accordingly, as an integral component of these reforms, First 
Ministers will take measures, by the end of 2005/06, to ensure that Canadians, wherever 
they live, have reasonable access to catastrophic drug coverage.38 
 
The Premiers, following their 2004 annual meeting, wanted the federal government to 
“assume full responsibility for these programs across the country.”39 A National 
Pharmaceutical Strategy was announced in the 2004 First Ministers’ 10-year, $41 billion plan 
to strengthen health care.40 That plan was to ‘buy change, not time,’ and the new money 
came with reporting strings monitored by the Health Council of Canada. Following an 
update in 2006 by the Health Council, no further progress was reported.  
 
4.4.2 2010 to Present  
The pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA) was created by nine Premiers in 2010 
under the Council of the Federation to negotiate lower prices for new patented drugs on 
behalf of provincial formularies. The federal government joined the pCPA in 2016,41 
following Quebec’s entrance in October 2015.   
 
Starting when the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) was established in 2004, the federal 
government provided six percent annual funding increases to the provinces until 2016-17. 
The 10-year plan was replaced with a series of bilateral deals between the federal 
 
37 Government of Canada, 1998. Canada Health Action: Building the Legacy. The text of Volumes 1 and 2 is available at: 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/com/fed/nfh-fns-eng.php. In Volume 2, Directions for a Pharmaceutical Policy in Canada is 
at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/pubs/renewal-renouv/1997-nfoh-fnss-v2/index-eng.php#a7.  
38 Government of Canada, 2003. First Ministers’ Accord on Health Care Renewal. Available at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-
sss/delivery-prestation/fptcollab/2003accord/index-eng.php. Viewed June 18, 2014. 
39 News release, July 30, 2004. Premiers’ action plan for better health care: Resolving issues in the spirit of true federalism. 
Available at: http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/healtheng.pdf. Viewed May 11, 2019.  
40 Government of Canada, 2004. News release, September 16. Available at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-
prestation/fptcollab/2004-fmm-rpm/index-eng.php. Viewed June 16, 2014. 
41 Additional discussion of the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance follows in later pages. 
 
 44 
government and each province in early 2017.42 Since 2017-18, the CHT has been increasing 
using a three-year moving average of nominal Gross Domestic Product, with a minimum 
annual increase of 3 percent.43 Nationally, prescription drug prices have had average annual 
increases of 4.0%, 5.0%, 2.4%, 1.7% and 5.0% over the most recent five years (CIHI, 2018). 
 
4.4.3 House of Commons Standing Committee on Health (HESA) 
Unexpectedly, national pharmacare (NPh) was elevated in federal policy following the 2015 
federal election. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Health (HESA) decided to 
study national pharmacare as an insured service under the Canada Health Act.44 These last 
nine words are a crucial frame for its work. HESA commissioned a costing study from the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO, 2017), which estimated savings of $4.2 billion from a 
federally-administered national pharmacare plan under the Act. However, the report had 
some crucial cost-saving assumptions that are most unlikely in the real-world, among other 
limitations (Bonnett, 2017). HESA (2018) issued its 140-page report in April 2018, 
recommending NPh as an insured service under the Canada Health Act.  
 
Although HESA was to examine an alternative (reforming the existing system with a 
collaborative public-private approach aimed at filling the gaps) its report took one page (pp 
69-70) on this issue to make statements for which there was no evidence of any broader 
investigation. The only recommendation that included private payers was to: “undertake 
consultations with employers, unions, private plans and Canadians at large to identify 
possible approaches towards financing the expansion of the Canada Health Act to include 
prescription drugs” (p. 56). There was no mention of consultation on design, principles, 
transition or implementation. The Minister of Health responded in August 2018 while the 
House was in summer recess, stating the government will “…consider the full range of 
options,”45 which were not more fully explained.  
 
4.4.4 Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare  
The Minister’s agnostic statement underscores the importance of the Advisory Council on 
the Implementation of National Pharmacare (Advisory Council), headed by Eric Hoskins. In 
February 2018, HESA was overtaken by the federal Budget announcement creating the 
Advisory Council which was to lead “a national dialogue on how to implement affordable 
national pharmacare for Canadians and their families, employers and governments.” The 
focus on implementation indicated the Liberal government had become more serious. 
 
 
42 Marchildon G, 2017. Health funding: Why 12 federal-provincial deals are better than none. April 12. 
Available at: https://healthydebate.ca/opinions/health-care-funding-2. Manitoba held out until August. 
43 Department of Finance Canada. See: https://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/cht-eng.asp.  
44 A full record of HESA’s national pharmacare meetings, briefs and a list of witnesses is here: 
http://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/HESA/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=8837577.  
45 Petitpas Taylor G, 2018. Letter (undated) to the Chair of HESA responding to the “Pharmacare Now” report tabled in 
April 2018. Response presented to the House of Commons, August 22, 2018. 
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Its mandate was to: 
 
• “conduct an economic and social assessment of domestic and international models 
• work closely with provincial, territorial and Indigenous leaders 
• consult with Canadians, as well as experts and stakeholders from relevant fields.”46 
 
The Council reported to both the federal Minister of Health and the Minister of Finance, 
indicating that program cost was very important. The Advisory Council had very limited 
time in the public eye. After the Budget announcement, not much happened until Council 
members were named on June 20, 2018. Public consultations closed just three months later 
at the end of September. The Council did not summarize and post findings from 15,000 
questionnaire responses and did not post any of over 150 written submissions it received 
(Advisory Council, 2019a). These decisions may have dampened public interest and 
awareness of the Council’s work and the views of important stakeholders. It may also be 
true that the federal government did not want to promote the Advisory Council unless or 
until its recommendations were certain to support government policy.  (In contrast, HESA is 
an all-party standing committee and both the NDP and Conservative parties issued their 
own pharmacare opinions.47) 
 
A very short interim report released in March 2019 (Advisory Council, 2019a) provided 
six core principles and recommended only modest changes: (1) Creation of a national drug 
agency (2) Development a comprehensive, evidence-based national formulary that 
considered drugs for rare diseases, and (3) Investment in drug data and information 
technology systems.  
 
The 2019 federal Budget then announced that the Canadian Drug Agency (CDA) would 
be immediately established with funding of $35 million over four years. A national strategy 
for drugs for rare diseases would be developed, but new federal funding of $500 million 
annually would be delayed four years until 2022-23, the end of the next government’s 
mandate.48 There was no support for the investment in information technology 
recommended by the Advisory Council. 
 
The Council’s final report (171 pages) was released on June 12, 2019, four months 
before the next federal election (Advisory Council, 2019b). Similar to HESA, the Advisory 
Council recommended a single payer universal drug plan under the Canada Health Act be 
implemented in steps beginning in 2022. CDA would consolidate work now done in other 
federal and provincial agencies (likely excepting Quebec’s INESSS) and develop a national 
formulary by 2022. A strategy for drugs for rare diseases is also due by 2022. However, the 




47 Ibid. Canada, 2018. The main report includes appendices with the dissenting (Conservative Party) and supplementary 
(New Democratic Party) positions.   




formulary would follow by 2027. The provinces and territories could opt in if they agreed to 
national standards and funding mechanism. The new drug plan would have very small 
patient cost-sharing requirements with exemptions for those with very low income or who 
receive government disability benefits. New federal costs were estimated at $3.5 billion by 
2022, rising to $15.3 billion five years later following full implementation.  
 
Similar to HESA, the Advisory Council (2019b, Annex 7) said it studied catastrophic 
coverage model and a “statutory multi-payer model” similar to systems used in Germany, 
the Netherlands and Quebec. Both models were briefly described over just 3½ pages but 
there was no analysis provided. The Council decided these alternatives “were outweighed by 
the longer-term efficiency and sustainability of a single-payer model” (p. 167). 
 
The government has yet to make a policy commitment to a comprehensive NPh program 
similar to the models recommended by HESA and the Advisory Council. 
 
4.4.5 Provincial responses 
There is no indication the Premiers are willing to support national pharmacare except under 
specific conditions which include: (1) retaining provincial control over design and delivery, 
(2) “long-term, adequate, secure, flexible” funding that considers cost drivers, and (3) “the 
right to opt out unconditionally, with full financial compensation (Canada’s Premiers, 2018 
Final Communiqué).”49 This positioning makes the development of national standards (e.g., 
formulary or out-of-pocket spending caps) very difficult. There was no significant, new and 
immediate federal funding for medicines announced in the 2019 Budget. 
 
Following their 2019 meeting, the Premiers proposed four principles including improved 
access and careful assessment of potential benefits, risks, costs, and supply reliability for 
NPh. They would retain responsibility for public drug plan design and delivery, and 
repeated their demand for an adequate and secure funding envelope (Canada’s Premiers, 
2019 Final Communiqué).50 
4.4.6 Private payer concerns 
National pharmacare is of direct concern to health insurers, benefit advisors and pharmacy 
benefit managers that all derive significant revenue (and unknown profits) from employer-
sponsored extended health plans under which prescription drug coverage is provided. 
However, there is little evidence that this segment, collectively known as ‘private payers’, is 
prepared for significant changes.  
 
 
49 July 20, 2018. Available at: http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Final_communique_July_20-
1.pdf.  




The CLHIA has produced one drug policy paper on behalf of life insurers (CLHIA, 2013). 
In essence, an update to this appeared in its submission to the Advisory Council (CLHIA, 
2018). The CLHIA also supports a public advocacy site that calls for universal drug 
coverage, the protection of employee health benefit plans, and affordability for taxpayers.51 
 
There is no advocacy group for group health benefit advisors or for pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs) such as Telus Health and Express Scripts Canada that operate national 
electronic drug claim payment networks on behalf of private health insurers.  
 
There are two business associations, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (200,000 
employers in 450 local chapters), and the Canadian Federation of Independent Business 
(CFIB) which represents 110,000 small employers, 96% with fewer than 50 employees. 
Neither the Chambers nor the CFIB appear to have a sustained interest in health care or 
drug insurance in order to advocate a position with nearly as much vigour as the CLHIA.52 
Neither organization is listed as a Witness or as contributing a Brief on the HESA website. 
There are just two relevant communications: 
 
• The Chamber called for an update to the Canada Health Act in 2017, and noted 
OECD estimates of significant waste (OECD, 2010b) in Canada’s health spending 
relative to the best-performing members. They wanted F/P/T governments to 
“Collaborate on purchasing and regulation to reduce prescription drug costs.”53 The 
Chamber has no public documents on NPh other than its submission to the Advisory 
Council.54 
• The CFIB notes the creation of the Advisory Council in a media release55 but has not 
made public any advocacy document on national pharmacare on its website. 
 
Health professional groups such as the Neighbourhood Pharmacy Association of Canada 
(NPAC, the industry association for retail pharmacy companies), the Canadian Pharmacists 
Association (CPhA), the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), the Canadian Nurses 
Association (CNA) and the Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions (CFNU) have publicly 
advocated their positions on national pharmacare. All but NPAC appeared as Witnesses 
before HESA and the CMA, CNA and CFNU provided Briefs to this Committee.56 The CPhA 
produced pharmacare-related reports in 2015, 2016 and 2017, and collaborated with 
 
51 See: https://www.betterhealthbenefits.ca/.  
52 The Canadian Chamber of Commerce made a 4-page submission to the Advisory Council, available at: 
http://www.chamber.ca/advocacy/submissions/archives-2018/.  
53 Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2017. Revisit the 30-year old health act to address looming crisis. Available at: 
http://www.chamber.ca/advocacy/policy-resolutions/special-issues/.  
54 Available at: http://www.pdci.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Canadian-Chamber-of-Commerce-Submission-to-the-
Advisory-Council-on-the-Implementation-of-National-Pharmacare-FINAL.pdf.  
55 Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 2018. The good and bad about what is missing in Budget 2018. Available 
at: https://www.cfib-fcei.ca/en/media/good-and-bad-about-what-missing-budget-2018.  
56 Available at: https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/HESA/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=8837577.  
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patient groups on a joint paper in 2018.57 NPAC and CPhA would be expected to support 
private insurance given their revenue and likely higher margins from private drug plans.  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, the Canadian Labour Congress fully and publicly58 supports a 
single payer drug plan despite a belief that its members may receive less generous benefits 
under that regime.  
 
Allied with the prime antagonists to a fully public NPh are brand drug manufacturers 
which charge more to private payers than public plans allow. Patient groups are also very 
concerned since provincial plans provide much smaller formularies and much more limited 
and slower access to new drugs (Pharmacare Working Group, 2018; BMC, 2018). 
 
4.4.7 Public Interest 
Public support for NPh, however it may be defined, has been and remains high (84% to 91%) 
in large national polls (Angus Reid Institute, 2015; Abacus Data, 2018; Pollara, 2018).59 This 
is despite the estimate that 90% or more of Canadians are likely to have adequate drug 
insurance.  This high level of support indicates most Canadians see the lack of universal 
drug coverage as a problem. Perhaps they perceive NPh as a values question on national 
identity, beyond their personal situation. As Dr. Hoskins put it in his opening Message, NPh 
could be a ‘great national project’, “…one that we can feel in our hearts” (Advisory Council, 
2019b, p.3) 
 
There are caveats. One poll (Pollara, 2018)60 reported that NPh ranked lower in priority 
(79%) than seven other health system challenges, such as wait times for surgery (95%) and 
diagnostics including MRIs (93%), and access to mental health services (93%). More than half 
said pharmacare was less deserving of funding than six other national priorities, including 
clean water on First Nations’ reservations (70%), ending hallway medicine (68%) and tax cuts 
for the middle class (67%). The survey also reported that “universality” meant that “a service 
is available to all and that the quality of health care is consistent.” Only 25% interpreted this 
word to mean that the government pays. Almost nine in 10 (87%) of respondents were 
somewhat or very concerned about governments’ ability to administer such a plan 
efficiently and effectively. Almost three-quarters (72%) were somewhat or very concerned a 
 
57 These papers are available at: https://www.pharmacists.ca/advocacy/pharmacare-20/.   
58 See: http://canadianlabour.ca/news/news-archive/canadas-unions-step-pharmacare-campaign-labour-day. Follow link 
to http://www.aplanforeveryone.ca/.  
59 (1) Angus Reid Institute: Ninety-one percent agreed with “the concept of having “pharmacare” in Canada, providing 
universal access to prescription drugs” and 87% supported “adding prescription drugs to the universal health coverage of 
‘medicare’ so all Canadians have access to prescribed medicines without having to pay out of their own pocket (p.12).” 
Available at: http://angusreid.org/prescription-drugs-canada/. (2) Abacus: Ninety-one percent of 2,000 Canadian adults 
surveyed said that ensuring everyone can afford the medicine they need should be a high (55%) or medium (36%) priority 
for the federal government. (3) Pollara: National pharmacare support is high (84% in favour) and intense (52% strongly 
support it). 
60 The Pollara polling sample of 4,173 adult Canadians was very large. A probability sample of this size has a very small 
margin of error (+/- 1.5%). Results were adjusted for age, sex and region. 
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government plan would have fewer choices than their private plan. The poll was funded by 
Neighbourhood Pharmacy Association of Canada. The finding that support for NPh weakens 
considerably when alternatives are proposed is not new. Tuohy (2020, p. 2) notes: “Public 
support for such proposals [universal drug insurance in Canada], however, has historically 
been broad but shallow.” 
 
There are many other issues inside and outside the health domain clamouring for 
attention and universal drug insurance could easily be sidelined. 
 
4.5 Cost Control 
Both provincial and private payers have strategies and tactics to control claim costs driven 
by higher utilization, the higher prices of new drugs, and escalating pharmacy fees. But 
while provincial plans are backed by legislation and regulation, employers have been much 
less inclined to control health and dental plan designs fearing a human resource backlash 
(Stevenson, 2011). Private insurer administration costs are usually calculated as a 
percentage of claims and so increase in lockstep with drug costs. Health claims have for 
decades been escalating at rates exceeding the Consumer Price Index (CPI). That dampens 
any incentive by the insurer to control drug or administration costs. Over the last decade, 
provincial drug plans have had lower average annual cost increases than private drug plans, 
3.0% (provincial) and 3.8% (private) (CIHI, 2018). 
 
Volume growth for generic drugs outpaced brand medicines between 2010 and 2016, 
drawing even in 2017 (IQVIA, 2018).61  Cost reductions for generics are allowing higher 
spending in specialty drugs without driving total plan costs appreciably higher. In 2018, the 
growth rate in per claimant drug spending was 0.9%, versus 2.5% in 2017 and 2.9% in 2016 
(ESC, 2019, p. 5). By comparison, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased 1.4% in 2016, 
1.6% in 2017 and 2.3% in 2018.62  
 
Average per capita drug costs have escalated at multiples of the CPI, from $9 in 1961 
(about $77 in 2018 dollars63) to $909 (forecast) in 2018 (CIHI, 2018).64 Those averages hide a 
broad range of costs.  
 
Use of drugs is relatively concentrated in both the privately and provincially insured 
populations. In one private payer portfolio, the top 5% of claimants accounted for 52% of 
total plan costs and incurred on average $8,982 in annual drug costs (ESC, 2018, p. 17). 




62 Statistics Canada. Consumer Price Index, annual average, not seasonally adjusted. Available at: 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1810000501.  
63 Ibid. Timeframe adjusted to 1961 (15.7) through 2018 (133.4). 
64 With a reference year of 2002=100, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 15.7 in 1961 and 122.8 in 2013, 7.8 times 
greater (Statistics Canada, Summary Table). For comparison, per capita drug costs increased by a factor of 88 ($9 to $795). 
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(49.6%) of the program’s total cost.65 CIHI reported that 2.3% of public drug program 
beneficiaries incurred at least $10,000 in drug costs in 2017. This small cohort accounted 
for almost 37% of spending (CIHI, 2018b, p. 22). In 2017, all provincial drug plans and the 
First Nations and Inuit Health Branch plan paid drug costs of at least $1,500 for almost 23% 
of their beneficiaries (p. 21). This equates to roughly 2.5% of the median after-tax income of 
$59,800 that year.66 Those 23% accounted for 81% of all drug program expenditures. 
 
The Atlantic provinces, Quebec and Ontario’s Trillium plan have made their drug plans 
second payer for any resident with private insurance. In return, insurers have more 
aggressively pushed claims back to provincial plans.67 This maneuvering is not helpful to 
patients. 
 
Implementing change is not a trivial undertaking. In 2018, an estimated $33.7 billion 
(bn) was spent on prescription drugs, the third largest spending item after hospitals ($71.6 
bn) and physicians ($38.2 bn) (CIHI, 2018a).68 Prescription drug spending consumes 13 cents 
of each dollar of health spending, versus about six percent in 1985 (CIHI, 2018b).  This 
spending is split between governments ($14.4 bn) and the private sector ($19.3 bn). The 
private side can be defined as private insurance ($12.3 bn) and out-of-pocket or household 
spending ($7.0 bn) (CIHI, 2018a). Private insurers are forecast to pay more than provincial 
governments for prescription drugs in 2017 and 2018. There were about 673 million 
Canadian prescriptions dispensed in 2017.69 Policy changes also affect the pharmacy 
industry. The OPDP reported that $1.53 bn, 25.1% of total program costs of $6.08 billion, 
was paid to Ontario pharmacies in 2016-17 for wholesale and retail mark-ups and 
compounding fees.70 
 
Health insurance is big business, and it is concentrated. The ten largest health insurers 
had employer-sponsored health product revenues of $38.6 bn in 2018. The top ten 
accounted for 95% of health insurance revenues and the three largest insurers alone had 
$26.5 bn and 65% of total industry health premium revenue (Benefits Canada, 2019). Drug 
benefits accounted for 32% of all health-related workplace benefits (extended health care, 
dental, disability and accident) (CLHIA, 2019, p. 16) 
 
65 Ontario Public Drug Programs, 2017. 2015/16 Report Card for the Ontario Drug Benefit Program. Slide 21. Available at: 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/drugs/pub_drugs.aspx.  
66 Statistics Canada, 2019. Income of Canadians, 2017. Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-
627-m2019013-eng.htm 
67 Sun Life announced changes typical of other insurers in Focus Update #256 (December 9, 2010), available at: 
http://www.sunlife.ca/Canada/sponsor/Group+benefits/Plan+sponsor+communications/Focus+Update/Enhancing+integr
ation+with+provincial+drug+programs?vgnLocale=en_CA. The insurer also announced expanded integration with 
provincial cancer drug programs in Focus Update #282 (May 19, 2011), available at: 
http://www.sunlife.ca/Canada/sponsor/Group+benefits/Plan+sponsor+communications/Focus+Update/Focus+Update+20
11/Expanding+integration+with+provincial+cancer+drug+programs?vgnLocale=en_CA.  
68 In 2018, CIHI forecast an additional $3.6 billion was spent on non-prescription (over-the-counter) drugs. The combined 
total drug spending of $37.3 billion still trails physician spending. 
69 IQVIA, 2018. See: https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/canada-location-site/yir_2017_infographic-
final.pdf?la=en&hash=D13B58D8E8AB98993F3AEFCD60E623B9CC4BFF43.  




4.6 Policy and Planning 
Provincial and private drug plans co-exist largely in ignorance of each other, and as an 
“accident of history that no sensible planner would design…” (Morgan & Daw, 2012, p. 16). 
The status quo and usual debate about public versus private in health care is ideologically 
framed, dichotomous, and usually not considered in a rational or practical way. A 
potentially more fruitful discussion would organize an integrated and proactive system that 
supports a healthy population as well as better economic and financial management 
(Morgan et al., 2016).  
 
Public, universal, first-dollar coverage for drugs remains the dominant idea (Advisory 
Council, 2019b; HESA, 2018; Gagnon, 2010; Morgan, 2012; Gagnon, 2014) but history 
suggests it may be unattainable at least in the short and medium term (Boothe, 2013). That 
noted, even some proponents of a single payer plan acknowledge important outcomes are 
also possible through social insurance (Morgan, 2008; Gagnon 2017). A social insurance may 
be “politically easier to implement” than a single payer plan if it was developed as a 
replacement for private insurance (Gagnon, 2017, p. 205). 
 
Widespread provincial debt and deficits will discourage any major change to drug 
programs unless there is adequate and permanent federal funding. Both provincial and 
private drug plans have become entrenched and institutionalized: both are embedded in our 
health system. Since the Romanow and Kirby reports of 2002, protection from catastrophic 
(“last dollar”) drug costs has been improved although the level of protection varies widely 
across provinces and incomes (Table 4.2).  
 
Indeed, in April 2014 New Brunswick had proposed mandatory employer funding for a 
Drug Plan (NBDP) that would cover the 20% of its population who were uninsured.71 At least 
partly as a result of strident lobbying by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 
the mandatory coverage provision was set aside for further study. Alberta has a similar 
issue with estimates of between 20% and 27% (Alberta, 2006) of its population without drug 
insurance. The provincial government announced “comprehensive drug…benefit coverage 
for all Albertans” in its 2013-14 Budget72 and then quietly withdrew its plan. Fortunately, 
residents of both provinces can immediately get drug plan coverage, at their own cost, 




71 The Government of New Brunswick withdrew this plan for further study. See news release, dated December 9, 2014 at: 
http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/news/news_release.2014.12.1381.html. 
72 Government of Alberta, News release dated March 7, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=3377946A8CD70-C069-7894-1D9786D5EBBD7C8E. Accessed February 28, 2016. 
73 The New Brunswick Drug Plan is a government plan. Alberta’s Non-Group Plan is administered by Alberta Blue Cross on 
behalf of Alberta Health (see: http://www.health.alberta.ca/services/drugs-non-group.html). Both plans are open to all 
residents under age 65. 
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4.6.1 Case Description – The Rise and Retreat of OHIP+ 
 
As some opinion leaders noted in their interviews for this thesis, politics can 
overwhelm good policy. The result can be program lurches in one direction followed 
by a retreat, with considerable frustration for patients caught in the middle.  
 
This happened in Ontario when the Liberal government in its 2017 Budget 
announced OHIP+, a new drug plan to provide provincial formulary coverage to all 
residents under age 25. This moved quickly to implementation on January 1 2018, 
just a few months before the next provincial election. While the policy was sound – 
universal public drug coverage for all residents in this age cohort – execution of the 
new plan was rushed and inequitable. Physicians were sometimes confused and 
some patients were disadvantaged. First, the public plan formulary was less 
generous than most private plans, even though private plans required higher cost-
sharing. Second, younger residents would have OHIP+ at no cost, while seniors still 
had to pay small deductibles for their drugs. Third, it was noted OHIP+ was not 
originally written into the Budget document, suggesting it was added very late in the 
process, and stakeholder consultation was therefore minimal or non-existent 
(personal communication, various). The CFIB termed it “one big surprise.”74 
 
The Liberals at the time were approaching an election they were not expected to 
win. OHIP+ was conveniently budgeted at exactly $10 million less than the NDP’s 
proposal for an essential medicines formulary projected to cost $375 million. (No 
funding detail or assumptions were released.) Since many patients were already 
covered by private insurance significant investigation was required to coordinate 
transfers ideally without loss of coverage. While this worked well for those with 
traditional medications, those with drugs paid by their private insurance that were 
ineligible under the OPDP general formulary had to be individually reviewed for 
inclusion in the province’s Exceptional Access Program. Not all were accepted, 
sending patients back to their private insurance. CLHIA member insurers had to 
offer an additional six months of coverage when the government was not ready on 
its launch date75 or settle whether OHIP+ would grandfather coverage for private 
plan drugs. 
 
Telus Health (2019, p. 16) reported that average monthly drug claims in Ontario 
for those aged 24 and younger were reduced 54% in 2018 versus 2017. Shortly after 
the 2018 election, the new Conservative government then largely reversed the new 
plan and another transition period was required.76 The OPDP would become second 
payer to those eligible for private insurance as of April 1, 2019. Those without 
 
74 The Canadian Federation of Independent Business represents 110,000 small business owners across Canada. See: 
https://www.cfib-fcei.ca/en/advocacy/ontarios-budget-what-does-it-mean-your-small-business.  
75 Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, undated. See p. 1, 2: http://www.ocpinfo.com/library/practice-
related/download/OHIP+Tip-Sheet-Pharmacists.pdf.  
76 See: https://clhia.ca/web/clhia_lp4w_lnd_webstation.nsf/page/9229F048964BB45E852582BB0064A31B.  
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private coverage would remain part of OHIP+ but those with inadequate private 
coverage would not return to OHIP+. They would have to apply to the Trillium 
catastrophic drug program after drug costs exceeded 4% of their family’s income. 
The majority of patients were swept back to private plans and some lost coverage 
completely, 77 just 15 months after becoming provincial program beneficiaries. Telus 
Health (2019, p. 16) expected drug claims after April 1 2019 would return to 2017 
levels, although no confirming data are yet available. 
 
While the principles of free and universal coverage were honoured, the practical 
planning and implementation was seriously flawed for many Ontario residents. A 
rush to install the plan in less than one year for political advantage largely 
prevented appropriate consultation and coordination with patients and their 
families, prescribers, dispensers, employers, benefit advisors and health insurers. 
Importantly, EAP reviews were very slow and some patients were left less well 
covered. This experience is instructive for planning and implementing national 
pharmacare. 
 
4.7 Why has nothing changed? 
Brownson et al. (2006) outline eight challenges that keep evidence from becoming good 
public policy, including differences between academic and political culture, the time needed 
to conduct good research, ambiguous findings (such as the cost of a universal pharmacare 
program, see Section 4.10), and effective communication of complexity (e.g., systems, 
research design attributes, and costing). “There is often little correlation between the 
quality of research and the policy derived from it” (p.164). 
 
There are several possible reasons why a universal pharmacare plan has not been 
adopted in the 55 years since the Hall Commission report. Based on the researcher’s 
summary of the literature, the most salient are: 
 
1. Cost,  
2. Limited policy ideas,  
3. Resistance to change, 
4. Impractical principles,  
5. Indifference of policy elites,  
6. Political interpretations of the Canada Health Act,  
7. Patients feel protected, and 
8. Insurer strategy.  
 
77 Levy D, J Purvis, H Averns, 2019. Changes to OHIP+ mean some kids will go without life-saving medicine. Healthy Debate, 
April 17. Available at: https://healthydebate.ca/opinions/changes-to-ohip-plus.  
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These will be described in the following paragraphs. 
  
4.7.1 Cost 
One apparent barrier to implementation has been cost. Hall (1964) had already recognized 
that “many of these drugs [introduced in the last decade] are relatively expensive…” (p.347). 
The Hall Commission found those costs worried the public because the incidence of high 
drug costs is “unequal and generally unpredictable” (p.355) among the population. Note 
that prescription drugs were 12% of total health expenditures in the 1950s (p.344), and as 
noted above, are only slightly more now (13%; CIHI, 2018a). Citing national programs in New 
Zealand, Australia, Great Britain and Norway, the Commission assumed utilization (and 
therefore costs) would be driven higher by a national insurance program – the principle of 
moral hazard. Despite public concern and even after concluding that prescription drugs 
should be part of a new comprehensive health care program, the Commission 
recommended that inclusion be deferred. Cost escalation and predictability (i.e., 
sustainability) were important factors. This mindset appears to be very durable among 
governments. Boothe (2013, p. 433) has argued the singular government focus on prices and 
cost succeeds because it does not involve jurisdictional dispute and its regulatory solutions 
are relatively inexpensive. As commonly proposed, NPh means governments would not only 
take on a new $19 billion funding obligation (CIHI, 2018a), but provinces would forego $1.1 
billion in lost sales and premium taxes from private insurance.78 
 
4.7.2 Limited policy ideas 
Boothe (2013) recognizes financial and institutional barriers (e.g., provincial jurisdiction, the 
interests of private insurers, etc.), but argues “ideational barriers might be even more 
daunting” (p. 447). When ideas are limited, Boothe argues that that goals, choices and 
actions are also constrained. Lack of consensus on big ideas may have conditioned both 
policy makers and the public to seek nothing more ambitious. This narrow perspective may 
in turn tend to encourage only incremental progress (Kingdon, 2011), if any at all. After 
decades of national coverage for only hospitals and physicians, and no obvious progress on 
a national approach to pharmacare, perhaps Canadians have limited their expectations and 
learned to cope with a fragmented and sometimes inadequate system of drug insurance. 
While too many citizens remain in great need, this has been reduced since most provinces 
provide varying standards of protection from catastrophic drug costs (Table 4.1).  
 
Successive federal governments over 70 years (1949-2019) have been fixated on better 
management of drug prices and costs instead of a bigger strategy: insurance which could 




78 Personal communication, N. Simon, CLHIA, July 25, 2019. 
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Tactical examples of government actions are readily found: 
 
1. Compulsory licensing of brand drugs to generic companies (1969-93). 
 
2. Establishing the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB) in 1987 to review 
and set new drug prices that are “not excessive” relative to seven comparator 
countries. Almost 30 years after PMPRB’s establishment, reforms were proposed in 
2016. Final changes to PMPRB regulations were announced in the Canada Gazette in 
August 2019 and are to be implemented on July 1, 2020. 
 
3. All provinces except Quebec established the Common Drug Review (CDR) in 2002 to 
make coverage recommendations for most new drugs. CDR resides in the Canadian 
Agency for Drugs and Technology in Health (CADTH). 
 
4. The interim Joint Oncology Drug Review (2007-11) was established by all provinces 
except Quebec to make coverage recommendations for new cancer drugs. It was 
renamed the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pCODR) and transferred to 
CADTH in 2014. 
 
5. The pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical (formerly Pricing) Alliance (pCPA) was established 
in 2010 by the Council of the Federation. It now includes all provinces, the First 
Nations health plan and the federal government. The pCPA has significantly cut 
prices for 67 leading generic drugs and negotiated 257 secret Product Listing 
Agreements (PLAs) for new brand-name drugs.79 A PLA reflects the confidential 
product-specific terms negotiated between a (brand) pharmaceutical manufacturer 
and a payer. The outcome is usually achieved through a rebate that may be linked to 
total costs for that drug, to utilization patterns, or (rarely) to health outcomes 
(Morgan et al., 2013a). 
 
While each of the five actions has been important, all are limited in scope. None has 
changed the underlying and unequal model of drug access and reimbursement in Canada. 
No province has ceded any jurisdictional autonomy. No private payer has been included. 
Each initiative was initiated and is governed by just one level of government.80 National 
standards still do not exist, although standards for a national formulary and out-of-pocket 
limit were proposed by the Senate (2002, p. 142). 
 
We are left to wonder who would want to expand the universal pie if it is already 
“unsustainable” even without NPh. The “alternative institutional arrangements” (Boothe, 
2013, p.447) of private and provincial drug plans cover almost everyone and so any 
remaining access problem is at the economic margin.81 However, Boothe (2013) concludes 
 
79 As at June 30, 2019: 49 more drugs are under negotiation, 40 negotiations have been closed and 66 negotiations have 
been declined by the pCPA. Updates available at: http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/pan-canadian-pharmaceutical-alliance/.   
80 The PMPRB’s National Prescription Drug Utilization Information System has an Advisory Board with nine provincial 
representatives. The role of the federal government in joint governance of the pCPA is not yet clear. 
81 There are no precise estimates of the number of uninsured and underinsured Canadians – see Section 4.12. 
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such arrangements: “…may obscure but do not negate real gaps in pharmaceutical 
coverage” (p. 447).  
 
A more comprehensive policy alternative has not emerged because of limited 
policymaker ambitions and risk tolerance, and a population that appears to accept coverage 
on a patchwork basis. Though pharmacare is frequently supported in opinion polls, it is 
sufficiently complex that awareness of “trade-offs and costs are not made explicit” 
(Mendelsohn, cited in Boothe, p. 441).  
 
4.7.3 Resistance to Change 
Tuohy (2012) draws attention to hybridization, a process where some national health 
systems are evolving beyond their original (i.e., single payer or social insurance) structures 
to absorb elements of other systems. She describes major health system changes in the UK 
and the Netherlands and then points to Canada as a control case. Though most countries 
have faced swings between periods of runaway costs and periods of retrenchment, neither 
extreme can persist forever. Ultimately the system must stabilize in some balance of equity, 
cost control and quality. Tuohy argues this in turn creates opportunities for institutional 
entrepreneurs who engage their networks of public and private leaders to reorganize 
system resources using “the politics of redesign” (p. 613). She cites Ostrom (2005) in 
defining entrepreneurship as “a particular form of leadership focused primarily on problem 
solving and putting heterogeneous processes together in complementary and effective 
ways” (p. 615). Tuohy includes state authority and governance as key resources, alongside 
financial and human capital. 
 
She notes the British and Dutch health systems began as classic examples of general 
taxation and social insurance models, respectively. Britain has quickly absorbed major 
changes and moved closer to a single payer model. The Dutch have implemented important 
changes in slow, deliberate phases towards nation-wide regulated competition that has now 
placed formerly separate state and private insurers under common corporate ownership. In 
contrast, Canada has held onto its limited-scope single-payer model with no integrated role 
for private insurers. Tuohy attributes this to a “bilateral monopoly” (p. 625) between 
governments and the medical profession which leaves little room for entrepreneurial 
innovation.  
 
There are few examples of even attempting entrepreneurial innovation in Canadian 
health care. Tuohy (2018, p. 499) recounts the story of Canadian Radiation Oncology 
Services, a short-lived experiment (2001-03) with privately-contracted after-hours radiation 
therapy at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre in Toronto. With mixed results,82 the contract 
was terminated by the Conservatives after considerable (and predictable) political 
 
82 Results explained in Tuohy (2018) are complemented by news coverage 
(https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/private-cancer-treatment-clinic-to-stay/article25444515/) and critique 




controversy about privatizing health care. However, political ideology cuts both ways and 
appears undiminished over time. After gaining power in June 2018, a new Ontario 
Conservative government announced two months later that it would terminate the Basic 
Income Pilot Project. The three-year poverty-reduction study was launched in 2017 by a 
Liberal government and was to be carefully evaluated for effects on health, housing, 
education and employment.83  
 
The “third-rail” (Appendix 1) imagery of Canada’s health care system persists: Ideology 
typically overwhelms pragmatic innovation, even when government-sanctioned. As 
behavioural economics predicts, the threat of loss prevails over the opportunity for greater 
gain. 
 
I am unaware of any peer-reviewed academic paper that has examined the scope, 
complexity or process of transitioning from private insurance to a fully public coverage. 
The Advisory Council (2019b) devoted just half a page (p. 99-100) to the transition and 
simply recommended (#54) that F/P/T governments “engage with” insurers, employers and 
employees with private drug benefits (p. 100). 
 
4.7.4 Impractical principles 
MacPherson and Kenny (2009) explored principles as a possible explanation for why there 
had been so little progress on the proposed National Pharmaceutical Strategy (NPS – First 
Ministers, 2004). They identified unanimous agreement in six independently-sponsored 
policy discussion papers on principles of equity, accessibility, safety and effectiveness. 
However they discovered that each term had significantly different meanings and use, and 
the relationships between them had not been described in the existing literature. 
Importantly, principles had not been linked to practical or political concerns. They 
concluded: “…to date, these principles have done no meaningful work for us, but rather 
appear to function as we have seen elsewhere (Giacomini et al. 2009) – as conventional, 
politically correct decorations” (p.34). While principles are important to guide decisions and 
some have been agreed upon within at least the policy community (see Sec 5.7), this process 
of identifying and debating principles may have distracted us from more practical and 
meaningful progress. Further, the OHIP+ experience (Sec 4.6.1) indicates that principles are 
important but not sufficient to implement practical change. 
  
4.7.5 Indifference of policy elites 
Another possibility that could explain why universal insurance coverage for out-patient 
prescription drugs has not been implemented is that established organizations do not 
support the idea. Deber and Berger (2004) surveyed 2,522 “policy elites” representing 24 
 
83 News release, April 24, 2017. Ontario. See: https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontario-basic-income-pilot, and link to 




organizations including medical, nursing, hospital, other health sector associations and 
three business-oriented groups.84 The general focus was to determine what health care 
services should be publicly-funded, which was variously defined as: 
 
a. Universal – without cost according to the Canada Health Act. 
b. Partial coverage – income-tested with coverage declining as income increases. 
c. Subsidized – universal, but only partially paid by government. 
d. Not included – privately paid. 
 
The researchers found broad agreement for retaining full public coverage for hospital-
based care and some support for cost-sharing physician services. Coverage for out-patient 
prescription drugs was among several services for which only a minority (25%) of the elites 
thought there should be universal public coverage. More supported partial coverage (38%) 
and nearly as many (23%) chose subsidized coverage. Fourteen percent said there should be 
no public coverage. The survey was undertaken just as expensive specialty medicines were 
being introduced.  
 
4.7.6 Political interpretation of the Canada Health Act 
The 1984 Canada Health Act (CHA) advances five principles that underpin all publicly-
funded health services: universality, comprehensiveness, accessibility, portability and public 
administration. Each province structures and funds its suite of publicly-insured health care 
services accordingly, and many have created additional rules that appear to expand the 
reach of the CHA principles.85 Following the 2005 Chaouilli decision in Quebec, there was 
heated debate about two health reform proposals in Alberta (Mazankowski in 2001 and 
Alberta’s 2006 Health Policy Framework86) and one in Quebec (Castonguay in 2008). 
Boychuk (2008) examined all three proposals for consistency with the CHA and concluded 
all provinces could allow increased latitude for private funding of health services. The ‘heat’ 
was driven not by the CHA but by political dynamics and feasibility within Alberta and 
Quebec, and by reasonable extension, all other provinces. Fear of vocal public concern about 
abandoning rigid enforcement of the Act appears to have led politicians to a cautious 
interpretation of the CHA.  
 
 
84 The three business groups were the Conference Board of Canada, The Canadian Federation of Independent Business and 
the Ontario Chamber of Commerce. Participation among these groups’ members was typically poor. The Canadian Life and 
Health Insurance Association was not one of the research partners. 
85 Boychuk (2008) states the CHA does not: (1) Ban the private purchase of any health service; (2) Require physicians to 
operate completely within or outside the provincial system; or (3) Ban private insurance for publicly-insured services. In 
Chaouilli, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled unconstitutional a Quebec law that bans private health insurance for services 
covered by the public health care system. The decision applies only in Quebec, but other provinces have similar 
restrictions. 
86 The Framework is available at: https://open.alberta.ca/publications/077853491x.  
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Political interference and pressure from advocacy groups are common in tax-funded 
health systems like Canada’s. One of the advantages of a separate and dedicated social drug 
insurance fund is better protection from political whim (Mintz & Tarasov, 2008, p. 71-72).87 
 
It’s unclear if this fear continues. If it does, F/P/T politicians may be unlikely to 
champion a pharmacare program that formalizes or institutionalizes private funding. 
However, high plan member satisfaction with private health benefit plans (Sanofi, 2019) 
may mean politicians do not actively resist a role for private drug insurance either. 
 
4.7.7 Patients feel protected 
Since the 1970s, the provinces have ensured that their potentially most vulnerable residents 
have been protected, namely seniors and especially those on social assistance who have the 
lowest drug co-pays. Some provinces have specific programs for those with serious, high-
cost conditions such as cancer, multiple sclerosis, or certain genetic disorders. Rarely do 
other patients in need generate headlines, so the general population may feel public drug 
insurance is adequate. Pharmaceutical manufacturers often provide no- or low-cost 
compassionate access programs when the cost of their drug is high relative to family 
income.88 Media coverage of drug policy and programs has been limited (Daw et al., 2013), 
so pharmacare may not be perceived as an unmet need. 
 
Boothe (2013, p. 438) argues that chronic issues related to existing programs, notably 
surgical wait times and access to physicians, have taken precedence over the desire for new 
programs. Other gaps in health services (e.g., home care, long-term care) have been seen as 
higher priorities by both elites and the general public (Pollara, 2018).  
 
About 90% of the private insurance that covers about 60% (Law, 2018) of the population 
is provided through employer-sponsored contracts (CLHIA, 2019). The employer determines 
plan design and cost-sharing among workers, although union negotiations will influence 
those decisions. Generally, enrolment is a condition of full-time employment. Employees in 
most mid-sized and large companies expect health plans as part of their total 
compensation. While plan termination or a significant reduction in workplace coverage 
would garner attention by plan members, this has rarely happened to date. Cost-sharing 
between employers and employees is mostly affordable89 and insurers offer 24-7 access to 
customer service and health education that public plans do not. Administration generally 
 
87 In this same volume, Jost points out that politically powerful organizations, such as physicians and drug manufacturers, 
might prefer to negotiate with social insurers to avoid direct government oversight (p. 177). However, social insurers are 
usually tasked with selective (conditional) contracting with providers. The pCPA negotiates and recommends drug prices 
with drug manufacturers but not drug policy. There is no selective contracting with physicians in Canada. 
88 Innovative Medicines Canada, the brand drug industry association, reported 673,000 Canadians benefited from $900 
million in spending on these programs. See: http://innovativemedicines.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/20171030_EY-
REPORT_IMC_FINAL.pdf. (p. 3). 
89 Those with private drug plans still report cost-related non-adherence, though at half the rates (3.4% vs. 7.1%) of those 
with provincial coverage (Law, 2018, Table 4). 
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works as advertised. Employees are very satisfied with their drug benefit plans (Sanofi, 
2019).  
 
This helps ensure there is little pressure to change delivery or funding. From the 
perspective of those who enjoy protection from insurance, “If it ain’t broke…”. It must also 
be remembered that the status quo also serves to marginalize those who do not enjoy 
adequate provincial or private coverage. Those in poor health with the lowest incomes are 
not as well satisfied with private plans as those in better health with higher incomes (Sanofi, 
2019). 
 
Driven by theory and real-world issues (primarily in the United States), some politicians, 
bureaucrats and academics have been uncertain or even hostile to changing the role of 
private insurance. A counterbalancing tension exists in that governments do not always 
generate public confidence to provide adequate or timely health services, and have not yet 
used proven cost-control levers available to them (Skinner et al., 2015). Sometimes, they act 
in arbitrary, budget-driven ways, as in Ontario’s decision to control access to Avastin, a 
drug used primarily to treat metastatic colorectal cancer.90 (The provincial Ombudsman 
reported there was no medical evidence for an “arbitrary” government limit of 16 cycles of 
Avastin. Funding was terminated even when the patient was responding to the drug.) 
Ontario’s recent experience with OHIP+ (Section 4.5.1) provides a cautionary tale of the 
politicization of a well-intentioned new policy. 
 
Among voters, the salience of drug insurance reform remains low. They may also be 
uncertain what is on offer. Current polling indicates NPh has wide public acceptance 
however the term has different meanings and the intensity of support appears low (Pollara, 
2018). Patient groups fear being left without adequate coverage in a budget-driven public 
system (BMC, 2018). All this must change before politicians can back what may be seen as 
“a risky, radical approach to policy development” (Boothe, 2013. p. 430). 
 
4.7.8 Insurer strategy 
Historically, the health insurance industry has maintained a low public profile on health 
care services and insurance. Most of its political capital has been invested in Ottawa to 
protect its traditional, federally regulated financial services business from incursions by the 
big banks. Life and health insurers are massive investors and provide secure employment to 
tens of thousands of Canadians. NPh would cost insurers over $12 billion in revenue and 
unknown profit. While the industry has thin relationships with provincial governments, it is 
well-connected to the federal department of finance. If Ottawa is driving the introduction of 







The 2005 Chaouilli decision did not encourage a rush of new private health insurance 
products. It was only in 2009 that the industry publicly released its first policy paper, The 
CLHIA Report on Health Care Policy,91 followed by its drug policy report (CLHIA, 2013). 
Quietly, the industry approached all provincial governments to ensure regulatory changes 
lowering the cost of generic drugs would also apply to those covered under private drug 
plans.92 Various health insurers have introduced some product and adjudication changes to 
control client costs. However, these recent developments are relatively few and most are 
tactical. Other than a response by the CLHIA in the CMAJ (Frank, 2014), the industry has not 
publicly responded to academic research that is generally critical of private drug insurance 
(Hurley & Guindon, 2008; Stevenson 2011; Kratzer et al., 2013; Law et al., 2014).  
 
As political interest in national pharmacare has increased since the HESA investigation 
began, the CLHIA appeared twice before HESA and has released its submission to the 
Advisory Council and related documents, helped fund the Conference Board of Canada’s 
National Pharmacare Initiative, sponsored a paper on the Quebec drug insurance model,93 
and promoted its position to the public.94  
 
Contrary to expectations, Boothe (2013) found that insurers were “surprisingly muted” 
(p. 428) to both Romanow’s and Kirby’s reports in 2002. Currently, the CLHIA directly 
supports pharmaceutical initiatives announced in the 2019 federal Budget and of many of 
the tactics in the Advisory Council’s final report.95 Boothe (2013) points out the 
inconsistency of business stakeholder (and provincial government) reactions to various 
federal health care proposals since the Second World War. She concludes these stakeholders 
cannot fully explain the failure of NPh: “…opposition varied from one policy episode to 
another, while the policy outcomes did not” (p. 426). Rather, she suggests that historically 
limited federal policy ideas and consequently lower public expectations were as likely to 
have prevented NPh as more conventional explanations centred on opposition from 
provinces, physicians or organized business groups such as pharmacy, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers or private insurers.  
 
Indeed, the CLHIA has also called for more cooperation. "The Canadian life and health 
insurance industry stands committed to working with governments to obtain these savings 
[in pharmacare programs]," notes [Frank] Swedlove. At the same time, we must preserve the 
 
91 Available at: 
http://www.clhia.ca/domino/html/clhia/CLHIA_LP4W_LND_Webstation.nsf/resources/Health+Care/$file/CLHIA_Report_o
n_Health_Care_Policy_ENG.pdf.  
92 Personal communication, 2012, with Stephen Frank, then VP Policy Development and Health, CLHIA. 
93 These initiatives or links to them are available at:  
https://clhia.ca/web/clhia_lp4w_lnd_webstation.nsf/page/1B6F3681BFB12B838525831A004D6A14!OpenDocument.  
94 See, for example: https://www.betterhealthbenefits.ca/.  
95 CLHIA, 2019. News release, June 5: 
https://www.clhia.ca/web/CLHIA_LP4W_LND_Webstation.nsf/page/E7010B7FD78BDC4685258417005D0245!OpenDocum
ent. The CLHIA continues to advocate for a robust private insurance role, contrary to the Advisory Council’s 
recommendation for a single payer model that retains only a minor residual role for private insurance.  
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benefits from competition and innovation that the private sector provides to the 
marketplace."96  
 
Insurer clients (employers) may feel differently than the insurance industry. Employer 
views are ambivalent about NPh, and there have been no high quality, current and 
comprehensive surveys about NPh.97 While many companies might like to terminate their 
increasingly complex drug benefit plans, employers are unlikely to see any short- or 
medium-term cost advantage under NPh since today’s insurance premiums are likely to 
transition to higher corporate or payroll taxes. 
 
4.8 Plan Design Considerations 
Building on the principles (Sec 2.2.2), certain plan design attributes are recommended based 
on the referenced literature and briefly described below. Public and private payers and 
citizens and patients could help negotiate roles and responsibilities (Savedoff et al., 2012). 
 
1. Governments and all employers are required98 to provide an adequate minimum 
standard formulary for cost-effective prescription drugs. Citizens are mandated to 
have drug insurance from employment or government. Mandated employer coverage 
will “level the playing field among employers and remove the competitive advantage 
currently enjoyed by those who provide no health care coverage to employees.” 
(Rasell, 1999, p. 185) 
 
2. Consistent out-of-pocket limits allow people to get drugs without financial hardship.  
 
3. If governments cannot afford to provide adequate coverage, there is provision for 
citizens to buy additional coverage from private sources. 
 
4. Governments use general tax revenues and dedicated payroll taxes to fund the 
public share of universal drug insurance (Allin, Stabile & Tuohy, 2010). These funds 
are directed to the unemployed and other vulnerable population segments who 
cannot pay for themselves. Employers and employees share responsibility for 
payroll taxes equally. 
 
 
96 News release, CLHIA, March 26, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.clhia.ca/domino/html/clhia/clhia_lp4w_lnd_webstation.nsf/page/AA2597E98A11A70085257E140047580C. 
Mr. Swedlove was President and CEO of the CLHIA at that time. 
97 In addition to Sanofi (2019), HR consulting firm Aon published a poll of 120 employers in 2015, available at 
https://www.aon.com/canada/insights/RR-PharmacareEmployerPerspective.jsp. The sample is not described. Similarly, 
the CFIB published some findings from its members but details are scant. See: https://www.cfib-
fcei.ca/en/media/national-pharmacare-must-not-impose-new-costs-and-taxes-small-business.  
98 A less rigid approach would be to allow the smallest employers, e.g., those with fewer than 5 or 10 employees, to avoid 
drug insurance for affordability reasons. Their employees would be covered by the provincial plan, similar to the 
employees of Quebec employers that do not provide an extended health benefit. Otherwise, an employer would be 
required to provide coverage to all employees and family members. 
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5. Patients pay a share of drug cost, and ideally cost-sharing is integrated with the 
income tax system to mitigate the deterrent effects on access of up-front 
deductibles and high co-pays. Costs will be reduced or eliminated for low-income 
patients or those with expenses exceeding 3% of net family income. 
 
6. There are clearly defined boundaries between payers. The government covers 
anyone without an employer plan (e.g., outside the labour force) and employers 
cover all employees and their dependents (Kutzin, 2001). 
 
7. Prescribers are aware of drug cost (Blomqvist and Busby, 2015) and respect cost-
effectiveness analyses provided by expert panels. Ideally, physician incentives would 
be introduced to improve prescribing.  
 
8. All plans reimburse drugs using the same negotiated price. Private insurance plans 
also benefit from product listing agreements negotiated by the pCPA. In exchange, 
insurers would contribute appropriately to pCPA costs and resources. 
 
9. Efficiency is improved through lower administrative costs. For example, insurer 
profit and risk charges and premium and sales taxes can be reduced through 
regulation and an effective risk-sharing mechanism. 
 
10. Drug manufacturers are required to prove the value of their products. Prices and 
pharmacy fees that reflect value to patients and payers will improve system 
sustainability. 
 
An important consideration in plan design is whether plan designs create regressive 
effects on lower income patients. Sanmartin et al. (2014) found 37% of those in the lowest 
income quintile (Q1) spent more than 5% of their total household income on prescription 
drugs in 2009, versus just 14% of those in the highest income quintile (Q5) (p. 15, Table 2).  
 
Many private drug plans are regressive because all employees pay the same premiums, 
deductibles or coinsurance regardless of their incomes. Some provincial drug plans fail this 
test as well (e.g., AB, ON, NB, QC) when there is a flat dollar co-pay. A single percentage of 
income applied to all beneficiaries is proportional at best. (Table 4.1).99 Provincial plans that 
increase co-pays with income are not considered regressive. It is important to consider the 
out-of-pocket cost of public drug plans in the context of the overall burden of taxes and 
other fees. For example, the income tax system is highly progressive and blunts the effect of 
drug plans that do not have progressive co-pays or income-based caps on out-of-pocket 
expenses. The timing of co-pays can be an issue when they must be paid at the point of 
dispensing. Collecting them through the income tax system (Blomqvist & Busby, 2015) is 
easier to afford and reduces the effects of cost-related non-adherence to therapy. 
 
 
99 The same coinsurance percentage is similar in effect to a flat tax. Although the dollar value rises with income, a flat 
percentage is likely to consume a larger share of disposable income for those with lower incomes. 
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As the Senate Committee proposed in 2002, it would seem administratively simple to 
require private health plans to limit out-of-pocket costs to a certain annual dollar amount. 
This would improve protection for all beneficiaries, although higher-income plan members 
would be advantaged because any cap would be a smaller share of their income. Currently 
private insurers do not have access to income information. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Average Portion of Household Spending for Prescribed Medicines and 
Pharmaceutical Products, by Before-tax Household Income Quintile, 2015  
 
Source: PBO (2017) p. 23. Analysis of Statistics Canada, Survey of Household Spending 
(CANSIM 203-0021). Note: Reported spending may not necessarily take into account the 
Medical Expense Tax Credit. 
 
Using IQVIA and CIHI data, PBO (2017) included estimates on out of pocket spending as 
a percent of gross (pre-tax) household income (Figure 4.1). Average out of pocket 
prescription drug spending was fairly similar across all quintiles, between about $350 
(lowest quintile) and $460 for the second and third quintile (p. 23), however average 
household health expenses cost lower-income Canadians proportionately more than those 
with higher incomes (Sanmartin et al, 2014, p. 5). Using averages may disguise affordability 
issues if the range of expenses is very wide per quintile. Using median drug expenses by 

























4.9 The Opportunity for Regulation 
Health insurance is funded through a combination of tax-based, social insurance and 
private pay models. In 2001, 38 nations had private health insurance markets, about half in 
high-income countries generally with well-developed regulation (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2006). 
Governments routinely cover certain market segments, such as seniors, low income and 
chronic disease groups in which private insurers cannot function over the long term 
(Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1992; Kutzin, 2001; Savedoff et al., 2012). Private insurers add 
resources to the system by funding health insurance for employed citizens, but controls are 
required to ensure the public interest – defined by Sekrhi and Savedoff as equity, 
affordability and access – is met and is held above the interests of shareholders. 
 
Governments must make decisions about the degree to which they will intervene in the 
private insurance market. Kutzin (2001) describes five regulatory options each with 
progressively more intervention than the one before: 
 
1. Information is provided to various external stakeholders. 
2. Insurer function and reporting is regulated. 
3. Regulation mandates specific actions or terms by insurers or citizens. 
4. Health services are financed with public funds but privately delivered. 
5. Health services are provided by government employees.  
 
While the financial services industry has very significant federal and provincial 
oversight, health insurance is only lightly regulated in Canada (Hurley & Guindon, 2008). 
Regulation may encompass: (i) prohibiting coverage limits or exclusions related to age or 
health status, (ii) provision of (at least) a defined minimum level of coverage, including 
formulary and out-of-pocket expenses, (iii) marketing, (iv) a risk sharing mechanism for 
insurers to stabilize premiums, (v) consumer protection and decision-appeal mechanisms, 
and (vi) ensuring people can switch their insurers without penalty (Kutzin, 2001). 
 
Social insurance system regulation addresses concerns about private insurance, such as 
operational efficiency,100 pricing, quality, formulary breadth, waiting periods, limitations and 
exclusions, and claim payment accuracy. Policy determines if private insurers can sell 
supplemental coverage, and under what conditions. Like public utilities, regulation also 




100 Operational efficiency is likely better in a regulated social insurance system relative to private insurance, however a 
single payer system will have the lowest administration costs. Insurer administration charges decreased in the Netherlands 
after the introduction of its social insurance market in 2006 (Sec 5.4.5). 
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These requirements become feasible when an entire population is required to enrol. 
Concerns about adverse selection101 and knowledge asymmetry by patients or countervailing 
risk selection (“cream-skimming”) by insurers are significantly mitigated.102 Moral hazard, 
defined as the incentive for excessive service use based on the insurance subsidy of 
provider cost, can also be managed by ensuring patient cost-sharing is reasonable and 
progressively geared to income. 
 
The OECD (2010a) found that health inequalities were lower in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland – each with private insurance-based systems – than several 
countries having predominantly public systems including the United Kingdom (UK) and New 
Zealand: “…indicating that regulation and equalisation schemes can help mitigating cream-
skimming and the effects of other market mechanisms which can raise equity concerns” (p. 
14).103 
 
As a matter of policy, regulation may also allow the reduction or elimination of certain 
costs now borne by the industry. Private insurers levy risk charges to employer clients for 
insured health plans, reflecting the risk that the client could cancel the plan while the 
insurer is in a loss position. Given universal coverage, an appropriate risk-sharing model 
(described in Chapter 5) and no anti-selection for a standard plan, risk charges are no 
longer needed. Supplemental private drug coverage that could top-up a basic mandated 
drug plan would have to be managed through regulation as in the Netherlands. Perhaps 
health insurers would no longer pay premium taxes to provincial governments, and sales 
taxes in QC, ON and MB. Under a public mandate, the federal government would have to 
consider the tax deductibility of employer premiums and the tax-free benefits (claim 
reimbursements) received by employees. Bringing private insurers or plan sponsors into 
public policy and operational bodies such as the pCPA and PMPRB would enable all patients 
to pay lower drug prices. Right now, public drug plan beneficiaries pay lower prices than 
other taxpayers. With a single national price, public payers may get a smaller discount, but 
private plans might get a larger one. It should be clear that beneficiaries also benefit from 
the negotiated discount on their cost-sharing. With a public mandate, pharmacy mark-ups 
and fees might also be renegotiated. 
 
Government policy also decides the place of competition between insurance providers. 
Such a principle can be used to improve quality in systems as different as US private 
 
101 Anti-selection is defined as knowledge asymmetry between insureds and insurers. Insureds are more likely to buy 
health insurance when they believe their benefits will exceed their premium cost, typically due to a diagnosed or 
suspected health issue. Insurers balance anti-selection with underwriting rules that require proof of good health, or they 
may limit their exposure to known risk through coverage limitations, or by packaging different benefits together, or by 
charging higher premiums for sub-standard risk. The threat of anti-selection is eliminated when insurance coverage is 
mandatory, giving insurers an optimal spread of risk across 100% of a population. Risk-sharing mechanisms among insurers 
are also typical. 
102 There is some evidence that some insurers in the Netherlands offer inducements to enrol healthy younger people. 
However, since enrolment is mandatory and 84% of residents buy private insurance this has limited negative effects.  
103 The OECD’s report focuses on policy enabling health systems efficiency. Collectively, social determinants of health will 
have much greater effect on population (vs. personal) health than the health system itself. That noted, health system 
design, funding, policy and governance materially impacts equitable access to health services. 
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insurance plans (see: NCQA.org) or the UK’s public National Health Service (Frakt, 2015). 
The key difference between single-payer and multi-payer systems is that the former can 
better control costs, but the latter allows more consumer choice (Hussey & Anderson, 2003; 
Oliver, 2009). The latter approach allows employers to customize their plans to align with 
their human resource strategy. They may improve coverage for drugs that enable better 
health (e.g., nicotine replacement therapy) or that impact disability (income replacement) 
costs not borne by governments. Competition can enable more innovation, customized 
policy designs and better plan member services. Without adequate regulation, poorly 
capitalized and administratively inefficient companies can waste resources and poorly serve 
both customers and policy interests (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2006) at least for a period.  
 
Regulation allows governments and societies at large to place a value on externalities, 
defined as the effect of health care decisions (societal, organizational or personal) on 
others. At the macro level, societies choose to value equity and so ensure that governments 
pay for health services for individuals who could not otherwise afford them. Regulation of 
organizational (meso) mandates, such as for public health, can enable financial coverage for 
mass vaccinations for contagious diseases, or manage workplace health programs (e.g., the 
US Affordable Care Act). At a micro level through an individual mandate, regulation can 
ensure that employees are able to work because they have access to health services that can 
mitigate work absence (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2006). 
 
The amount of consumer protection should increase in proportion to the importance 
and scope of the role played by private insurers in a social insurance system (Sekhri & 
Savedoff, 2006). It is crucial to find the right balance in regulatory policy decisions. For 
example, controls can be so rigid that insurers cannot afford to invest, innovate or provide 
expected service levels, but they can also be so loose that insurers ignore the public 
interest. Arguably, if private insurers are to continue, their fiduciary and public interest 
roles should be clear, compelling and consistent. One way to protect health insurance 
offered by employers to their employees would be to expand the CLHIA’s industry-wide 
high-cost drug pooling arrangement to benefit all private plans, not just those for small 
employers. This could be part of a broader industry risk sharing mechanism, an essential 
part of social insurance systems. Anecdotally from benefit advisors, smaller employers 
already “protected” by the industry pool continue to face higher pooling charges that 
trigger at higher claim thresholds. As a result, some small and mid-sized employers may be 
tempted to reduce or terminate their drug plan financial risk and thereby shift costs to 
provincial drug plans that offer catastrophic coverage.104 
 
There is little discussion of regulation in Canadian drug policy research. One reason 
may be that a single payer system allows more dramatic contrast to the expensive, multi-
payer American private health insurance system, and its stark image of privilege for those 
with insurance and hardship for tens of millions of its citizens who are un- or under-
insured.  One study linked medical problems to 62% of all bankruptcies filed in the United 
 
104 Personal communication, Dave Patriarche, Mainstay Insurance and Canadian Group Insurance Brokers. January 2016. 
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States in 2007 even though 78% were insured at the onset of illness (Himmelstein et al., 
2009, p. 743).  
 
However, regulation is a low-cost approach (Kingdon, 2011, p. 107) to addressing the 
classic concerns of anti-selection and cream-skimming by ensuring that coverage is 
provided regardless of health status or age. Insurer concerns about anti-selection can be 
addressed through risk-pooling mechanisms. For insurers, regulation need not be unduly 
stringent. Quebec requires annual filing of reports with the government but provides 
insurers with significant latitude.105 There’s an obvious parallel between insurers and self-
regulating health professional Colleges established to oversee their members and protect 
the public interest. Regulating health insurers can provide a simpler and still effective 
approach. A fully public drug insurance system is not essential to provide universal 
coverage. 
 
4.10 Model and Outcomes 
OECD nations use different models to provide universal health coverage, and while none is 
broadly superior to others (Glied, 2009; Oliver, 2009; OECD, 2010b), most provide superior 
results to those of Canada (Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, 2014; Davis et al., 
2014; Schneider et al., 2017). Commenting principally on the US health system, Glied (2009) 
states: 
 
“The similarities among OECD countries – and the glaring difference between the OECD 
and the United States – suggest that it is universal coverage and not the mechanics of 
system design that explain the divergence [in health system performance]” (p. 614). 
 
In comparing the health systems of 29 member states, the OECD (2010b) concluded: 
 
“Efficiency estimates vary more within country groups sharing similar institutional 
characteristics than between groups. [See Table 4.3] This suggests that no broad type of 
health care system performs systematically better than another in improving population 
health status in a cost-effective manner” (p. 14). 
 
Using the OECD (2010b) country categories and comparing them with the 2014 and 
2017 Commonwealth Fund rankings, there appears to be minimal linkage between health 
system category and overall performance ranking (Table 4.3). The ranking for several 
countries changed between reports. The OECD determined six institutions groups. Groups 1 
to 3 were: “Reliance on market mechanisms in service provision”, and Groups 4 to 6 were: 




105 Personal communication, Claude Di Stasio, (former) Vice-présidente, Affaires québécoises, CLHIA. October 20, 2015. 
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Table 4.3 – Comparing Health System Performance and Structure 
Country 
Commonwealth Fund 
Performance Ranking  
OECD Institution Group (2010) 




6 – Ample provider choice / strict 
budgets 
Switzerland 2 6 
1 – Private insurance for basic 
coverage 
Sweden 3 6 
4 – No gate-keeping / ample provider 
choice 
Australia 4 2 2 – Public for basic / private beyond 
Germany 5 8 1 – As above 
Netherlands 5 3 1 – As above 
New Zealand (NZ) 7 4 6 – As above 
Norway 7 4 6 – As above 
France 9 10 2 – As above 
Canada 10 9 2 – As above 
United States 11 11 Not Included 
Sources: (1) Davis et al., 2014. (2) Schneider et al., 2017. (3) OECD, 2010b. Note the 
Institution Group descriptions are paraphrased from the OECD report descriptors in Figure 
0.1 (p. 15). Davis and Schneider reports published by the Commonwealth Fund. 
 
Commonwealth Fund comparative health system performance rankings put Canada in 
tenth place in 2014 (Davis et al., 2014) and ninth in 2017 (Schneider et al., 2017) among 
eleven nations reviewed.106 In 2014 Canada placed no better than fifth in eleven measures, 
and had seven measures ranked 9th, 10th or 11th. In 2017, Canada’s best showing was sixth in 
two domains and the other three were ranked 9th and 10th. The domain names were 
somewhat different between reports but the descriptions were very similar. Four of the five 
2017 domains include metrics that impact drug prescribing, dispensing or utilization, and 
reflect the interplay of hospital use, physician and drug access on chronic disease 
management.  
 
Such dismal international performance does not support greater public stewardship of 
prescription drugs within our health system. These findings do support the need for better 
 
106 These reports assess health system performance rather than prescription drugs specifically. These reports rely on data 
from a variety of sources including Commonwealth Fund international surveys of patients, physicians and the general 




health system governance in Canada in order to improve our actual and relative 
performance. 
 
4.11 Cost of Universal Access 
Cost estimates for universal single-payer (government) coverage of prescription drugs vary 
significantly according to design, quality/rigour, time period, roles and political agenda. The 
following 15 cost studies were identified from the literature review and have been updated 
since. The researcher is not aware of other major costing studies since the late 1990s. Some 
assume a continuing role for private payers. 
 
1. In February 1997, the National Forum on Health recommended universal, publicly-
funded, first-dollar drug coverage. It did not provide costs, but said: “Over time, we 
propose to shift private spending on prescribed pharmaceuticals (estimated at $3.6 
billion in 1994) to public funding” (p. 17). 
 
2. In September 1997, the National Pharmacare Cost Impact Study (Palmer d’Angelo 
Consulting, 1997) estimated that a first-dollar, publicly administered drug plan 
would increase government drug costs by $4.31 billion. Plans with typical patient co-
pays would cost governments $2.1 to $2.5 billion more. Using a Quebec public-
private model with 25% coinsurance, the government cost would increase only 
modestly by $82 million. The Quebec plan with no co-pays would cost governments 
$1.55 billion more. In 1996, prescription drug costs were $6.8 billion (CIHI, 2018a).  
 
3. In 2002, the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology 
recommended catastrophic drug coverage when individual drug costs exceeded 
$5,000 annually. The federal government would pay 90% of costs thereafter. The 
province or employer would pay the remaining 10%. Individual out-of-pocket costs 
would be capped at 3% of family income, or $1,500 for private plans, whichever is 
less. The plan incorporated both public and private coverage. The federal cost was 
estimated at $500 million annually. Prescription drug costs in 2002 were $14.8 
billion (CIHI, 2018a). 
 
4. Also in 2002, the Royal Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (2002a) 
valued a catastrophic model providing citizens with full coverage above $1,500 
annually at between $749 million and $1.01 billion.  
 
5. The Competition Bureau (2008) estimated Canada could save $800 million (20%) by 
changing the way it pays for generic drugs, e.g., through tendering supplies and 
better monitoring prices. Most of the savings – about $600 million – would accrue to 
private insurance plans. This analysis was limited to generic drugs but helps 
illustrate the order of magnitude of savings available. Generic drug spending was 




6. The OECD (2010a) estimated Canada could potentially save 2.5% of government 
health costs if we could “become as efficient as the best performing countries” (p. 6. 
Those countries were not identified.). If we assume the 2.5% applied equally to 
prescription drug costs, the potential government saving would have been $360 
million using 2018 public expenditures of $14.4 billion.  
 
7. Gagnon and Hébert (2010) estimated that Canada could save between $2.7 billion 
(11%) and $10.7 billion (43%),107 in prescription drug costs depending on changes to 
industrial policies favouring drug manufacturers, if it moved to universal, first-
dollar coverage. About $1.5 billion would come from eliminating extra 
administrative costs and the tax subsidy for private drug plans. The politics, 
mechanics, timing and overall feasibility of transferring billions in private spending 
to government plans was not explored. 
 
8. Using a proprietary database, Morgan et al. (2015) estimated that Canada could save 
$7.3 billion (26%, range $4.2 to $9.4 bn) if it moved to a universal public drug plan. 
The private sector would save $8.2 bn and government costs would increase about 
$1 bn. Their model used prices from the UK NHS to arrive at an immediate 23% cost 
reduction for brand drugs. They used an undisclosed cost reduction for generic 
drugs “…equal to moderate performing comparators, such as the United Kingdom 
and Sweden” (Morgan et al., Appendix 1, p. 2). Their model assumed co-pays of $2 
bn and that costs would rise by 3% due to additional claims (moral hazard) from the 
(previously) uninsured. Prescription drug expenditures were $28.3 bn in 2012 (CIHI, 
2018a). 
 
9. Skinner et al. (2015) concluded a national single-payer drug plan was not needed and 
would transfer $13.2 billion in costs to taxpayers. While this cost is not realistic 
because it ignores changes in plan design and timing that would accompany NPh, it 
identified some transitional and implementation costs of moving to a fully public 
system. These were estimated at $4.1 billion, mostly from assumptions about 
employment and tax revenue losses. Eliminating private drug insurance 
administration costs would save an estimated $937 million. They suggested 
considering “mandatory universal private [social] drug insurance systems supported 
by means-tested public subsidies” (p. 3). Drug expenditures were $30.8 bn in 2015 
(CIHI, 2018a). 
 
10. Through the CD Howe Institute, Blomqvist and Busby (2015) published a short paper 
suggesting a “politically feasible way forward” (p. 1). They recommended a specific 
role for the federal government to partially fund a cross-Canada cap on catastrophic 
drug costs, as well as managing drug pricing, developing a model formulary with the 
provinces, and addressing high-cost drugs for rare diseases. Use of the income tax 
system for managing individual entitlements would be administratively simple and 
 
107 Note this study used 2008 Rx drug costs of $25.1 bn. CIHI (2018a) now reports $23.4 bn for 2008. The dollars and 
percentages used reflect the original values in Gagnon & Hébert (2010). 
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inexpensive. They estimated costs would increase by $2.8 billion. They also argued 
against the Morgan et al. (2015) study and suggested the immediate cost transfers to 
government were so large as to make them completely infeasible. Private funding 
would continue and prices negotiated by the pCPA would apply to private plan 
beneficiaries. 
 
11. In 2016, the Canadian Pharmacists Association (CPhA) released two commissioned 
studies that challenged the assertion that a fully-public national pharmacare plan 
would save $7.3 billion (Morgan et al., 2015). In the first study, Palmer, Nelson and 
Lamb-Palmer (2016a) adjusted two major assumptions used by Morgan et al. First, 
they updated the 2012-13 prices and the UK exchange rate used previously. That 
added $3.25 billion in costs. The second adjustment applied to Morgan et al.’s 
assumption that governments would save the full cost of their employee drug plans 
once that obligation became publicly funded. Palmer et al. assumed public sector 
unions would bargain most of those drug plan savings into higher compensation. 
That added $2.4 billion. Using these new assumptions, the $1 billion net government 
cost reported by Morgan et al. (2015) in their moderate scenario increased to $6.6 
billion in added government and taxpayer costs.  
 
In the second study (Palmer, Nelson & Lamb-Palmer, 2016b) seven different plans of 
varying designs and funder combinations were modelled. They argued that evolution 
in inter-governmental cooperation could lead us to universal drug coverage while 
still respecting provincial autonomy and retaining a role for private insurers. Large 
and disruptive cost transfers to governments and taxpayers from the elimination of 
private plans would be avoided, and equity and sustainability would be improved. As 
for Morgan et al.’s assumption that governments would use their clout to force huge 
price concessions from global drug companies: “Given that the monopsony buying 
power that could achieve these lower prices has existed for years though [sic] the 
pCPA and PMPRB, it is not apparent how this would change as a result of  
establishing national pharmacare” (Palmer, Nelson & Lamb-Palmer, 2016b, p. 23). 
 
12. As directed by HESA, the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO, 2017) released a cost 
estimate for a single federal payer national pharmacare plan. The PBO was required 
to use the Quebec formulary, by far the most extensive of provincial plans. That 
requirement eliminated $4.0 billion in spending reimbursed by private plans. The 
PBO made other assumptions including an immediate 25% price reduction for all 
covered drugs (PBO Table 3-6), saving another $4.2 billion. The PBO reported total 
spending $2.3 billion less than reported by CIHI that year (2015-16), which reduced 
new federal spending by the same amount. The net effect of these and other 
assumptions by PBO was to increase federal spending by $19.3 billion and reduce 
total spending by $4.2 bn (17%) if their NPh model was introduced in 2015-16. 
 
13. Canadian Doctors for Medicare, in association with the Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, estimated gross savings from a single payer national pharmacare plan 
of $31.8 billion using 2016 figures. This is 101% of $31.4 billion in actual 
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prescription drug expenditures that year. Two requests for clarification went 
unanswered.108 
 
14. Macdonald and Sanger (2018) revised the PBO (2017) model using the Quebec 
formulary and projected costs to 2020. Their main goal was to explore seven 
different revenue generating approaches that would cover the $10.4 billion 
incremental cost to the federal government. Their model indicated new federal costs 
would be more than offset by $16.6 savings to individuals and employers, netting 
$6.1 billion in annual savings. 
 
15. Using the Quebec provincial formulary, the Advisory Council (2019b) estimated a 
comprehensive universal single payer NPh plan would cost governments $15.3 
billion more per year when fully implemented in 2027. The interim step of an 
Essential Medicines List in 2022 would increase cost by $3.5 bn. Even with universal 




108 Canadian Doctors for Medicare, 2017. News release, September 17 available at: 
http://www.canadiandoctorsformedicare.ca/Press-Releases/report-shows-canadians-will-save-billions-with-
pharmacare.html. The report is no longer available on this website. 
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Table 4.4 – Summary of NPh Cost Studies 
Year Study (data year) 
Plan 
Design 
Net Cost Impact 
Dollars (bn) Percent 
1997 National Forum on Health (1996) SP – FD  Not specified 
1997 
National Pharmacare Cost Impact 
Study (1996) 
SP – FD  4.3 + 63% 
  SP – CS  2.1 – 2.5 + 31 – 37  
  QC 25% CS 0.08 + 1 
  QC – FD  1.55 + 23 
2002 Senate Standing Committee Cat 0.5 + 3 
2002 Royal Commission Cat 0.75 – 1.01  + 5 – 7  
2008 
Competition Bureau (2007, generics 
only) 
No Chg - 0.8 - 20 
2010 OECD No Chg - 0.7 - 2.5 
2010 Gagnon & Hébert (2008) SP – FD  - 2.7 – 10.7  - 11 – 43  
2015 Morgan et al. (2012-13) SP – FD  - 7.3 - 26 
2015 Skinner et al. SP – FD  Not specified 
2015 Blomqvist & Busby Custom 2.8 + 10 
2016 CPhA (2015) 






2017 PBO (2017) QC Custom - 4.2 - 15 




2018 Macdonald & Sanger (2020) SP - 6.1 - 17 
2019 Advisory Council SP – FD  
- 0.3 (2022)   
- 4.8 (2027) 
- 0.8 
- 9 
Key: SP-FD = Single payer, first dollar; SP-CS = Single payer, cost-sharing; QC = Quebec; Cat 
= catastrophic; No Chg = No change. 
 
Fifteen reports have been summarized (Table 4.4), and none propose exactly the same 
solution. Most recent studies suggest NPh will save money overall, however the amount of 
inadequate coverage is unclear and the cost of implementing a universal drug insurance 
plan is based on varying assumptions, data, timing and ideologies. Recent studies, almost 
all by credible organizations and authors, report a pharmacare plan could save $31.8 billion 
or cost $2.8 billion by 2027 (Advisory Council, 2019b). This range in costs creates 
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significant uncertainty and is perhaps the most likely reason why this country has not 
progressed to any form of universal coverage (Boothe, 2013).  
 
In determining a role for the life insurance industry, its financial and therefore political 
importance should be considered. The CLHIA (2019) notes its members have $867 billion in 
investments in Canada, of which $136 billion is invested in government bonds. The industry 
has 156,400 full-time employees and agents. Member companies pay $4.3 billion in taxes to 
all levels of government and collect another $3.7 billion in sales and payroll taxes. The 
association estimated that provincial governments would forego $1.1 billion in annual 
premium ($380 mm) and sales ($720 mm) taxes currently collected on private drug plans.109 
 
Plan design also matters. While there is agreement on developing a “national formulary”, 
the meaning and scope of those words will determine the cost. As Blomqvist and Busby 
(2015) point out, there is a more pressing need for national standards for out-of-pocket 
costs as well, since there are very significant differences according to where you live or 
work. 
 
There are several reasons to believe this will be a slow, step-wise transition that may not 
deliver transformational change for several years. Time will be needed for F/P/T 
negotiations about funding, plan design, timing and compensation, and the potential role(s) 
of private insurance. A transition period is needed and transitional costs need to be 
accurately calculated based on the final NPh strategy. Provincial governments may not all 
implement a new NPh program at the same time. Private plans that are collectively 
bargained may need special attention. The 2019 federal Budget set up a four-year period 
just to develop the Canadian Drug Agency (including a national formulary) and a strategy 
for rare diseases. This is not a comprehensive NPh strategy. The Advisory Council 
recommendations beginning in 2022 and through 2027 assume future governments will 
implement NPh exactly as planned. All these considerations and the likelihood of 
unexpected developments mean it will be extremely difficult to calculate changes to overall 
drug spending as a result of NPh whatever form that finally takes.  
   
4.12 A fiscal opening? 
The federal government funding formula changed significantly beginning in fiscal 2017-18. 
Instead of annual increases of 6%, the Canada Health Transfer now grows according to a 
three-year moving average of nominal (after inflation) growth in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), with a minimum annual escalator of 3%.  
 
While this change makes federal spending sustainable, it will seriously aggravate deficits 
of sub-national governments assuming healthcare costs rise faster than inflation (PBO, 
2012). Fiscal sustainability, as defined by the PBO, requires that government debt at all 
levels cannot grow faster than the economy. The most recent projection (PBO, 2018) is that 
 
109 Personal communication, CLHIA. July 26, 2019. 
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the federal government has the fiscal room to increase spending or reduce taxes by 1.4 per 
cent of GDP per year – about $29 billion annually – over the next 75 years. Conversely, sub-
national (provincial, territorial and local) governments will on average need to decrease 
spending or increase revenue by 0.8% of GDP ($18 billion) to keep debt levels at the same 
percentage of GDP. (The fiscal situation of each province varies markedly.) The provinces 
fund the most capital-intensive and high-wage obligations – health care and education. The 
federal government has the financial capacity to fund almost any variation of national 
pharmacare, while the provinces in aggregate do not. This may open a window of 
opportunity if the federal government chooses to make pharmacare a priority over other 
large-cost projects such as oil pipelines and fighter jets.  
 
The provinces may be amenable to a larger role for Ottawa, and Ottawa may be 
interested and able to facilitate change early in the mandate of the next government (2019-
2023). Indeed the Communiqué from the 2004 Premiers Meeting welcomed the federal 
government to take over responsibility for all provincial drug plans, though that call was 
never repeated.110 
 
4.13 Inadequate Insurance and Out-of-Pocket Costs 
A key dimension of quality is the share of personal out-of-pocket costs, even though “how 
much is too much” is contentious. It is unclear how many Canadians have no drug 
insurance or inadequate coverage that exposes them to high out-of-pocket costs. Several 
older estimates exist (Applied Health Management, 2000; Kapur & Basu, 2005; Dewa, Hoch & 
Steele, 2005) but all these precede the advent of catastrophic plans in several provinces. 
There are ten newer studies but none capture the combined breadth of the un- and under-
insured population nor have the methodological rigour to confidently provide accurate and 
current estimates. 
 
1. Based on responses to the 2007 Canadian Community Health Survey, Law et al. 
(2012) reported 9.6% of Canadians (2.8 million) who received a prescription 
experienced cost-related non-adherence (CRNA) to drug therapy. CRNA was lowest in 
Quebec and highest in British Columbia. Using 2016 data, Law et al. (2018) reported 
5.5% of Canadians were unable to afford at least one drug in the past year. The 
prevalence of CRNA reported in employer plans was half the level of public plans 
(3.44 vs. 7.13. Table 1, Part 2). CRNA is a proxy measure for inadequate insurance. 
 
2. Statistics Canada (2010) has estimated the proportion of households spending 
between zero and 5% of their after-tax incomes on prescription drugs.111 In 2008, 3% 
of Canadians spent over 5%, a percentage that is less than in previous years. While 
7.6% of all Canadians spent over 3% of after-tax income on prescription drugs in 
2008, provincial figures ranged from 4.7% in Ontario to 13.3% in PEI. Equity is an 
 
110 Council of the Federation, 2004. News release, July 30. Premiers’ Action Plan for Better Health Care: Resolving Issues in 
the Spirit of True Federalism. Available at: http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/healtheng.pdf.  
111 The figures noted do not include non-prescription drugs or any drugs paid by governments or insurance companies. 
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issue across provincial plans; a “postal code lottery” exists for a medically necessary 
expense.  
 
3. McLeod et al. (2011) used 2006 Statistics Canada data to estimate portions of 
general, social assistance and senior households with median and 95th percentile 
household spending on prescription drugs. The top 5% within those three household 
categories spent 2.6%, 5.4% and 7.4% of their household incomes, respectively. There 
were significant inter-provincial variations.  
 
4. Sanmartin et al. (2014) found 37% of those in the lowest income quintile (Q1) spent 
more than 5% of their total household income on prescription drugs in 2009, versus 
14% of those in the highest income quintile (Q5). Average costs in 2009 were not 
very different by quintile, at $296 for Q1 and $268 for Q5. The highest costs ($388) 
were incurred by those in Q2, who may not qualify for public (or private) drug 
insurance subsidies. The mean household out-of-pocket expenditure for prescription 
drugs was $321 in 2009. 
 
5. Personal, out-of-pocket health costs for Canadians (15.5% of total health spending in 
2011) exceed those of Germany (12.4%), the United States (12.1%), and were twice the 
level paid in France (7.7%) and the Netherlands (6.0%) (Lorenzoni, Belloni & Sassi, 
2014).  
 
6. Skinner et al., (2015) estimated about 100,000 Canadians have no drug insurance, 
relying on coverage data provided by IMS Brogan and the CLHIA. However, both 
Alberta (2006) and New Brunswick (2012)112 have reported that about 20% of their 
citizens have no drug insurance, equalling about 994,000 (2.75% of) Canadians.  
 
7. The Survey of Household Spending provides average household expenditures on 
“prescription drugs and pharmaceutical products.” Figures in recent years have been 
between $400 and $450: 2013 ($451); 2014 ($408); 2015 ($417); 2016 ($455); 2017 
(452).113 Again, using median may be a more appropriate statistic assuming the range 
is very wide among all households. 
 
8. The Angus Reid Institute (2015) published a survey of 1,556 Canadians drawn from 
a proprietary panel that reported 11% of households paid for all of their drugs, ten 
percent paid for most and six percent reported a 50-50 cost-sharing. Descriptive 
statistics of the panel were not published, nor were the amounts paid for drugs, nor 
were there details of any available insurance so it is not possible to generalize these 
findings to all Canadians. The survey implies all those without coverage need 
coverage. Morgan et al. (2016) cite this survey in stating “approximately 10% of 
 
112 News release, 18 December 2012. Provincial government receives recommendations on drug insurance plan. Available 
at: https://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/departments/esic/news/news_release.2012.12.1197.html.  




Canadians [have] no prescription drug coverage at all and a further 11% [have] 
limited drug coverage, requiring them to pay for most of their prescription drug 
costs out-of-pocket (p. 7).”114 
 
9. Public drug plans tend to provide drug benefits based on net (after-tax) family 
income. Using 2017 data, the median after-tax family income of $59,800115 and the 
average prescription drug expenditure of $452 (#7 above), the typical household 
spend 0.76% of net income on prescription drugs. However, that percentage varies 
by province, workplace, family type and other criteria.  
 
10. The Conference Board of Canada (Sutherland & Dinh, 2017) estimated that 1.8% of 
Canadians had no drug insurance, about 667,000 people, as of January 2018. Based 
on catastrophic coverage availability, most of these were thought to be residents of 
Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador. However, Ontario’s Trillium plan 
notionally covers everyone with prescription drug costs exceeding about 4% of 
income. 
 
Another indicator of need is that almost one-quarter (23%) of “sicker” Canadians 
reported not filling a prescription or skipping a dose due to costs in 2011 (Health Council of 
Canada, 2011).116  
 
In addition to a widely studied and quantified general problem about non-adherence to 
drug therapy, these studies suggest affordability problems based on people in specific 
circumstances: (i) those in fair or poor health with certain chronic conditions, (ii) residence 
in BC (Law, 2012), PEI and NL, (iii) lower income working Canadians without access to drug 
plans, and (iv) Canadians spending over 3% of after-tax income on prescription drugs.117 
 
There have been important changes in generic and brand drug spending levels in recent 
years so data older than five years may not be sufficiently accurate to estimate current out-
of-pocket costs.  
These studies measure out-of-pocket and inadequate insurance in different ways and 
provide mean prescription drug spending estimates of as little as $320 per family 
(Sanmartin et al., 2014) to perhaps $2,100 (Statistics Canada, 2010). There could be 2.5 
million spending over 3% of family income on prescription drugs (Statistics Canada, 2010) 
 
114 I note the percentages are reversed between the survey and the subsequent article, but there is only one percent 
difference between those reported with no coverage and those paying the majority out-of-pocket. The greater issue is 
using a single proprietary survey with unreported generalization to infer 21% of Canadians have no or very limited drug 
insurance. Dr. Morgan worked with the ARI and “contributed significantly to the research and analysis of this study (ARI 
survey cover page).” 
115 Statistics Canada Table 11-10-0190-01. Market income, government transfers, total income, income tax and after-tax 
income by economic family type. Available at: 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1110019001#timeframe.  
116 The Health Council defined “sicker” Canadians as those with fair or poor self-reported health and who had at least one 
of seven common chronic conditions. 
117 If the 7.6% figure from 2008 remains accurate in 2019, about 2.8 million Canadians spent over 3% of their net income 
on prescription drugs. 
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or perhaps four million who pay the full cost of their drugs (Angus Reid Institute, 2015). 
Average cost data indicate a fairly narrow issue, but personal experiences at the margins of 
society and the labour force, and in certain jurisdictions, are likely significant and need 
action. A worst-case estimate might be 10% of Canadians who are under- or uninsured. This 
conclusion suggests a targeted approach that includes a national standard of coverage 
would address the problem of Canadians without any or enough drug insurance. It may also 
be a more feasible and effective solution and less expensive for governments to fund and 
implement than a single payer plan.  
 
Regardless, a major need in determining the impact and extent of inadequate drug 
insurance is current, accurate data from a reputable source. 
 
4.14 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviewed private and social drug insurance in Canada. There is a wide range of 
plan designs, eligibility criteria and cost-sharing. Protection from catastrophic cost varies 
widely and is often insufficient. Fragmented governance means there are no national 
standards and the goal of harmonizing and improving coverage across Canada will be very 
difficult.  
 
Research indicates a well-designed social drug insurance plan could achieve adequate 
universal coverage and improve equity, quality, financial feasibility and sustainability. 
 
Costs have also been very difficult to predict, in part because of flawed models and 
implementation marred by politics. For example, the PBO (2017) report used the Quebec 
drug formulary as a model plan, eliminating $4 billion in previously paid private drug plan 
claims by without providing alternative coverage. The messy implementation of OHIP+ 
created concerns about public administrative competency, lost coverage and political 
interference in essential health care. The Advisory Council did not address the need for 
lowering and standardizing out-of-pocket costs and improving protection from catastrophic 
drug costs. Strangely, neither HESA nor the Advisory Council explored social insurance as 
an alternative to a single payer drug plan.  
 
Problems and solutions are complex, technical and involve different levels of 
government, as well as important stakeholders such as insurers, employers, health 
professionals and patients. Health system performance is weak in Canada relative to other 
OECD nations, but this appears to be independent of the model. Better governance could 
help improve performance. 
The combination of extremely high-cost gene- and cell-based therapies and a lack of 
current, complete and well-accepted costing studies for alternatives creates significant 
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Comparative review of drug insurance in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Quebec 
Research Question 1 
 
Could a social insurance model that includes employer-sponsored private insurance be a 
more feasible way to achieve adequate universal prescription drug insurance?118 Feasible 
means probable, with faster and less disruptive implementation. 
 
a. Social insurance: What are the experiences, characteristics and advantages and 
disadvantages of drug insurance in Germany, the Netherlands and Quebec and could 




This chapter compares demographics, the pharmaceutical sector and the social health 
insurance systems of Germany, the Netherlands and Quebec (drugs only). Each provides a 
customized variation of social insurance, showing this approach is flexible, even to the 
point of mixing a social insurance drug plan with a single payer hospital and medical model 
in Quebec. All three jurisdictions have formalized and regulated roles for private insurers 
that include risk-sharing vehicles. Funding is not mainly through general taxation, but 
primarily through employers and citizens with a top-up by the government. Each state 
includes different levels of provider regulation to manage cost, quality and access to health 
services. The two European systems also feature active legislative and regulatory changes to 
protect and optimize the performance of their health systems. Each offers various lessons 
and cautions for Canada. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
“The phrases “National Health Service” (NHS) and “market forces” both carry powerful 
ideological overtones that make calm and practical discussion of appropriate principles 
of organization and management very difficult. Any serious proposal for change in 
Britain’s NHS is sure to be attacked as “an attempt to destroy the National Health 
Service.” Perhaps that is why there has been so little such discussion in public…” 
(Enthoven, 1991, p. 61). 
 
Enthoven was an important influence behind structural reforms to the UK’s NHS in the 
later 1980s, and in the Netherlands through the Dekker Commission’s instrumental 1997 
 
118 Adequate, universal coverage is defined in Sec 1.5.4: Coverage will be adequate when it provides access to a broad 
formulary of medicines at an affordable level of out-of-pocket cost according to medical need. Coverage is universal when 
all Canadians have access to necessary medicines. 
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report. His concerns apply equally to Canada’s historical position on health system 
innovation and evolution. Our current opportunity to achieve universal drug insurance 
looks increasingly like a limited set of tactical responses without any overarching system 
goals and with no improvement in transparency or accountability or governance. 
 
This thesis attempts a “calm and practical discussion” of alternatives to existing 
programs and governance. Enthoven identified nine structural problems within the NHS.119 
 
1. Gridlock: Change is “exceedingly difficult;” health system is “extremely politicized. 
(p. 62)” 
 
2. Inefficiency: “No serious incentive to make change to improve efficiency. (p. 62)” 
 
3. Perverse incentives: Provinces with better drug plans need less federal funding to 
meet a national standard. They all want more money, including Quebec which has 
the best plan. 
 
4. Provider [and funder] domination: “Nobody [has] responsibility to measure and 
prioritize patients’ needs and wants. (p. 63)” 
 
5. Inadequate accountability: Prescribing or dispensing quality is not measured or 
directed. 
 
6. Capital spending / Management information systems: Inadequate funding meant 
“the necessary management information systems did not exist. (p. 63-64)” 
 
7. Poor customer service: Provinces and employers make drug plan design, funding and 
administrative decisions with limited or no structured accountability to patients.  
 
These issues surface in Canada today and will be regularly noted as the German, Dutch 
and Quebec models are assessed in this chapter.  
 
5.1 Country Overview 
Germany, the Netherlands and Quebec will be reviewed to draw important lessons that 
could allow Canada’s drug insurance systems to evolve to provide universal coverage.  
 
Germany provides universal, mandatory drug coverage through self-regulating social 
insurance funds that compete regionally under the overall supervision of the federal 
Ministry of Health. Its Federal Joint Committee provides a unique and relevant model to 
improve drug insurance governance. Its approach to new drug assessments improves 
timeliness and pricing. Private health insurance (PHI) substitutes for Statutory Health 
 
119 Overcentralization is not included in my list. Two problems have been combined in point 6.  
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Insurance (SHI) in three select cohorts amounting to 11% of the population. SHI provides an 
out-of-pocket cost cap of no more than 2% of income (Schoen et al., 2010). The division 
between SHI and PHI is contentious, with inequity from different risk-sharing, financing, 
access and services (Busse & Blümel, 2014, p. 2324). 
 
The Netherlands uses a managed competition model and an active approach to system 
governance and management. Its health system supports privately-owned but heavily 
regulated insurers that compete nationally to provide universal, mandated social health 
insurance. The country has implemented an increasingly rigourous risk sharing model for 
insurers. In addition to basic SHI over 80% buy complementary PHI for additional coverage.  
 
Both Germany and the Netherlands present two important characteristics distinct from 
Canada. First and most obvious, their social health insurance provides far more integrated 
governance and comprehensive coverage – including drugs – than our deep but narrow 
public coverage of hospital and physician services. Second, both European countries have a 
long history of corporatist involvement in their health systems. Interest-based organizations 
(firms, industry and professional associations) outside the government have had important 
influencing and self-governing roles. That noted, Germany and the Netherlands are 
different. Advocacy bodies still play important roles in Germany, for example as members 
of the Federal Joint Committee. Industry and professional groups have also been important 
in the Netherlands although traditional corporatist bodies that “shared political space” 
(Tuohy, 2018, p. 105) are being replaced by expert regulatory committees (p. 349-50). The 
Dutch also benefit from a uniquely collaborative approach to health system modernization 
which allowed changes to ebb and flow but still progress in a stepwise “blueprint” strategy 
(see: Tuohy, 2018, Chapter 8). 
 
Since 1997, Quebec has achieved universal access with mandated and relatively 
generous drug coverage and mild regulation of private insurers. It is the only model of its 
kind in Canada. Provincial per capita costs are second-lowest (after BC) and cost-related 
non-adherence to medications is the lowest in Canada (Law et al., 2012). However overall 
per capita spending is the highest in Canada. Private insurers have their own risk-sharing 
agreement and report annually to the province. Quebec residents are protected from annual 




120 See: http://www.ramq.gouv.qc.ca/en/citizens/prescription-drug-insurance/Pages/rates_effect.aspx.  
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Table 5.1 – Demographic Comparison, Canada, Germany and Netherlands 
 Canada Germany Netherlands 
Population (millions) 35.9 80.5 17.2 
Population Growth Rate (%) 0.72 – 0.17 0.38 
GDP per capita ($US PPP) $48,400 $50,800 $53,900 
Median Age 42.4 47.4 42.7 
Percentage Age 65+ 19.1 22.4 19.1 
Life expectancy at Birth 82 80.9 81.5 
Infant Mortality 
(Deaths per 1,000 Live 
Births) 
4.5 3.4 3.5 
Source: CIA World Factbook. Viewed May 18, 2019. Available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-





Table 5.2 – Pharmaceutical Industry Comparison, Canada, Germany, Netherlands 
 Canada Germany Netherlands 
 Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 
Population 
(millions) 






















$920 €6,227 2 €642 10 
Notes: Average exchange rate in 2018 was €1.00:CAD1.53 (Bank of Canada, available at: 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/annual-average-exchange-rates/.  
Sources: (1) Population and GDP (2017): Rankings are world. CIA World Factbook. Available 
at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/.  (2) Canada: 
Industry Canada, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, 2016 data, available at: 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/lsg-pdsv.nsf/eng/h_hn01703.html. Canadian values may not 
be calculated the same as EFPIA. (3) Germany and The Netherlands: Data and rankings are 
from 32 European nations, effective 2016: European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations: The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, Key Data,2018 
available at: https://www.efpia.eu/media/361960/efpia-pharmafigures2018_v07-hq.pdf.  
 
5.2 Germany  
The key features of the underlying Bismarckian model of social protection has been in place 
since 1883. Germany then implemented industrial accident insurance (1884), old-age and 
long-term disability insurance (1889), survivors insurance (1911), and unemployment 
insurance in 1927 (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 1992). By 1925, about two-thirds of German 
workers, mostly blue-collar, were covered (Cutler & Johnson, 2004). Canada uses different 
models, structures and revenue sources to address pensions, workers’ compensation and 




Germany also has a very important pharmaceutical manufacturing industry (Table 5.2), 
fourth largest in the world and is the fourth-ranked country for clinical trials (IGES Institute, 
2018). Its population is also one of the largest consumers of prescription medicines and its 
drug prices (USD, PPP) rank fifth just behind Canada (OECD Health Statistics, 2018). Among 
European nations, Germany ranks first in pharmaceutical industry employment, second in 
research and development expenditures and third in sales revenues.121  
 
5.2.1 Financing and Spending Overview 
Comparative health system costs between Canada and Germany are shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 – Canada and Germany: Health Cost Comparison (2016 and 2017, $US PPP)  
 Canada Germany OECD Average 
Health costs Percent of GDP (2017) 10.4 11.3 8.9 
Health costs per capita (2017) 4,826 5,728 4,069 
Drug costs per capita (2016) 833 777 577 
Source: OECD Health Statistics, 2018. PPP = Purchasing Power Parity 
 
Germany’s total health spending was €375.6 billion in 2017.122 Figure 5.1 shows the 
distribution of funding sources, excluding statutory pension insurance of €4.7 billion. The 
total public share is 74%, the sum of the first four categories. 
 
Most social health insurance (SHI, aka sickness funds) revenue is raised through a 
payroll tax of 14.6% of income (unchanged since January 2015), split equally between 
employers and employees. Contributions stop once annual income exceeds €54,450 (2019), 
meaning the effective contribution rate declines as income increases above that threshold. 
Individual funds are permitted to set a supplementary income-based surcharge for 
members, which was 0.9% of income on average in 2017.123 Long-term care coverage is also 
mandatory at extra cost and employer subsidized. Residents of the employee’s home are 
included in the employee rate. Patients pay coinsurance of 10% for prescription drug costs, 
with a minimum of €5 and a maximum €10 per script. There is a €10 charge for the first 





121 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, 2018. The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, Key 
Data 2018. Available at: https://www.efpia.eu/media/361960/efpia-pharmafigures2018_v07-hq.pdf.  
122 Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019. Table 23611-0001, Health expenditure: Germany, years, sources of funding Available at: 
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/data;sid=0FCA45F48DE7B43755FB80900AE2CC87.GO_2_1.  
123 Association of Private Health Insurers (Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherung, PKV). See: 
https://www.pkv.de/service/zahlen-und-fakten/rechengroessen-der-pkv-und-der-sozialversicherung/. Google Translate. 
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Figure 5.1 – Health System Funding, Germany 2017 
 
Source: © Statistisches Bundesamt / Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden 2019. Table 
23611-0001. April 2019. 
 
While Canada had lower drug costs than Germany until 1997 (Table 5.4), our drug costs 
have been higher ever since, peaking at 21% higher in 2006 and running at 7% higher over 
the last three years where data is available for both countries (2014-16). Overall private 
health insurance spending is somewhat larger in Canada at 12.4% (CIHI, 2018) versus 7% for 
Germany (OECD, 2015). Public funding is also similar, at 73% for Germany (Busse & Blümel, 
2015) and 69% for Canada (CIHI, 2018a). 
 
Table 5.4 – Ratio of Canada (CA) to Germany (DE), Drug and Medical Non-durables 
and Health Costs. 5-Year Bands, Cost per capita, $US PPP. 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
CA / DE Drugs 0.62 0.78 0.97 1.05 1.18 1.18 1.07 
CA / DE Health 0.88 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.99 0.96 0.87 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD 2018 Health Statistics.  
 
5.2.2 Insurance Market 
Since 2009, hospital, medical and dental insurance has been mandatory except for public 
sector workers and retirees, the self-employed and those with incomes exceeding €60,750 
(2019).124 These three exception groups have private health insurance (PHI). Citizens may be 
 
124 For reference, the average annual wage in Germany is almost identical to Canada at about $47,600 (2017, USD, PPP). 


















covered by both SHI and PHI plans and residents use the same hospitals and physicians. 
Ninety percent of the population is enrolled in a social insurance plan.125 Also in 2009 the 
government made SHI funds responsible for negotiating prices, quantities and provider 
quality assurance (Busse & Blümel, 2014). The 110 (2017126) non-profit public health plans 
(Krankenkassen) compete regionally but all charge the same premiums through payroll 
deduction. All plans are regulated (Schneider, undated)127 and must meet minimum coverage 
standards, although some variation is allowed beyond that.128 Reforms introduced in 2015 
were to improve service and care quality. 
 
PHI offers somewhat broader services and pays providers higher rates (OECD, 2017a, p. 
7). PHI can provide complementary or substitutive coverage. In 2017, PHI was offered 
through 41 insurers, and covered 11% (8.75 million) Germans.129 Private plans cover 
physicians, private hospital rooms, vision care, homeopathy and other alternative 
treatments, and provide more dental coverage. They are risk-rated (underwritten) only at 
the onset of coverage but must accept all applicants regardless of health status. Insurers 
must set aside reserves to offset the costs that come from aging. 
 
Busse and Blümel (2014) note “substantial problems” (p. 265) from the co-existence of 
SHI and PHI. Inequity occurs because only citizens in the three exception groups may opt 
for private insurance, and they tend to be younger, healthier and wealthier than those with 
SHI. Over time, this would tend to accelerate cost increases in the SHI risk pool. However, 
this negative effect is somewhat offset by the fact those with higher incomes also pay more 
income tax, and general tax revenues provide a share of health system funding (Figure 5.1). 
 
5.2.2.1 Risk Sharing 
Germany uses a model including age, sex and the prevalence of 80 chronic and costly 
diseases to prospectively set sickness fund compensation. There are two goals for the 
morbidity-based risk-adjustment scheme. The first is to discourage cream-skimming. The 




125 National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV Spitzenverband). Available at: https://www.gkv-
spitzenverband.de/english/statutory_health_insurance/statutory_health_insurance.jsp.  




127 Regulation is comprehensive and covers: (i) prices, (ii) underwriting, tariff switch and termination, (iii) premium and 
reserve calculations, (iv) premium adjustment, and (v) use of profits.  
128 Note German public health plans include disability benefits of 70% of wages (before deductions) for up to 78 weeks 
after the typical employer covers 100% of pay for the first six weeks of disability. 
129 Association of Private Health Insurers (Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherung, PKV). See: 
https://www.pkv.de/verband/ueber-uns/. Google Translate. 
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Risk adjustment was first introduced in 1994 and 1995 based on age, sex, disability, 
income levels and number of dependents, and was specific to each sickness fund. 
Refinements implemented in 2001 focused on morbidities, the incentives for disease 
management programs, and prohibiting cream-skimming (risk selection by insurers). Then 
in 2009, risk adjustment was pooled for all sickness funds across the country (Busse & 
Blümel, 2014).  
 
5.2.3 Drug Price Regulation  
Several legislative levers used to control drug prices are in Table 5.5 (Busse & Blümel, 2014).  
 
Table 5.5 – Recent Health Legislation in Germany affecting Prescription Drugs 
Year Act / Action 
1989 Reference pricing introduced (Henschke, Sundmacher & Busse, 2013).130 
1993 Health Care Structure Act 
1998 Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Statutory Health Insurance [SHI] 
2001 Pharmaceutical Budget Redemption Act 
2002 Pharmaceutical Expenditure Limitation Act 
2004 SHI Modernization Act 
2006 Act to Improve Efficiency in Pharmaceutical Care 
2007 Act to Strengthen Competition in SHI 
2010 SHI Reform Act 
2011 Act on the Reform of the Market for Medicinal Products (AMNOG) 
2017 
Statutory Health Insurance Medicinal Product Supply Improvement Act 
(AMVSG) 
 
The comparison is dramatic with Canada. Our federal government is armed only with 
the Canada Health Act (1984) and one section of the Patent Act (Sec. 79-103) under which 
the PMPRB operates. Established in 1987, the PMPRB was proposing its first new strategy 
only in 2015 (PMRPB, 2015a). Each province has separate health legislation, some specific to 
drug plans such as Ontario’s Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act. It was the 




130 According to Henschke et al., patented medicines were originally included in reference pricing along with their 
approved generic or therapeutic substitutes. In 1996, patent drugs were excluded to encourage innovation, but then 
included again in 2004 because so many “me-too” drugs (those without clear additional benefits) had been introduced. 
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Generic penetration in Germany has increased rapidly to second highest in the world by 
value – 76% in 2016, versus 74%. Canada was ranked third (PMPRB, 2018b. Fig. 1.4). 
However, generic drug prices in Germany were much lower, just 74% of those in Canada, on 
average (PMPRB, 2018b. Fig 2.6). Since 2004, OTC drugs in Germany have been excluded 
from coverage. 
 
Germany has regulated drug prices and costs in five ways (Busse & Blümel, 2014). 
 
1. Standard Rebates must be paid to social insurers. Since April 2014, drug manufacturers 
have paid rebates of 7% for patented drugs not subject to reference pricing and 6% for 
off-patent drugs (Busse & Blümel, 2014). Pharmacies also pay a rebate to the insurers of 
€1.77 per prescription, which amounted to a discount of about 4% overall (Busse & 
Blümel, 2014). In addition, each insurer can negotiate its own rebates in exchange for 
exclusive listing on its formulary. Busse and Blümel (2014) reported the legal and 
mandatory manufacturers’ rebates, and those negotiated by individual insurers, were 
each worth about 8% off the list price in 2012. These rebates are often not reflected in 
German list prices for drugs and so overstate the price paid for the drug as well as total 
expenditures when quoted in international comparisons. 
 
2. Price Freezes apply to all drugs at 2009 price levels until 2022. Starting in 2018, annual 
increases for inflation have been allowed.131  
 
3. Reference Prices have been set by the FJC since at least 1989 and are defined as the 
upper limit of a drug’s price that will be paid by the insurer to the pharmacy. Since 
2004, all generic drugs and patented medicines that provide no additional therapeutic 
benefit over existing products are included in reference price groups. Patients pay any 
extra cost and flat co-pays when their drug price is less than 30% below the reference 
price. Few drugs are sold above the reference price due to competition and because 
physicians are legally bound to inform patients of their out-of-pocket cost. Novel 
patented drugs with additional therapeutic value are not subject to reference pricing 
(Gress et al., 2007).  
 
Additional therapeutic value over existing products is decided by the FJC and defined as 
“improved health status or quality of life; reduced duration of illness or side effects; 
extended length of life” (Henschke, Sundmacher & Busse, 2013. p. 266). The degree of 
additional benefit is considered in the price negotiation between the manufacturer and 
the Federal Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds. The Association of Private 
Health Insurers attends these negotiations as an observer. By the end of 2017, 337 
products with additional benefit had been through the FJC evaluation and rebates had 
 
131 Ministry of Health, Germany. See: https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/preismoratorium.html.  Translated 
using Google Translate.  
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been set for 161 of them, mostly through negotiation. 132 Between 2012 and 2016, €2.85 
billion was saved through price rebates.133 
 
4. Reimbursement Limits were first negotiated between 2007 and 2010 for new drugs not 
subject to reference pricing. To avoid the price ceiling, the manufacturer had to: (i) 
establish product development costs, (ii) that the drug was cost-effective, and (iii) that it 
had no alternative treatment. Additionally, SHIs considered “the suitability and 
reasonableness of having the insured community take on the costs of reimbursement” 
(Busse & Blümel, 2014, p. 211). After 2011, drug manufacturers set the price for drugs 
containing new active substances for the first year while it is being reviewed for 
additional benefit.  
 
5. Provider Tactics include (i) limits on physician “no substitution” orders, (ii) periodic 
spending caps and incentives for physicians to prescribe within a defined budget limit 
(5%, 10% or 12.5% of target), and (iii) an obligation (between 2002 and 2008) by 
pharmacists to sell less expensive drugs from other countries if the price difference was 
at least €15 or 15%.  
 
Regarding physician interventions, Barnieh et al. (2014) in their review of 34 OECD 
members reported that Germany and five other countries have introduced compulsory 
prescribing guidelines for physicians.134 Ten other nations have non-compulsory 
guidelines, including the Netherlands. Physician prescribing patterns and volume are 
monitored in 19 countries, often with peer benchmarking. Four countries have 
introduced incentive rewards for physicians, and three have penalties directed at 
physicians who over-prescribe. Canada had no regulation of prescribing. In Canada, the 
Advisory Council (2019b) proposed a national strategy on appropriate prescribing 
focusing on “prescribing guidelines, assessment, feedback and tools” (p. 80).  
 
Busse and Blümel (2014) report a variety of approaches to impose drug spending caps 
on physicians, starting in 1993. Controls started at the regional level (1993-1997), were 
abolished in 1998, reintroduced in 1999 with individual targets, abolished again in 2001 
but replaced with non-compulsory targets. Since 2000, each physician has been given a 
cost-focused report showing his or her prescribing behaviour relative to others in their 
region. Physicians are regularly audited and those shown to prescribe off-label (for 
unapproved uses) and outside the social insurance formulary are penalized. Each wave 




132 As of March 13, 2020, this link is broken. National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV Spitzenverband 
/ GKV-SV). Available at: https://www.gkv-
spitzenverband.de/english/statutory_health_insurance/amnog_evaluation_of_new_pharmaceutical/amnog_english.jsp.  
133 GKV-SV. Focus: AMNOG negotiations. Google Translate used. Available at: https://www.gkv-
spitzenverband.de/gkv_spitzenverband/presse/fokus/amnog_verhandlungen/s_thema_amnog_verhandlungen.jsp. 
134 According to Gress et al. (2007), German insurers could not at that time exclude any prescriber that serves one of their 
plan members, so insurers had no influence on prescribing quality and costs. 
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Physicians are assigned an individual medicines budget based on prescribing data for 
similar patients. When their budget is exceeded by 15% physicians are investigated and 
told to prescribe less. Physicians may be liable for overspending if their budget is 
exceeded by 25% or if they prescribe drugs outside FJC guidelines. Physicians may also 
incur fee penalties or be required to undertake training on selecting more economical 
drugs if they over-prescribe certain therapeutic classes (IGES Institute, 2018). 
 
Since 2004, the FJC can exclude drugs if clinical effectiveness has not been 
demonstrated. Otherwise, once approved by the FJC, all drugs must be reimbursed by all 
insurers (Gress et al., 2007).  
 
Germany has a unique practice of providing reference drug reviews and prices. This 
transparency policy has broad effects because so many countries, including Canada, use 
Germany as a reference country for their own pricing reviews.135 
 
5.2.4 Opportunities for Canada 
Two key features of the German system have potentially high value to Canada: 
 
1. Governance authority, structure and principles 
2. New drug assessment, including reference pricing 
 
5.2.4.1 Governance authority, structure and principles 
Similar to Canada, Germany is a federation of 16 jurisdictions, including three city-states. 
Unlike Canada, its health system is controlled by the national government through the 
federal Ministry of Health.136 The health system includes an explicit goal of social solidarity 
and has been defined by its self-governing health institutions (Busse, Blumel, Knieps & 
Barnighausen, 2017). It has similar challenges to other OECD countries, i.e., how to ensure 
access and control costs. 
 
The Ministry of Health supervises the Federal Joint Committee (FJC; formally the G-BA – 
Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss) which was established in 2004, as well as national 
associations for social insurance funds (GKV-SV), physicians (KBV) and the hospital 
association (DKG). The Ministry audits resolutions and directives passed by the FJC. To 
increase transparency and accountability, many must be published in the Federal Gazette 
before they take effect.  
 
 
135 The price list is in German at: https://www.dimdi.de/static/de/amg/festbetraege-zuzahlung/festbetraege/index.htm.  





Other members of the FJC are the IQWiG, the Institute for Quality Assurance and 
Transparency in Health Care (IQTIG), and the national association of statutory health 
insurance dentists (KZBV). The FJC and institutional associations are all private, not-for-
profit and self-governing, an important principle within the German health system.  
 
On behalf of 73 million insured persons, the FJC determines SHI benefits, is responsible 
for inpatient and outpatient quality, and makes final decisions in the self-governance of 
physicians, dentists, hospitals and health insurance funds in Germany.137 This non-arm’s 
length relationship at the highest operating level of the health system must balance the 
public interest with the proprietary interests of its members.  
 
There are 13 voting (Plenum) members including the Chair and two other salaried 
impartial members who are proposed by member organizations and approved by 
Parliament. In addition, there are two members each from the hospital and physician 
associations, one dentist and five others representing the statutory insurers. Care providers 
vote only on topics within their area of expertise.  
 
Five non-voting patient representatives participate in all Plenum discussions and submit 
petitions, and more than 100 other patient representatives are involved in various 
subcommittees and working groups. The Plenum typically meets twice a month in Berlin 
and sessions are open to the public.138 Three committees focus on rules and procedures, 
finance and innovation. There are nine sub-committees.139 
 
Six other groups participate in the Plenum and are involved in at least one of the sub-
committees: 
 
1. Two members represent the 16 states in the needs planning sub-committee; 
2. One member from each of the professional associations of physicians and nurses 
and the private health insurer federation sit on the quality assurance sub-committee; 
and 
3. Dental and psychotherapy professional association members are engaged on quality 
assurance matters that concern these two professions.  
 
The pharmaceuticals sub-committee includes three hospital and physician 
representatives, plus six from the statutory health insurance funds. Since 2011, the Institute 
for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG) has assessed the benefits of new 
medicines on behalf of the FJC.  
 
 
137 Source: http://www.english.g-ba.de/.  
138 Source: http://www.english.g-ba.de/downloads/17-98-2804/2018-12-04_G-
BA_Flyer_Der_Gemeinsame_Bundesausschuss_EN_bf.pdf.  
139 The nine sub-committees are: pharmaceuticals, quality assurance, disease management programs, highly specialized 
outpatient care, method evaluation, ordered services, needs planning, psychotherapy and dental treatment. 
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5.2.4.1.1 Application to Canada 
Relative to Canada, the FJC includes a higher level of professional and public participation 
and transparency in health system planning. Its self-governing institutional structure is 
completely novel relative to Canada’s public structure and oversight. Its explicit principle of 
solidarity is only implied in the Canada Health Act’s equal treatment for Canadians 
accessing hospital and physician coverage. However, when Canadian patients need 
additional health and social services, solidarity is violated because such services are 
fragmented according to where you live or work, your age, whether you are covered by a 
Workers’ Compensation Board, or perhaps by what health condition afflicts you. Medicare 
here runs deep but is very narrow in its scope of covered services relative to Germany. 
 
The current interest in national pharmacare is an opportunity to experiment and engage 
citizens in system improvements. The FJC model suggests establishing a multi-stakeholder 
Plenum to inform and coordinate key stakeholders in ongoing drug policy and programs. A 
Canadian “Medicines Advisory Council” (MAC) could include physicians, pharmacists and 
patient representatives, as well as business and labour leaders, health insurers and 
provincial drug program leaders. The pharmaceutical industry – brand and generic – could 
have observer roles. If additional participation, transparency and better policy and 
programs work with drug policy, the idea could be expanded to inform other health areas 
such as long-term care or community care. 
 
The breadth of stakeholder engagement in a new MAC could counter-balance political 
interference in drug insurance operational decisions. (This was a concern of three research 
participants – see Chapter 6) Open meetings would help engage and educate Canadians, 
especially if they were broadcast online or if Minutes were published. That public-facing 
posture would help ensure Plenum members actively consider the public interest, which 
could be included in their Terms of Reference. The Plenum could advise the jurisdictions on 
such matters as strategic planning including development of national standards, formulary 
management, system integration, finance and budgets and program delivery and evaluation. 
 
Oversight of the MAC could be provided by the Council of the Federation’s Health Care 
Innovation Working Group which is currently comprised of provincial and territorial 
Ministers of Health. An alternative mechanism would be through the new Canadian Drug 
Agency or a new dedicated committee of F/P/T Ministers of Health. 
 
Politicians willing to consider any major change in drug insurance need to ensure 
adequate public support (Kingdon, 2011, p. 146-49). The MAC should be mandated to 
improve public awareness and confidence in drug system management. One study of print 
media indicated public engagement in health services is limited, flaring only when specific 
initiatives (“focusing events”) are underway such as Royal Commissions (Daw, Morgan, 
Thomson & Law, 2013). Even then, interest can fade rapidly.  
 
Going to the source of prescribing is a bold and important initiative that has not been 
tried in Canada. It would no doubt be very contentious. Physicians drive costs for drugs, 
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diagnostics, hospital procedures, access to other professionals and to other services. There 
is a plethora of prescribing guidelines developed by expert panels but training on new 
drugs (“detailing”) is mostly provided by drug manufacturer sales representatives. The 
Advisory Council (2019b) noted some jurisdictions use trained health professionals to 
provide prescribing evidence to physicians (p. 79). No comparative information is provided 
to Canadian physicians on their prescribing relative to similar peers, and drug prices are not 
readily available. Patients don’t know out-of-pocket costs, an important factor in mitigating 
cost-related non-adherence. While prescribing and dispensing controls may be intrusive to 
self-regulating professional associations, national pharmacare presents a rare opportunity 
to monitor and improve prescribing, dispensing and adherence behaviours. 
 
5.2.4.2 New drug assessment 
Germany has a more structured process for evaluating and approving new drugs than 
Canada. While regular changes have been made to its laws and regulations (Table 5.5), some 
of the most important occurred when the Arzneimittelmarkt-Neuordnungsgesetz (translated 
as the Act on the Reform of the Market for Medicinal Products140 and abbreviated as 
AMNOG) was enacted on January 1, 2011. According to the GKV-SV, AMNOG’s stated goal is 
“to limit the cost of pharmaceuticals.”141 Important differences are summarized in the 
following 13 steps and then compared to Canada in Table 5.6. Several points in this list are 
from Wenzl and Paris (2018). Others are from the GKV-SV. 
 
1. New drug prices are set by the manufacturer for the first year, and are then adjusted 
by the FJC according to its determination of additional value. 
 
2. Germany automatically excludes certain drug types (e.g., over the counter, lifestyle, 
herbal remedies, treatments for minor illnesses) in a “negative” formulary. 
 
3. On behalf of the FJC, IQWiG14 (usually) assesses the additional value of new drugs to 
patients relative to existing comparators (“early evaluation”). The comparators are 
determined by the FJC. Drugs with sales less than €1 million (~$1.5 mm) are not 
evaluated. This work must be completed within three months following market 
launch. IQWiG has six added-benefit categories (major, considerable, minor, non-
quantifiable, added benefit not proven and less benefit) and also assesses the 
probability of the additional benefit (proof, indication or hint). 
 
4. The FJC then has three months to decide on the added benefit (until month 6). It can 
also commission reviews of existing therapies already on the market in order to 
establish the added value of a new drug. 
 
140 Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen (IQWiG), 2018. In a nutshell, Facts and Figures from 
IQWiG 2018. Available at: https://www.iqwig.de/en/press/media-centre/flyers-annual-reports-and-brochures.7357.html.  
141 GKV-SV, AMNOG – evaluation of new pharmaceutical [sic]. Available at: https://www.gkv-
spitzenverband.de/english/statutory_health_insurance/amnog_evaluation_of_new_pharmaceutical/amnog_english.jsp. 




5. If there is no added value, the new drug price is set according to a reference group, 
if one exists, containing at least three therapeutically similar medicines already on 
the market. The price of a new drug with no added benefit is capped at the price of 
the lowest cost alternative. If there is no reference group, the new drug’s price will 
be the same as the alternative drug. The difference between the manufacturer’s price 
and the market price is a negotiated rebate (“refund rate”) or a supplement relative 
to existing comparators. 
• Reference pricing applies to 34% of drugs, 80% of prescriptions and 33% of 
drug spending, and 
• Most drugs (84%) in a reference group are priced at or below the limit (about 
the 30th percentile) set by the social insurer association (GKV-SV) and so 
avoid any patient cost-sharing (Robinson, Panteli & Ex, 2019). 
• Reference drug prices are public and updated bi-weekly by the Deutsche 
Institut für Medizinische Dokumentation und Information (DIMDI). 
 
6. If there is added value, then a price supplement over less effective comparator(s) is 
negotiated between the GKV-SV and the manufacturer. This process can take no 
longer than six months (month 12).  
 
7. If there is no agreement between the parties, then the price is set through arbitration 
no more than three months later (month 15). If the manufacturer does not like the 
arbitration price they may withdraw their drug. As of December 31, 2017: 
• Historically the price of between 15% and 20% of new drugs is determined by 
arbitration.142 Another 13% settled the price after arbitration had been 
initiated. 
• About 20% of new drugs since 2011 (N=29) were withdrawn from the German 
market because the manufacturer did not get an acceptable price. Of this 
group 40% decided immediately following the FJC assessment; 55% were 
withdrawn once the price had been decided, and one drug was not sold in 
Germany because its manufacturer went bankrupt. 
• On average, arbitration favours payers. It reduced new drug prices to 20% 
below the mid-point between the initial manufacturer and social insurer 
prices (Wenzl and Paris, 2018). 
 
8. The drug price may vary according to the condition it treats, i.e., higher for one 




142 GKV-SV, 2018. Self-government for the future, Annual Report 2017. p. 65. Available at: https://www.gkv-
spitzenverband.de/english/statutory_health_insurance/statutory_health_insurance.jsp.  
143 See: Kaltenboeck A, PB Bach, 2018. Value-based pricing for drugs, Theme and Variations. Journal of the American 
Medical Association June 5. 319(21): 2165-66. 
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9. Drug prices, including rebates or supplements, apply to the entire market – social 
and private insurance, and out-of-pocket.  
 
10. Drugs dispensed in hospitals are separately negotiated by the hospital, a hospital 
chain or a group purchasing organization. Hospitals cannot pay more for an 
outpatient drug than the FJC allows. 
 
11. Orphan drugs (drugs for rare diseases) are automatically listed once the product has 
been approved by the FJC. If annual sales exceed €50 million (~$75 mm) then IQWiG 
will formally evaluate the orphan drug in the same way as non-orphan drugs.  
 
12. Manufacturers must provide a 7% discount off the ex-factory price of non-reference 
drugs to social insurers. Generic drugs not in reference clusters have a 6% discount 
plus up to 10% more. Most generic drugs are tendered by individual insurers (IGES 
Institute, 2018). Total drug discounts are about 16% of the pharmacy retail price.  
 
13. Insurers may negotiate the price of a drug lower than the price negotiated by the 
GKV-SV but this applies almost always to generic drugs.  
 
5.2.4.2.1 Application to Canada 
Since 1987, Canada’s PMPRB has attempted to control patented drug prices primarily by 
comparing them to prices in a basket of seven other countries, including Germany. A 
complicated set of reforms to the PMPRB mandate and operations was proposed in 2016 
aimed at lowering drug prices. Changes announced in August 2019 will take effect on July 
1, 2020.144 The new PMPRB11 includes Germany and the Netherlands.145 
 
Drug manufacturers argue that these changes will likely slow the introduction of new 
drugs146 or deter manufacturers from selling them in Canada.147 PMPRB reforms do not 
consider patient perspectives and its new cost-effectiveness review may duplicate health 
technology assessment (HTA) already done by the Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technology in Health. CADTH procedures include patient input. The new Canadian Drug 
 




145 The PMPRB7 are the seven comparator countries currently used by the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board: US, UK, 
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, France and Sweden. The PMPRB11 drops the US and Switzerland and adds Australia, Belgium, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain.  
146 EY, 2019. An assessment of Canada’s current and potential future attractiveness as a launch destination for innovative 
medicines. Innovative Medicines Canada. Available at: http://innovativemedicines.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/2019_01_29_-IMC_PhRMA_LaunchSequencing_vFINAL3.pdf.  




Agency proposed in the 2019 federal Budget and by the Advisory Council (2019b) may 
create a single HTA process. 
 
External price referencing was innovative in 1987 but is far less useful now because 
many countries negotiate the prices of new drugs and those outcomes are confidential. That 
makes it very difficult to accurately estimate net, currency-adjusted prices for the same 
drug in foreign markets. Drug manufacturers may inflate their “asking” prices for new 
drugs knowing price negotiations will follow (Henschke, Sundmacher & Busse, 2013). The 
pCPA’s price negotiation does not benefit taxpayers who are private plan beneficiaries or 
patients who must pay out-of-pocket. In fact, it may harm many taxpayers by encouraging 
drug manufacturers and pharmacies to resist discounting and maintain higher product and 
service prices for private payers, including patients with no insurance, to offset the 
discounts given to governments.  
 
Germany’s approach may, but not always, provide potential advantages to Canada. Its 
national system is simpler, more consistent and more efficient to manage than our 
“patchwork” of public and private drug plans. Both Canada and Germany allow a higher 
price for a new drug only if it provides a clinical improvement over existing therapy.148 
However, the PMPRB still allows new patented drugs with minimal or no improvement over 
existing products to be priced at the top of the therapeutic class (PMPRB, 2015a). 
 
While drug prices in Germany are high, OECD drug cost comparisons include Value 
Added Tax which is 19% in Germany. (GST does not apply to prescription drug sales in 
Canada.) The PMPRB excludes VAT from its comparisons.149 In 2016, drug costs were almost 
22% lower in Germany (PPP US$653 net of VAT, versus US$833) than in Canada, equivalent 
to a difference of $7.5 billion in that year.150 Germany’s GDP per capita is 11% higher than 
Canada’s (Table 5.1), suggesting greater overall affordability in Germany. Germany’s lower 
drug costs occur alongside a much more significant drug manufacturing industry, the 
fourth largest in the world. Perhaps Germany does a better job balancing cost controls on 
drug spending with investments in innovation and the biotechnology sector. They have 
certainly introduced more legislation to actively manage their health and drug spending 
than Canada (Table 5.5). 
 
Germany’s health system draws criticism for high prices, over-service in the hospital 
sector and poor integration of ambulatory and inpatient care, as well as primary and 
specialized care (OECD, 2017a). Germany and Canada share many concerns related to 
efficiency and equity. The continued split of sickness funds and private insurance for 
higher earners argues against solidarity even though most (75%, according to Blümel & 
Busse, 2016) of those who qualify for private insurance continue under social insurance.  
 
 
148 PMPRB, 2018. Guidance document on changes to the Guidelines. Available at: http://www.pmprb-
cepmb.gc.ca/view.asp?ccid=1376#a.  
149 Personal communication, Elena Longu, Manager, Policy Development, PMPRB, April 20, 2019. 




Considering the Enthoven quotation that began this section, changing a health care 
system, or even one part of it, is fraught with challenges including the potential loss of 
current coverage even if that protection is inadequate. Yet this current opportunity to 
introduce national pharmacare could encourage a better overall universal health care 
system. Some characteristics and tactics of the German system bear consideration. 
 
1. Germany controls a new drug’s price mainly by assessing its added benefit to patients. 
Efficiency and quality matter more than cost containment (Busse, Blumel, Kneips & 
Barnighausen, 2017). “Additional benefit” is defined as improvement in health or quality 
of life, reduced duration of illness or side effects, or longer life (Henschke, Sundmacher 
& Busse, 2013). Indication-based pricing may also provide a way to ensure better value. 
This review of comparative effectiveness sidesteps the lack of transparency in 
international prices and provides an essential patient focus. The drug’s price is a 
second-level and minor consideration (Lauenroth & Stargardt, 2017).  
 
2. Rebates were estimated to reduce the price of new drugs in Germany by 20% on average, 
with greater savings on drugs that offered no additional benefit.151 As with Canada’s 
pCPA, rebates have been applied only to drugs assessed since the inception of the FJC. 
 
3. Reference pricing is far more extensive in Germany, applying to 80% of prescriptions. 
The FJC establishes a single negotiated or reference price for new drugs that applies to 
all patients: no German will pay more than another. One insurer-sponsored study 
estimated reference pricing saved social insurance funds €9.9 billion in 2017, roughly 
25% of the €39.9 billion prescription drug bill in that sector.152 Setting new drug prices 
based on existing comparator/reference products (internal market pricing) also seems 
more practical than using retail prices that do not reflect confidential price rebates. 
Three older Canadian studies noted reference pricing used for certain drug classes in 
British Columbia had no statistically significant effects on physician visits or 
hospitalization (Lee et al., 2012, Table 3).153 In BC, eight drug classes have internal 
reference pricing.) Reference pricing is effective at controlling cost without a material 
effect on health (Law (2018, in Sec 5.1.4) 
 
4. Most drug prices are transparent in Germany which contrasts to Canada (and virtually 
all other countries) where a negotiated price is confidential. Canada requires biosimilar 
and generic drug prices to be public and proposed PMPRB changes will enable it to 
collect price information on patented drugs net of rebates. 
 
 
151 Grubert N, 2018. German health insurer call for tougher pharmaceutical cost-containment policies. Available at: 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/german-health-insurers-call-tougher-pharmaceutical-policies-grubert/.  Grubert 
references the Arzneiverordnungs-Report 2018 provided by AOK, the largest statutory insurance fund in Germany. That 
report is available only in German: https://aok-bv.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/2018/index_21055.html.   
152 Ibid. Grubert, 2018. Savings were somewhat less (25% vs. 33%) than cited by Robinson, Panteli and Ex (2019). 
153 The three Canadian studies were excluded in the latest Cochrane Review (2014) because they did not have two 




5. The explicit timelines for each part of the new drug evaluation process are an advantage 
in Germany. Since most new drugs take a year or more to reach their sales potential, this 
doesn’t give away much to drug manufacturers. Predictability and generally faster 
access benefits both patients and manufacturers. One industry study noted Canada 
ranked 15th of 20 countries in the time between market launch of a new drug and public 
plan reimbursement (T=449 days, or about 15 months). Germany ranked second (about 
120 days). The study average was just under one year (353 days).154  
 
6. Once a drug for a rare disorder is determined to be safe and effective by the European 
Medicines Agency it is immediately accessible by patients which can help build real 
world evidence faster than the DRD regulatory void that remains in Canada.155 A DRD is 
fully assessed only when sales become a material amount (€50 million).156 It is not clear 
which approach is more appropriate: Canada requires HTA which delays access, but 
Germany provides access without ensuring added health benefit for the patient. 
 
7. External reference country comparisons are less prominent in Germany than in Canada. 
Set discounts to drug and pharmacy prices and the deferral of a cost-benefit analysis 
until after the arbitration award157 may tempt drug companies to inflate their asking 
prices in Germany. Ruggeri and Nolte (2013) reported in their study of 24 EU countries 
plus Norway that 13 countries in 2012 included Germany as an external reference 
country which means that prices in Germany have an indirect effect on prices in those 
other countries. Germany’s high per capita drug costs – second in Europe only to 
Switzerland – tends to increase the composite reference price in those other countries. 
Put another way, for every €1 of lower prices in Germany, drug prices dropped €0.15 in 
Austria and €0.36 in Italy (Stargardt & Schreyögg, 2006).  
 
8. The Federal Joint Committee could be adapted to improve governance in Canada. The 
Advisory Board (2019a) spoke of greater participation in governing national pharmacare. 
The final report (2019b) notes only that the board of the new Canadian Drug Agency 
should include patients and the public (p. 68). This is a minimalist start and public 
members will be dwarfed by provincial and federal appointees. Including other 
stakeholders, especially insurers, employers and patients, becomes more crucial if 
private drug insurance continues. Supporting sub-committees can represent the 
important interests of prescribers, pharmacy, labour and drug manufacturers if they are 
excluded from the main “Medicines Advisory Council.” MAC deliberations ought to 
occur in a similarly open way. The MAC may also help Canadians better understand, 
sustain and future-proof their drug insurance system. 
 
154 Access to new medicines in public drug plans: Canada and comparable countries. 2016 annual report. IMS Health data 
were used and 4 of five authors were employed by IMS Health. Available at: http://innovativemedicines.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/20160524_Access_to_Medicines_Report_EN_Web.pdf.  
155 The 2019 federal Budget proposed funding DRDs in 2022 and the Advisory Council (2019b) proposed a new national 
strategy for DRDs. 
156 This is similar to Canada’s proposed PMPRB regime where more intense evaluation occurs if a drug is expected to 
generate sales greater than $20 million. This is one of the Category 1 criteria. 
157 Op cit. GKV-SV. AMNOG - evaluation of new pharmaceutical [sic]. As at March 13, 2020, this link is not working. 
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Table 5.6 – Comparative Drug Access Features, Canada and Germany 
 Canada Germany 
Process to access drugs Federal and each province; 
separate for each private 
insurer 
Federal with state input. FJC 
determines added benefit of 
new drugs or indications, 
comparators, net price, 
patient eligibility 
Regulatory structure All regulatory bodies are 
controlled by governments. 
Self-governance overseen by 
Minister of Health 
Initial review of new 
drugs 
Health Canada European Medicines Agency 
(EMA) 
Time limits on review No Yes 
Health technology 
assessment  
CADTH recommendation to 
pCPA. INESSS to RAMQ. 
Cost-effectiveness research 
used. Insurers/PBMs: 
limited economic review on 
some new drugs. 
IQWiG provides 
recommendation to FJC. 
Comparative effectiveness 
research can be used. 
Drug price limit and 
negotiation 
PMPRB first determines a 
“non-excessive” price based 
on 7 comparator nations, 
then pCPA negotiates public 
plan price. Some insurers 
negotiate prices of selected 
drugs. Drug prices vary by 
jurisdiction and payer, 
including hospitals and 
WCBs. 
Second-level, price review 
based on 15 countries.158 
GKV-SV negotiates national 
net prices but individual 
funds may sometimes 
negotiate a lower price. New 
drugs are not evaluated if 
expected sales are < €1 
million. 
Assessment of patient 
value (added benefit)  
Implied for public plans. 
CADTH allows patient 
input. Not done for private 
plans except in actively 
managed formularies. 
Key, explicit and patient-
centred: Improved health or 
quality of life, reduced 
duration of illness or side 
effects, or longer life. 
Arbitration None. pCPA decision is 
final. 




158 The 15 countries are: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Source: https://www.gkv-
spitzenverband.de/english/statutory_health_insurance/amnog_evaluation_of_new_pharmaceutical/amnog_english.jsp. 
As at March 13, 2020, this link is not working. 
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 Canada Germany 
Reference pricing BC only since 1995. Applies 
to eight drug classes 
Since 1989, default for all 
new drugs unless added 
benefit proved. Reference and 
generic drugs often tendered. 
Pricing transparency Confidential discounts, 
rebates. Private payers do 
not get pCPA discounts. 
FJC publishes drug price list 
and rebate/supplement 
details. Insurers may have 
proprietary drug prices. 
Access to new 
medicines 
Price set before access. 
Process typically 1 to 2 
years. Private plans usually 
list within weeks. 
After EMA approval, 
immediate access for one 
year at the drug 
manufacturer’s price. 
Standardized discounts None for drugs. Pharmacy 
caps depend on province 
and insurer. 
Overall, 16% of pharmacy 
price for non-reference. 
Mandatory rebates 7% 
(patent), up to 16% (generics). 
Price increases CPI on patented drugs. 
Older generic prices frozen; 
pCPA Generics Initiative 
(April 2018). 
Frozen on all drugs since 
2009 with annual inflation-
based increases in 2018 until 
2022. 
Prescribing oversight Multiple guidelines but 
prescribers have full 
discretion. 
Since 2002, systematic 
assessment with penalties 
Formulary Positive – all eligible drugs. 
Vary by province. Most 
private plans have broader 
formularies.  
Negative – ineligible drugs 
only. 
Drugs for rare disorders 
(DRDs) 
CADTH review and 
recommendation, then 
pCPA price negotiation. 
Private insurers use prior 
authorization and may 
negotiate price. 
Assumed value upon 
licensing by the government. 
No detailed IQWiG review 
until sales exceed €50 mm. 
Drugs dispensed by 
hospital  
Each hospital determines 
own formulary. Buying 
groups often negotiates 
secret price. No reference to 
community cost. No patient 
cost. 
Each hospital determines 
own formulary. Most use a 
buying group. FJC has price 
cap for outpatient drugs. No 




Source: Author. Table kindly reviewed by Neil Grubert, April 2019. 
German Acronyms 
FJC (G-BA) Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss) 
GKV-SV National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV 
Spitzenverband) 
IQWiG Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen 
Canadian acronyms: See List of Abbreviations, p. xii. 
 
5.3 Netherlands 
The Netherlands has adapted the original social insurance model created in Germany to its 
own political and cultural philosophy of market orientation, personal choice and social 
solidarity (Maarse, Jeurissen & Ruwaard, 2016). This began with German occupation during 
the Second World War when sickness funds were established in 1941 for lower income 
workers.   
 
This section identifies key features and lessons from the Dutch hybrid social insurance 
model that can be applied to Canada’s implementation of NPh. Key features of the Dutch 
system, narrowed to drug insurance, will be assessed. A recurring theme is active 
management and evolving governance. 
 
5.3.1 Health System Reform 
Countries choose the most appropriate balance point along the continuum between system 
archetypes. For the Dutch, this shifted dramatically in 2006. 
 
In 1967, the Netherlands combined health care for the general population with health 
coverage for industrial accidents and occupational disease. There is no separate Workers’ 
Compensation health care system as there is in North America and most European nations 
(Government of the Netherlands, 2011).159 WCB organizations in Canada have separate drug 
formularies and benefit entitlements for injured workers. Reflecting its German roots, the 
Dutch market at that time was split into a social insurance (sickness fund) model that 
covered about two-thirds of citizens and a separate private insurance model for wealthier 
people (van Ginneken, Shäfer & Kroneman, 2010). Funding was provided through general 
taxation. 
 
The latest reform cycle began in 1987 with a contentious report from the Dekker 
Commission (Maarse et al., 2016). Dekker proposed changes to create a hybrid and unified 
health insurance market that would include elements of both social and private insurance, 
with the former given priority (Vonk & Schut, 2018). At the time, it was suggested these 
 




changes would take about five years to implement (Tuohy, 2012). Reforms began in 1988 
that slowly migrated coverage to a compulsory plan. 
 
Interesting and relevant to Canada, prescription drugs were originally covered by 
sickness funds but in 1992 medicines were transferred to the tax-funded but privately-
administered Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) (Götze, 2010). A change in 
government returned drugs to the sickness funds in 1996 (Götze, p. 21). While Tuohy (2018, 
p. 351) describes the political reason as “austerity” in transferring drug cost from 
government to private payers, perhaps the government also hoped drug costs may be better 
managed by the private sector through regulated competition.  
 
The first serious attempt to implement Dekker in 1992 was strongly opposed by 
insurers and employers, but important transitional changes still occurred (Vonk and Schut, 
2018). As a result, consumer choice grew to include national and regional insurers, 
community-rating now allowed price competition, capitation payments changed insurer 
revenue and risk, and selective provider contracting first appeared. Income-based premiums 
remained. The former legal barriers that distinguished sickness funds and private insurers 
were removed so the two forms began to merge (Vonk & Schut, 2018). 
 
Over the next few years, changes to Workers’ Compensation shifted risk to employers 
who became concerned about the cost of long health system waiting lists that prevented or 
delayed employees from returning to work. This problem created a coalition of interests 
between business, unions and the public. Insurers were then isolated as they resisted 
change (Vonk & Schut, 2018). Finally, serious consultations and negotiations began after the 
government issued a new proposal in 2001, still based on the Dekker Report. A 
precipitating event (ultimately, wait times) opened a window of opportunity that led to 
government action.  
 
Almost 20 years following Dekker, two Acts were passed in 2006: the Health Insurance 
Act (Zorgverzekeringswet: Zvw), and the Healthcare Market Regulation Act (Wet 
marktordening gezondheidszorg: Wmg) which set up the Dutch Healthcare Authority 
(Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit: NZa). In this legislation, van Ginnekin, Shäfer and Kroneman 
(2010) state: “The role of the government was envisaged to change from direct control of 
volumes, prices and productive capacity to safeguarding the process from a distance 
(p.24).” This has likely not created less work for the government (Kroneman et al., 2016). 
The Zvw consolidated social and private coverage into universal health insurance and 
created an individual mandate (everyone must have coverage). A sophisticated risk-
adjustment formula deters insurers from ‘cream-skimming’ to enrol only the healthiest 
people (van Ginneken, Swartz & Van der Wees, 2013). 
 
The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport sets overall policy and controls the national 
budget that includes health insurers, drugs and providers. A complex array of advisory 
and/or supervisory bodies as well as self-regulating provider organizations replaced its 
direct steering role (Kroneman et al., 2016, Table 2.2 p. 47). Based on advice from the 
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National Healthcare Institute160 (Zorginstituut Nederland: ZiNL) the government decides the 
components of the Basic health insurance package. It provides legislative and regulatory 
structure to allow the independent NZa to regulate providers and insurers, determine 
services and their maximum prices and generally administer policy, all in the public 
interest.161 The NZa has authority to intervene and impose tariffs or other sanctions when 
market power is abused (van Ginneken, Shäfer & Kroneman, 2010). The Minister rarely 
intervenes in the NZa’s operations.162 “The result of these reforms is a unique Dutch hybrid 
in which the public-private boundary is hard to discern” (Tuohy, 2012, p. 624). 
 
As van de Ven (2008) nicely summarizes: “That is, the law describes the nature, content 
and extent of the care, while the insurance contracts determine who delivers the care, 
where, and under what conditions” (p. 155). 
 
The Zvw divides coverage into three “compartments.” The first is tax-financed and was 
introduced in 1968. It covers home and long-term care. The second compartment provides 
standardized mandatory Basic coverage with cost shared primarily by employers and 
workers. The third type is voluntary coverage, which comes in many forms and price points. 
Among other services, Basic insurance includes (Government of the Netherlands, 2018): 
 
• Medical care provided by GPs, medical specialists and obstetricians 
• Hospital care 
• Prescription medicines (formulary-based) 
• Dental care for children under age 18 
• Mental health services, including related hospital care up to three years  
• Nutritional/dietary care 
• Medical equipment 
• Ambulance  
• Various therapists, including speech and occupational therapists 
 
5.3.2 Financing and Spending Overview 
 
At 81%, public funding of the Netherlands health system is well above the OECD average 
(73%) and that of Canada (70%) (CIHI, 2018a) (Figure 5.2). By convention, both compulsory 
insurance and government funding is defined as “public.” The state’s contributions cover 
 
160 ZiNL administers the risk adjustment pool for insurers and performs health technology assessment for new drugs. 
161 See: https://www.nza.nl/english.  
162 Maarse et al. (2016) describe one situation in 2008 where the Minister overruled a decision by the NZa to restrict 
funding to a hospital that could result in its bankruptcy (p. 174). 
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costs such as health promotion and care for children under age 18, illegal immigrants and 
for the disabled. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Health System Funding, Netherlands, 2017163 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2018.  
 
 
Table 5.7 – Canada and Netherlands: Health Cost Comparison (2017 or 2016, $US 
PPP)  
 Canada The Netherlands OECD Average 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP, 2016) 164 44,819 51,340 42,466 
Health costs as percent of GDP 10.4 10.1 8.9 
Health costs per capita 4,826 5,386 4,069 
Drug costs per capita 860 410 577 
Source: OECD Health Statistics, 2018. PPP = Purchasing Power Parity controls for buying 
power in various jurisdictions 
 
Despite higher per capita health spending, drug costs per capita165 in the Netherlands 
are about half those of Canada (Table 5.7). Costs from the Netherlands include Value Added 
 
163 Available at: https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/en/dataset/84043eng/table?ts=1553971778498 
164 OECD Data. Values are from 2016, $US PPP. Higher health costs may reflect that GDP per capita is 14.5% higher in the 
Netherlands than Canada. Available at: https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-domestic-product-gdp.htm.  















Tax (now 9%) on prescription drugs;166 in Canada drugs are exempt from GST. The difference 
has grown in recent years as the Dutch have mandated steady declines in drug prices and 
costs through much expanded use of generic drugs and controls on pharmacy fees. 
Pharmaceutical budget costs have also been supressed because access to certain high-cost 
specialty drugs (auto-immune and oncology therapies, growth and fertility hormones) was 
shifted between 2012 and 2014 to the hospital sector (Kroneman et al., 2016). This 
somewhat distorts direct comparison with Canada. For example, many oncology drugs in 
Canada are paid from hospital and cancer agency budgets and some of this spending is 
separate from how CIHI reports prescription drug spending (CIHI, 2018b, p. 26-27). 
 
Drug prices are externally benchmarked to prices in Belgium, Germany, France and the 
UK. Dutch prices can be no more than the average prices across these four countries. The 
Beneluxa consortium provides joint health technology assessment and price negotiation 
with drug manufacturers on behalf of Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria. 
Ireland became the most recent partner in June 2018.167 As an interesting sidebar, as Brexit 
concerns grew in 2016, the British pound lost value against the Euro. Since the UK is one of 
four drug price benchmark countries, the Dutch government was able to reduce drug prices 
by 4% later that year (SFK, 2017, p. 11). In Canada, external price benchmarking is done only 
at the time a new drug is being reviewed by the PMPRB, although regulatory changes are 
proposed to allow for periodic therapeutic class reviews. 
 
The decrease in drug cost in the Netherlands is remarkable over the last decade (Table 
5.8).  
 
Table 5.8 – Annual Cost of Prescription and OTC drugs and Medical Non-durables, 
per capita, $US PPP 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Change 
Canada 680 731 781 778 774 788 794 812 833 860 26.5% 
Netherlands 450 450 455 462 422 411 403 399 406 411 (8.7%) 
Source: OECD 2018 Health Statistics.  
 
Table 5.9 – Ratio of Canada (CA) to Netherlands (NL), Drug and Medical Non-durables 
and Health Costs. 5-Year Bands. Cost per capita, $US PPP. 
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Latest 
(2017) 
CA / NL Drugs 1.38 1.49 1.45 1.47 1.54 1.74 2.04 2.10 
CA / NL Health 1.31 1.27 1.18 1.09 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.90 
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD 2018 Health Statistics.  
 
166 See: https://www.medicijnkosten.nl/servicepagina/engelse-informatie/objectives. On January 1, 2019, the VAT 
increased from 6% to 9% on Rx drugs. The OECD appropriately uses 6% in historical figures.  
167 See: http://beneluxa.org/news3.  
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Figure 5.3 also uses ratios, but displays them annually in graphic form over a much 
shorter period to illustrate similar and divergent cost differences. Data begins in 2005, one 
year before the Netherlands implemented reform. The CA:NL drug ratio (top/green line) 
dropped slightly in 2007, 2008 and dipped in 2011 but has otherwise steadily increased 
from about 50% higher (1.5 on the y-axis) to over twice as high in 2015. (Costs for 
prescription drugs and public health are the only two segments of health spending that 
have decreased since 2006.) Germany was added for comparison purposes. Both Canada 
and Germany have high per capita drug costs.  
 
Figure 5.3 – Canada, Netherlands and Germany: Cost Ratio Health and Drug 
Expenditures  
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2018. PPP = Purchasing Power Parity. 
 
The line showing overall health system spending in the Netherlands and Germany 
follows a similar pattern of gradual decline over this 13-year period, meaning lower health 
systems costs in Canada relative to each comparator. 
 
5.3.3 Health Insurance Overview  
The Netherlands is unique among OECD members in its heavily regulated, competitive and 
universal social insurance market. Regulation is “complex and extensive” (p. 16) and can be 
segmented into three parts: public health, service quality, and health insurers and providers 
(Kroneman et al., 2016). Overall health expenditures are high (9th) but are consistent with 
the country’s GDP per capita, also ranked 9th (OECD, 2018). Kroneman et al. (2016) reported 
very high (91%) citizen satisfaction with health system quality in 2013.  
 
While drug costs are exceptionally low, long term care (LTC) costs are extremely high 
(National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), 2014). Before reform in 
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(OECD, 2017b). All in, the Dutch health system consumes less of GDP than does Canada’s 
(Table 5.7) so its system appears relatively affordable despite constant concern about costs 
and prices.  
 
The 2006 Health Insurance Act (Zvw) identifies four system objectives that support 
public solidarity: accessibility, quality, efficiency and affordability of health care 
(Netherlands Authority for Consumers & Markets, 2017a). Competition is meant to help 
achieve the last three objectives (Netherlands Authority for Consumers & Markets, 2017a). 
These terms were not defined in legislation so meanings had to be developed by 
stakeholders as the Act was implemented (Maarse et al., 2016). The general rationale is that 
competition should create conditions for innovation and efficiency that improve the quality 
of health services and controls cost, while responding to customer preferences (van de Ven, 
2008). For several years, competitive advantage focused on volume and prices because 
sufficient provider quality information was not available (van Ginneken, Shäfer & Kroneman, 
2010). 
 
Insurers may be for-profit public companies or not-for profit mutual cooperatives: 
“virtually all” (Netherlands Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2018. p. 3) are the latter. 
Most operate nationally. The number of insurers has declined steadily since the 1960s when 
it peaked at about 165 (Vonk & Schut, 2018). Maarse (2009) reported there were 57 insurers 
in 2006, but only 33 remained in 2009. Currently 23 health insurers operate in ten groups, 
and the four main insurer groups account for 86.5% of industry revenues.168 (In Canada, 
there are 24 health insurers, 19 of which are independent. There are five Blue Cross 
affiliates. The three largest insurers are for-profit: the four largest control 71% of health 
revenues (Benefits Canada, 2018))  
 
In addition to Basic coverage, almost 70% of citizens had group insurance coverage in 
2017 (Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, 2017c), up from 64% in 2010 (van 
Ginneken, Shäfer & Kroneman, 2010). In the Netherlands, group contracts get a maximum 
discount of 10%. About two-thirds of Canadians have private drug insurance (CLHIA, 2018, 
p 3), although surveys indicate a smaller amount (60% according to Law, 2018). 
 
Insurers must accept everyone under the Basic insurance package. However, while 
insurers set their own prices the cost of the Basic package is community rated – the same 
for all clients of each insurer which reinforces social solidarity. Additional voluntary health 
insurance (VHI) is available. Residents can change insurers each January and about 6% do so 
annually (Netherlands Authority for Consumers & Markets, 2017b). This threat to the 
incumbent insurer is designed to be a catalyst for quality improvement. Maarse et al. (2016) 
report it is young, better educated consumers who are more likely to switch, primarily to 
obtain a lower premium. Age and the amount of health care expenses are inversely related 
to switching insurers. Higher age creates psychological switching costs, such as fear of 
getting less coverage with a new insurer (Duijmelinck & van de Ven, 2016).  
 
168 NZa, 2018. Monitor Zorgverzekeringen 2018. Available at: https://puc.overheid.nl/nza/doc/PUC_254666_22/1/. See pp. 




The government sets a maximum price for drugs on its approved formulary twice each 
year but the final cost to the patient is determined by insurer negotiations with drug 
manufacturers, hospitals, physicians and pharmacists. Insurers list eligible providers on 
their websites and reimburse others not on their list at lower rates, usually 75%. 
 
Since 1991, health insurers have used reference pricing to identify a preferred drug 
from among therapeutically equivalent and interchangeable drugs (Habl et al., 2006). 
Patients pay the difference for higher priced drugs out-of-pocket (Kroneman et al., 2016). 
Mandatory substitution and competitive bidding (tendering) is used to lower the cost of 
generic drugs. Tendering contracts run for two years with locked-in prices and no minimum 
specified volume.169 Generic substitution rates are high at 74% of all prescription volume 
and account for less than 17% of prescription sales (SFK, 2017, p. 13), vs. 72% of scripts and 
20% of costs in Canada (CGPA, 2018). 
 
5.3.4 Managed Competition among Insurers  
5.3.4.1 Defining managed competition 
According to Vonk and Schut (2018) managed competition is an attempt: “…to reconcile the 
tension between a competitive insurance market pressuring for selective underwriting and 
actuarially fair premiums (the insurance logic) and an upcoming welfare state pressuring for 
universal access and socially fair premiums (the welfare state logic) (Abstract).” They 
summarize the two polar positions (Den Exter and Guy, 2014) as follows:  
 
• Insurance logic: Voluntary individual responsibility for buying insurance to protect 
against financial losses. Competition enables product and service innovation. 
Insurers are protected against moral hazard through medical underwriting, risk-
adjusted premiums, waiting periods and coverage limits. Insurance is privately 
administered. Citizens can apply for extra coverage but they may be rejected or their 
policy terminated, most often due to age, pre-existing conditions, changing health 
status or risk behaviours. A pool for high risk insureds is typical, either by one 
insurer or among several insurers, to dampen premium fluctuations and protect 
insurer solvency. 
o Archetype: Private insurance. 
 
• Welfare state logic: Social solidarity pools risk among a large population and 
protection is a right of citizenship. This model requires mandatory enrolment, 
universal entitlement and Vonk and Schut would say public administration. Social 
insurance also qualifies, administered by governments and private insurers. To 
 
169 Medicines for Europe, 2016. Market review – European generic medicines markets: Policy Overview. Available at: 
https://www.medicinesforeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Market-Review-2016-Generic-medicines-
policies.pdf.  See p. 10. 
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properly function, this model must include six other features: periodic open 
enrolment, community rating, prescribed/standard benefits, low income subsidies, 
risk-sharing and limited competition if private insurers are included. Income-based 
and community-rated premiums often co-exist. Social insurance also requires an 
insurer pool for high risk insureds to dampen premium fluctuations and protect 
insurer solvency which is threatened by moral hazard and adverse selection. 
o Archetypes: Single payer and social insurance  
 
Vonk and Schut drew three conclusions relevant to both Dutch health insurance and 
national pharmacare in Canada. First, a well-functioning health insurance market can 
include private insurers only if they are effectively regulated. Second, changes take 
considerable time and are ongoing and controversial in the Dutch market. Finally, achieving 
managed competition in the Netherlands has been complex and requires sustained political, 
institutional and public support.  
 
5.3.4.2 Key features 
Six key features of the Dutch managed competition model will be reviewed and then the 
model will be assessed for application to drug insurance in Canada. 
 
1. Mandatory Basic insurance: Personal choice and voice 
2. Voluntary health insurance 
3. Risk sharing 
4. Transitional measures 
5. Market monitoring and transparency 
6. Policy dynamism 
 
Feature 1: Mandatory Basic insurance: Personal Choice and Voice 
 
The mandatory Basic health insurance plan is offered by 23 insurers through 55 policies 
with a choice of deductible. Insurers must accept all applicants regardless of health, age or 
sex. Costs are primarily covered by community-rated individual premiums and payroll 
deductions. Overall cost increases have been moderate, and per capita drug costs have 
actually declined in many recent years. Out-of-pocket costs are low, and subsidies are 
provided to those with lower incomes. 
 
• Annual Premium: In 2018, the average cost per adult was €1,332 (NZa, 2018. p. 19). 
There was a €390 (29%) difference between the least (€1,126) and most expensive 
(€1,506) Basic premium (NZa, 2018. p. 19).170 Even though nominal average premiums 
increased about 3% annually (17% overall) between 2014 and 2018 inclusive (NZa, 
 
170 Coverage was not the same in each insurer’s policy but was often similar. 
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2018. p. 20), the 2018 premium was slightly lower than it was in 2012 (€1,361) 
(Maarse et al., 2013). 
 
• Payroll Contribution: The average worker171 paid €1,750 in 2018 (NZa, 2018. p. 18).172 
The total payroll deduction of 12.65% (2019) is shared between employers (6.95%) 
and employees (5.7%) up to maximum annual earnings of €55,927.173  
 
• Annual Deductible:  It has held at €385 per adult since 2016 and applies to all 
eligible Basic health insurance expenses.174 It may be voluntarily increased in €100 
increments to €885 (total) in order to lower annual premiums. Almost 12% of the 
population has opted for a higher deductible, most of those (9%) at the €500 limit 
(NZa, 2018. p. 29). Deductibles can be waived when patients used preferred drugs or 
participate in certain prevention programs (Kroneman et al., 2016).  
 
• Tax Credits: Over one-third (36% according to Kroneman et al., 2016) of low income 
adults qualified for subsidies in 2015, paid monthly in advance (van Ginneken, 
Swartz & van der Wees, 2013). In 2019, the maximum monthly allowance is €99 
single and €192 for two or more with a household income of €20,500 or less. The 
allowance diminishes until it disappears at €30,000 for singles and €38,000 for two 
or more people in a household.175  
 
• Out-of-Pocket Health Costs: At 11.5% of total health expenditures, these are low 
relative to Canada at 14.6% and the OECD average of 20.3% (OECD Health Statistics, 
2018). This figure does not include social insurance premiums or income-based 
payroll deductions. 
 
• Voice: Though in a less prominent and influential role than Germany’s FJC, patient 
involvement is institutionalized. Health providers must have patient advisory 
councils and health insurers must involve patients in purchasing decisions (OECD, 
2017b). 
 
Consumer ratings of provider and insurer quality have been published and promoted by 
the government since 2005. Hendriks et al., (2009) examined seven health plan quality 
variables from among 54 core quality items across the health system. Five of these showed 
small but statistically significant improvements over the four years, while two were 
 
171 In comparing annual premium and deductible with payroll contribution, note that all workers are adults but not all 
adults are workers. 
172 An industry website (https://www.zorgverzekering.org/eng/insurance-companies/) shows monthly costs by insurer 
according to age and annual deductible, and includes a consumer rating. 
173 E&Y, 2019. Netherlands payroll tax in 2019 and 2020. Available at: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
pas-memorandum-loonheffingen-2019-en/$FILE/EY-pas-memorandum-loonheffingen-2019-en.pdf. See Table 2.2, p. 36.  
174 There is no deductible paid for children under age 18 or for maternity care and family medicine (GP) visits.  





unchanged. They also found that below-average health plans improved in 2008 more than 
those providing average or above-average quality in 2005. Den Exter & Guy (2014) 
determined that competition based on quality (vs. price) is not yet effective. 
 
Feature 2: Voluntary Health Insurance 
 
Voluntary health insurance (VHI) is complementary: it reimburses services excluded or only 
partially covered under the Basic plan such as dental and physiotherapy for adults, vision 
care, and costs for drugs above the reference price. VHI creates an outlet for those who are 
in good health, desire more extensive benefits and have the financial ability to pay. VHI can 
be risk-rated (medically underwritten) but insurers have not implemented this restriction 
(Kroneman et al, 2016).  VHI does not buy faster access or permit queue jumping (Wammes 
et al. 2017). Most Dutch buy their Basic and VHI plans from the same insurer (van Ginneken, 
Swartz & Van der Wees, 2013) since VHI on a stand-alone basis is more expensive than when 
packaged with Basic (Kroneman et al., 2016).176 A large majority of Dutch citizens make this 
choice: despite a good Basic plan, 84% also had VHI in 2018 (NZa, 2018. p. 24). That figure is 
unchanged from 2015 (OECD, 2017), but lower than in 2012 (88% (Maarse, Jeurissen & 
Ruwaard, 2013) and 2009 when 91% had VHI (Schäfer et al., 2010). 
 
Feature 3: Risk Sharing 
 
Risk sharing is an essential feature of both private and social health insurance systems. 
Payroll contributions from Dutch employers and workers are paid into the Health Insurance 
Fund operated by ZiNL. This allows greater transparency and public support (Allin, Stabile & 
Tuohy, 2010). The Fund is used to equalize risk among insurers according to market share 
and seven variables (shown next page). It either charges or credits insurers based on the 
deviation of their book of business from the “standard” set for overall risk (Schäfer et al., 
2010).  
 
The Dutch use a very sophisticated model but even so, it cannot fully anticipate or 
neutralize all risk. Risk sharing models are designed to support social solidarity without 
limiting price competition and system sustainability (Fouda, Fiorentini & Paolucci, 2017). 
Regulation, including risk-sharing, helps protect both insurers and patients from potentially 
adverse market effects. High-risk and high-cost patients may choose any plan and insurers 
are compensated for the extra costs these patients incur. All patients have more secure and 
affordable coverage. Insurers have much reduced incentive to “cream-skim” or otherwise 
game the market in the pursuit of lower risk patients which leaves them to focus on 
improving administrative efficiency, reduce costs and product prices and improve quality 




176 This is similar to the standard discount applied when Canadians buy home and auto coverage from the same insurer. 
Two complementary policies provide better risk spread. 
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Kroneman et al. (2016) report recent changes to risk sharing. While the first five ex-ante 
factors below are unchanged, two more have been added. 
 
1. Age and sex 
2. Income source and socio-economic status 
3. Region 
4. Prescription drug use for chronic diseases according to 20 therapeutic classes 
(outpatient) 
5. Inpatient chronic disease groups (N=13) 
6. Use of medical aids, high health costs from conditions not included in #4 or 5, and 
previous use of mental health care. 
7. Mental health care for single patients living alone. 
 
The ex-post system introduced in 2006 for Basic insurance recognized that risk cannot 
be perfectly predicted. As more claim experience data were collected, the need for ex post 
adjustments diminished. It was terminated in December 2014 once information systems 
and market predictability improved. (Adjustments were to remain in place for mental health 
care, nursing and personal care until 2017.) Canadian insurers should be interested in the 
ex post adjustment model if they introduce a national drug claim pool. Ex post adjustments 
originally included: 
 
• Outliers, in which most costs above a threshold were reimbursed by the government. 
• “Bandwidth”, based on the average cost difference between an insurer and the 
country. 
• Macro developments beyond the control of insurers. An example might be the mid-
year market entry of costly new Hepatitis C drugs. However, insurers may also be 
required to refund costs to the HIF if the company’s average claim cost is lower than 
that incurred by other insurers. 
 
While insurers may still try to unfairly attract lower-cost risk there are financial and 
reputational costs with insureds and regulators. For example, since VHI costs are not 
regulated, claim patterns under the Basic plan could be used to sell VHI to low-risk 
customers (Maarse et al., 2016). However, most people buy VHI from the same insurer due 
to visible pricing incentives so these selection risks are minimized. Delaying or denying 
services is likely to drive high-cost patients to other insurers on January 1, but will not help 
attract preferred risks except through very low rates which then lowers revenues and 





Feature 4: Transitional Measures 
 
After the Zvw legislation was passed in 2006, reforms to hospital and insurer roles and 
processes took several years and interim measures buffered these organizations from both 
anticipated and unforeseen changes to revenues and profits (or surplus for not-for-profit 
organizations). Insurers were to negotiate prices and services with hospitals but only 7% of 
hospital revenue was immediately put at risk. The share exposed to market forces increased 
to 34% by 2010 (van Ginneken, Shäfer & Kroneman, 2010) and to about 70% by 2012. The 
other 30% was protected due to risks that could not be planned (emergencies) or for which 
there were too few incidents to predict. Similarly in 2006, insurers were allowed to protect 
53% of their earned profits or inversely, were compensated for 47% of their losses 
(Kroneman et al., 2016). 
 
At least two performance reviews published in 2010 and 2016 made it clear that the 
transition was incomplete (van Ginneken, Shäfer & Kroneman, 2010; Maarse et al., 2016). 
Premium competition caused many insurers to merge or to leave the market, and hospitals 
and physicians had other unexpected experiences as they adjusted to the consolidating 
power of the insurers and the evolving role of government (Maarse et al., 2016). Following 
the first three years of system adjustment losses, insurer profitability has remained strong. 
That “success” has led to public resentment as the appropriate balance is negotiated 
between retaining surplus to meet capital and solvency standards and the short-term option 
to invest in new or improved services or reduce premiums. The latter approach provides 
immediate gratification – and good politics. These experiences could be very relevant to 
Canada as it works to introduce a comprehensive public single payer NPh plan by 2017. 
 
Subsidies for lower income residents were increased in tandem with the Basic health 
insurance deductible. Health insurance is compulsory but is obviously less affordable as 
incomes decrease. 
 
Health costs increased faster than expected for the first two years so the government 
began to claw back funds from providers that were over-budget. That act penalized efficient 
organizations. In 2011 (Maarse, Jeurissen & Ruwaard, 2013) and/or 2013 (Wammes et al., 
2017) the government negotiated cost growth and quality targets for hospitals, insurers, 
medical specialists, mental health care and then primary care in a four-year agreement 
(2014 – 2017). 
 
Coverage entitlements have also been adjusted over time. Mental health coverage was 
reformed and improved and session costs were eliminated in 2014. Long term care was 
extensively revised in 2015. But certain drugs have been delisted or removed from the drug 
budget and physiotherapy is reimbursed only under VHI unless it is for a chronic condition 





Feature 5: Market Monitoring and Transparency 
 
Price and quality transparency is essential in competitive markets. The Netherlands 
Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) is an independent regulator of several sectors 
including health insurance. It oversees competition and enforces consumer protection 
laws.177 The ACM’s consumer website (consuwijzer.nl, in Dutch) encourages informed 
comparison shopping for health insurance. 
 
Five years post-launch, information for patients was described as inadequate and did 
not reflect their diverse needs (van Ginneken et al., 2010). Insurance packages remain 
difficult for many consumers to compare, reducing market competition and innovation. 
Advertising may create confusion as well as clarity among consumers on important 
coverage differences. A patient who is afraid of not getting equivalent coverage is likely to 
be reluctant to change health policies. 
 
A 2018 study by the ACM and NZa reported that almost 10 million people – 72% of the 
13.6 million covered by Basic policies they had personally selected – could have chosen less 
expensive policies with similar coverage. (An earlier version of this joint study reported 
average savings of €100 (8%) were possible in 2016.)  
 
Another study by the ACM and NZa reported very similar health policies were offered at 
very different prices, and insurers were criticized for placing undue emphasis on minor 
policy differences and misleading consumers (Netherlands Authority for Consumers and 
Markets, 2017a). The insurance industry also provides a website where consumers can get 
comparative information on health insurers, prices, quality and benefits. 
 
The ACM expressed concern that stable market shares of insurers may indicate the 
market is not sufficiently dynamic and competitive (Netherlands Authority for Consumers 
and Markets, 2016). This study observed that insurers value stability in market share (and 
its more predictable revenue) over the risk of acquiring competitors. It noted that no new 
insurers have entered the market since 2006 and that smaller insurers are not growing.  
 
Another ACM study noted that insurers, mostly not-for-profit, feel public and political 
pressure to convert surplus into lower insurance premiums rather than increase capital 
which can in turn support innovation and long-term solvency (Netherlands Authority for 
Consumers & Markets, 2017a). In 2014 insurers reduced their rates by an average of €115 
(Maarse et al., 2016). 
 
All these investigative studies are instructive for Canadian patients and taxpayers, 
policymakers and politicians. They improve transparency, market functioning and allow 




177 See: https://www.acm.nl/en/about-acm/our-organization/the-netherlands-authority-for-consumers-and-markets.  
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Feature 6: Policy Dynamism 
 
Over 25 years, the Dutch government has intervened to make important though often very 
targeted changes in its laws or practices in order to improve drug affordability and health 
system sustainability. Aggressive drug policy changes have had generally178 steady and 
deliberate effects on drug prices (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). It’s important to note that while 
Dutch drug policies have been unusually effective, the country still struggles to bring other 
costs, e.g., long term care, in line with EU comparators.  
 
The following ten policy actions illustrate the scope of changes and the Dutch 
government’s willingness to remain focused on achieving the prescribed outcomes of its 
system: market orientation, personal choice and social solidarity.  
 
1. Generic drug prices were cut by 40% in January 2004 based on an agreement 
between the Ministry, insurers and the generic drug industry (SFK, 2010, p. 27). The 
price of new generic drugs would be 40% below the brand product and the brand 
industry signed a similar agreement in 2005 to drop their product prices to the 
same level if generic equivalents were available. In 2008, generic prices fell 10% more 
due to the Pharmaceutical Care Transition Agreement and new generic drug prices 
were then set at 50% of the brand price (SFK, 2010, p. 28). 
 
2. Drug preference policies introduced by four large insurers reduced the price of the 
most frequently prescribed generic drugs by 90% in mid-2008 (SFK, 2010, p. 30). 
This policy meant only one drug within a therapeutic class has full reimbursement. 
The cut was delivered through a tendering process that awarded exclusive supply 
contracts. 
 
3. Generic drug shortages continue179 mostly due to tendering practices that create sole 
supplier contracts. Occasional manufacturing quality problems also restrict supply. 
During the first quarter of 2014, inadequate supply affected a monthly average of 
800,000 prescriptions (4.3%) involving nearly 150 different medicines on at least one 
insurer’s preference list (SFK, 2014, p. 26). 
 
4. The large price cuts allowed the Ministry to reduce its drug budget for insurers. In 
response, one insurer introduced a “concealed price model” in which the drug 
manufacturer paid the insurer a confidential rebate (SFK, 2014, p. 20). This practice 
spread among other Dutch insurers and created a further reduction in generic drug 
prices of about 9%. 
 
 
178 “Generally” does not mean uninterrupted, as shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 which cover drug prices during 1996 to 2017. 
Policy direction has sometimes altered course for political, practical or ideological reasons, e.g., drug coverage did swing 
between sickness funds to government and back to sickness funds in the 1990s, as noted in Sec 5.3.1. 





5. By 2009, drug price cuts had a small (1%) cumulative negative overall effect on 
pharmacy revenues. However, the NZa allows pharmacies to earn considerably (26%) 
more in fees if there is a written agreement with an insurer that sets out quality and 
efficiency targets (SFK, 2010, 67). The number of pharmacies has been steady for 
several years (SFK, 2017, p. 15) indicating these changes have not led to widespread 
bankruptcies and reduced patient access. 
 
6. In 1998, the Ministry mandated a discount (“clawback”) be paid by pharmacies to 
insurers and patients. The discount started at 3% of prescription cost and was 
increased two years later to 6.82% (max €6.80) when pharmacy fees were increased 
(SFK, 2014, p. 20). In 2008, the Minister agreed that further efficiencies beyond the 
targeted amounts in the Transition Agreement would be returned to pharmacists, 
however, as of 2010, this had still not been paid. This delay undermines solidarity 
and trust. 
 
7. In 2009, 42 quality indicators were reported for the first time to monitor prescribing 
and dispensing behaviours in 2008. One insurer used two of these indicators to 
identify and reward exceptional pharmacy practice with higher fees, and a second 
insurer introduced several more the next year to their pharmacy contracts (SFK, 
2010, p. 81-83). One limitation is that pharmacy-level indicators do not follow 
patients across more than one pharmacy.  
  
8. Deregulated pharmacy prices in 2012 eliminated the government-mandated 
clawback and allowed pharmacists to set their own prices generally after 
negotiations with the insurers. Insurers quickly implemented their own clawback of 
pharmacy fees SFK, 2014, p. 20).  
 
9. Drugs that are not on the government formulary cannot be reimbursed under Basic 
insurance but they may be paid out-of-pocket or are eligible for VHI policies. In 
2013, patients paid for ineligible drugs valued at €185 million and €38 million more 
for costs above the price cap set by their insurers (SFK, 2014, p. 37). These amounts 
were 5.5% of total drug expenditures. Some drug manufacturers rebate these out-of-
pocket costs back to the patient. A €250 maximum patient contribution for off-
formulary drugs was introduced in 2019.180 
 
10. Parallel imports of brand drugs into the Netherlands from within the EU are allowed 
when such drugs are less expensive in other countries. This is a relatively small 
share of all drugs dispensed due mostly to supply problems, manufacturer 
resistance, and because Dutch prices on average are lower than any EU member of 
the OECD except Estonia, Poland and Denmark. 
 
 
180 See: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/veranderingen-basispakket-2019. 
Translated using Google Translator. 
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The Dutch approach indicates far more can be done. To recap, Canada is currently 
ranked 4th ($833) in drug costs among 32 OECD countries with 2016 data available, and its 
average per capita cost is 144% of the OECD average ($577). In comparison, the Netherlands 
is ranked 27th ($406) and its per capita cost is just 70% of the OECD average (OECD, 2018). 
 
5.3.4.3 Application to Canada 
There are four important challenges with negotiating and implementing this model within 
Canada’s single payer, top-down, government-controlled health system.  
 
5.3.4.3.1 Conflicting Philosophy 
The fundamental difficulty of the Dutch market-based policy is reconciling the business-
oriented motivations of competitive private markets with the legislative goals of improving 
quality, enabling choice, enhancing affordability and supporting social solidarity (Maarse et 
al., 2016). Kroneman et al. (2016) state: “Yet, friction seems to be growing between 
competition as the driver of the healthcare system and reforms that demand cooperation 
and integration among actors (p. xxvi).”  
 
Canadian Health Ministers and bureaucrats might find it extremely difficult to limit 
their primary role to oversight instead of direct administration and imposing plan design 
and funding. Recurring fears of privatizing and “two-tier” health care are real political 
threats and even the act of confirming or institutionalizing private drug insurance through 
regulation will be challenged unless the public supports this. As my interviews revealed, the 
relationships among public and private health stakeholder groups in Canada either do not 
exist (insurers and health ministries) or are fraught with mistrust (pharma and payers). 
 
5.3.4.3.2 Regulation 
The Dutch model includes heavy regulation of insurers. In contrast, the federal Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Services does not regulate Canadian health insurance. The 
provinces regulate insurer marketing but not plan design. Only Quebec makes eligibility 
mandatory and regulates a minimum formulary and a basic risk-sharing mechanism among 
insurers.  
 
Regardless of the model to be implemented in Canada, laws and regulations would have 
to be restructured to bring private drug plans (assuming they continue) under the law to 
protect the public interest. The degree of regulation would vary according to policy goals 






5.3.4.3.3 Selective contracting 
This was introduced in the Netherlands in 1992 and now includes factors such as price, 
quality, and access (waiting times, opening hours).  
 
Currently in Canada all regulated health professionals and institutions are equally 
qualified and accessible. Since the 1980s, almost all pharmacists and dentists, and more 
recently other regulated professionals have been enrolled in electronic networks operated 
by private-sector pharmacy benefit managers under contract to insurers, or by Green Shield 
and the Blue Cross organizations. Canadian benefit carriers (i.e., Sun Life and Green Shield) 
are beginning to collect plan member ratings of health professionals like pharmacists and 
dentists but this is likely only the first step in differentiating patient-perceived quality and 
perhaps to linking scores to provider compensation. (Patient ratings will need to be 
validated to objectively measure provider quality.) 
 
While this broadly supports the public interest, it also creates challenges. First, robust 
information management systems are needed. Second, prescribers and dispensers may have 
trouble agreeing to provide quality information or responding to its findings, especially if 
the outcome is lower compensation. Third, support for such changes is uncertain since 
patients and governments sometimes value convenient access over higher quality or lower 
price. Fourth, regulatory colleges may have concerns if insurers start to differentiate among 
equally qualified regulated professionals unless the public interest is clearly demonstrated. 
 
5.3.4.3.4 Information Technology (IT) 
The Advisory Council (2019a) made three initial recommendations, and one was to: “Invest 
in drug data and information technology systems” that would track prescriptions from the 
physician to adjudication to post-marketing data collection (p. 7). The 2019 federal budget 
ignored this recommendation, but the Advisory Council’s final report (2019b) reinforced the 
need: “The council is keenly aware that data on prescription drugs in Canada is fragmented 
and incomplete. We at times found it tremendously difficult to get information we needed 
on how Canadians use prescription drugs, to learn about the impact of prescription drugs 
on the health of Canadians, or to find out who spends what on prescription medicine” (p. 
102). There are at least two opportunities for IT infrastructure to manage drug costs. 
 
The first is risk-adjustment. The Netherlands has a sophisticated system that works well 
to equalize morbidity across all health insurers, but the model must be continuously 
refined to monitor new market practices, deliberate or otherwise. It requires robust data to 
minimize gaming opportunities by insurers. While Canada may be able to learn from the 
Dutch (and other) countries and start with a more robust model, this would also require 
data and reporting that does not currently exist. Quebec’s risk sharing model reportedly 
includes fewer and simpler data – insurers must track the number of employees by 




The second opportunity is better performance monitoring. Technology must be 
sufficiently integrated and robust to measure and forecast system performance in terms of 
cost, quality and access (Advisory Council, 2019a).181 Misunderstanding and mistrust are 
likely to be more evident in the absence of robust drug claims data collection, analysis and 
reporting. At present, there is no integrated information technology system that includes all 
of the nearly 700 million prescriptions written each year in Canada.182  
 
Whether in system governance or planning a market-oriented managed competition 
system for drug insurance, Canada’s historical behaviour indicates it is not ready to copy 
the Dutch system in any comprehensive way.  
 
5.3.5 Outcomes: Drug Policy and Spending post-2006 Reform 
At a system level, at least some hospital wait time indicators – the catalyst for reform 
legislation in 2006 – have shown improvement and NZa reported some were better than 
national standards by 2013 (Maarse et al., 2016).183 The OECD (2017) stated wait times were 
at a “historically low level (p. 12)” following an agreement about waiting times signed in 
2009 between providers and insurers. All insurers still offer waiting list mediation services. 
 
Administrative costs have also decreased, in part due to market consolidation. 
Administration costs in 2005 (before reform) were 4.2% for social insurers and 10.7% for 
private insurers. In 2013, these costs had decreased to a combined figure of 3.5%, including 
commissions and marketing (Maarse et al., 2016). 
 
While Canada’s drug cost increase has been relatively modest (about 2% compounded 
annually) between 2008 and 2017, the Netherlands is one of only six OECD members to 
have experienced a decrease in per capita drug cost (Figures 5.4 and 5.5).184 Other variables 
held constant, if Canada had the same per capita costs our total drug costs (Rx + OTC) 
would be almost CA$21 billion lower in 2017, dropping from $39.8 billion to $19.0 billion. 
A saving of even half this would be compelling, but must be considered in the context of 
the overall health system. 
 
 
181 One of the three recommendations was “to invest in drug data and information technology (IT) systems (p.7).”  
182 About 673 million retail prescriptions were dispensed in Canada in 2017 - see: https://www.iqvia.com/-
/media/iqvia/pdfs/canada-location-site/yir_2017_infographic-
final.pdf?la=en&hash=D13B58D8E8AB98993F3AEFCD60E623B9CC4BFF43. No drug claim system has complete national 
data. Claim systems installed in retail pharmacies do not send all claims through the provincial system before allocating 
them to the appropriate private insurer. This prevents a complete provincial record. CIHI relies on the CLHIA to provide 
health claims but these are not reported by province. Not all private insurance companies provide drug claim data to 
IQVIA, although this company has most of the available data. The PBO costing report noted IQVIA could not allocate drug 
claims proportionately to each payer so it attributed funding only to the majority funder. Quebec’s drug claims have only 
recently been included in PMPRB’s NPDUIS-based reports. Drug claims for hospital in-patients are separate, as are cancer 
drug claims when provincial cancer agencies exist.  
183 Kroneman et al. (2016) reported similar results.  
184 Six of 36 OECD countries had lower per capita drug costs in 2016 than in 2008, based on available data (OECD Health 
Statistics 2018): Greece (estimate), Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands and Portugal.  
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Figure 5.4 – Netherlands Drug Price History 1996-2014 
 
Source: SFK, 2014 Facts and Figures report, page 21, Figure 1.4. Used with permission. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 – Netherlands Drug Price History 2012-2017 
 




The Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics (Stichting Farmacuitische Kengetallen: SFK, 
2017 and various) collects dispensing data from 95% of Dutch pharmacies covering more 
than 90% of residents. SFK annual reports are released in English every second year and the 
following information is derived mostly from those documents, unless otherwise 
referenced.  
 
The outcome of many policy changes and market forces is very significant. Between 
1996 and 2012, the drug price index dropped about 53% (Figure 5.4. SFK, 2012; p. 25). After 
the Index was re-set to 100 in 2012, Figure 5.5 shows the average price dropped another 
14% due to semi-annual price changes mandated under the 1996 Medicines Pricing Act (Wet 
Geneesmiddelen Prijzen: WGP). The WGP alone has contributed to average price decreases of 
3% to 4% annually (SFK, 2014, p. 14). However, insurer negotiations and practices have also 
had important effects, primarily from a preference policy.  
 
One important policy outcome is that generic drug market share increased from 47% of 
all prescription volume in 2003 (SFK, 2004, p. 9), to 59% in 2009 (SFK, 2010, p. 11) and to 
74% in 2016 (SFK, 2017, p. 13). Generics accounted for about 17% of all drug costs in 
2016.185 Generic prices typically stabilize at 15% of the brand drug price after about two 
years on the Dutch market (SFK, 2017, p. 13). The market share of generic drugs increased 
12% between 2009 and 2014, tied with Switzerland as the biggest increase among 20 
countries. The Netherlands also had the greatest volume of prescriptions filled with generic 
products in 2014.186 
 
In Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, drug spending follows different patterns than 
overall health spending in both amount and in rate of annual increase. This may be from 
accidental or deliberate policy and program decisions, or from other variables. Health 
system-level and broader cultural and demographic differences are not explored in this 
investigation. 
 
Canada’s health system history over decades has been marked with small, step-wise 
public policy and program changes rather than large-scale innovation and expansion driven 
by any burning platform (Boothe, 2015). The Advisory Council’s final report (2019b) and the 
2019 federal Budget suggest this is not changing. Similarly, most employers make only 
minor benefit plan changes and continue to accept annual increases in health benefits costs 
for fear of upsetting employees in an era of low unemployment and skills shortages. Data 
and documentation from the Netherlands suggest that bolder changes, carefully managed 
with genuine consultation, can provide exceptional results. 
 
 
185 As noted earlier, Canada has similar though somewhat lower figures: 72% of costs and 20% of volume. 
186 IMS Institute for Health Informatics, 2015. The role of generic medicines in sustaining healthcare systems: a European 




5.3.6 Criticisms of the Dutch health system 
There have been several criticisms of the Dutch system. While most are broader than drugs 
alone, they are listed to address potential criticisms of using the Netherlands as a 
comparator. These system issues affect Canada, and they affect prescription drugs as part 
of the larger health system. They may be summarized as: misinformation (see 1 below), 
similar quality and pricing issues (2), data issues (3), periodic cost escalation (4), disparities 
and inequity (5), and concern (still) about insurer behaviour and the effectiveness of 
regulation (6). The most drug-specific criticism of the Dutch (and German) approaches is the 
balance between statutory and voluntary insurance systems.  
 
1. Tunstall (undated) noted “an increasing number of people are not using the system 
due to user fees, especially visits to family doctors. (p. 5)” However, Westert and 
Wammes (2013) point out General Physician care is exempt from cost-sharing, as is 
maternity care and health care for children (p. 85). Tax credits (p. 109) are available 
to low income residents. Allin, Stabile and Tuohy (2010) report exemptions from the 
deductible for those with long-term chronic illness (p. 15).   
 
2. The Dutch have struggled to measure health system quality, incent providers and 
implement improvements (Vanden Ber et al., 2014). The government’s periodic 
Health Care Performance Report (National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM), 2015) pointed out significant variations in quality and price 
between providers. Medical practice variations have been a common finding in 
Canada and many other countries (Corallo et al., 2014). Private plan design 
parameters are not systematically collected or reported by insurers or by their 
industry association in Canada. While quality is negotiated between providers and 
insurers, it is not influencing purchase decisions nearly as much as price and service 
volume. Part of this is a lack of reliable quality indicators although some exist and 
others are under development (OECD, 2017b). Hendriks et al. (2009) measured seven 
quality markers in The Netherlands as determined by large patient samples in 2005 
through 2008, and found four markers improved, and three first declined and then 
rose to pre-2006 levels. 
 
3. Although the Netherlands has been a pioneer in producing comparative health 
system reports (OECD, 2017b), current and accurate comparative data has taken 
time to develop and disseminate (Tunstall, undated). The OECD (2015c) reported 
that spending data can take up to two years to be reported to the government’s 
Finance ministry. 
 
4. Between 2009 and 2012, health system costs increased as a percentage of GDP and 
increases were higher than OECD averages. Special agreements between the 
government and various providers (professionals and insurers) in 2012 helped 
moderate annual increases (OECD, 2017b). The rate of increase has been well below 
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the OECD average from 2013-14 through 2016-17, including two years of negative 
growth between 2013 and 2015 (OECD Health Statistics 2018).187  
 
5. There was a significant increase in the percentage of Dutch respondents to a 
Commonwealth Fund (2016) survey who did not access their physician (12% in 2013, 
vs. 2% in 2011), or undergo medical tests or treatment (16% vs. 3%) due to costs. As 
in other countries, an inverse relationship between income and use of health 
services has been reported, and this included buying prescription drugs (National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), 2015). About 1.6% (277,000) 
defaulted on their annual health insurance premium in 2016 (OECD, 2017b). 
 
6. Voluntary private insurance provides extra services only to those willing and able to 
pay. This issue is somewhat blunted since so many (84%) purchase voluntary 
insurance and because government subsidies are available to about 30% of the 
population. However, since most people buy voluntary insurance from their basic 
plan insurer, insurers can offer low voluntary premiums to preferred-risk people 
they want to insure for both basic and voluntary plans (van Ginneken, Swartz & Van 
der Wees, 2013).  
 
5.3.7 System Governance 
One of the biggest differences between Canada and both the Netherlands and Germany is in 
the frequency of meaningful course correction through legislation and regulation. Over the 
last two decades, the Dutch health care environment has been punctuated with active 
governance and fundamental change, new laws and heavy regulation, and a familiar back-
and-forth debate on how to resolve insurance logic and modern welfare state logic (Vonk & 
Schut, 2018). Germany has also regularly updated its health and drug legislation over the 
last 30 years (Table 5.5). The NZa and Germany’s FJC fulfill similar oversight and control 
roles and provide an organizational buffer for politicians. There is no similar entity in 
Canada’s confederation. 
 
Power relationships between the major players has proven challenging in the 
Netherlands (Maarse et al., 2016). As directed by government, insurers have exerted 
purchasing power over hospitals and volume controls on physician services, and introduced 
reference drug pricing and generic drug tendering. Although the presumption is that 
insurers are acting on behalf of their patient-clients, they have not fared well in public 
opinion. When plans include selective contracting with preferred providers, patients must 
trust that insurers are as concerned with quality as with unit prices or service volumes.  
 
There is a cultural mismatch between the structure and operation of health care 
systems in Canada and the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a big advantage based on 
 
187 Author’s calculations from OECD data: Annual growth rate of government and compulsory health insurance schemes, 
per capita expenditure, in real terms. Calculated and Dutch growth rate (bracketed): 2013-14: 4.3 (-1.0); 2014-15: 2.7 (-
2.0); 2015-16: 3.9 (1.6); 2016-17: 3.7 (3.3). 
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drug cost and coverage outcomes and improved collection of quality data. The Dutch social 
insurance model has been regularly adjusted to fit its culture of market orientation. Social 
solidarity is reinforced through heavily regulated Insurance and provider services to serve 
the public interest. The Dutch government has often intervened to lower drug prices 
following its twice-annual reviews. These qualities are mostly missing in Canada. 
 
Canada can reflect a health culture of policy confusion (OHIP+; 
regionalization/centralization) and inertia (national pharmacare, PMPRB reform). The 
provinces have cooperated in drug price negotiations and are very slowly synchronizing 
their generic formularies, but there are still significant differences in eligibility, cost-sharing 
and access to specialty, gene and cell therapy. An important question is whether Canada 
could lower drug prices by following the Dutch approach. Unfortunately, there is little 
evidence of a determined effort to develop an integrated national prescription medicines 
policy or intensify price and cost control activities. Public and private payers largely remain 
in their own silos. Two prime examples: 
 
1. Reform of the PMPRB’s 32-year old mandate will be changed effective July 1, 2020, a 
process that took four years. Public input on its Guidelines (June 2016) and 
Regulations (June 2017) was requested. Changes were proposed in May 2017188 
originally to be effective on January 1, 2019.189 This long and uncertain process 
creates considerable uncertainty for drug manufacturers. 
 
2. Canada announced an Initial Draft Discussion Document for A Canadian Orphan 
Drug Regulatory Framework190 in December 2012. By October 2017 all references to 
the Draft had been removed from the Health Canada website.191 Then a “national 
strategy for high-cost drugs for rare diseases” was announced in the 2019 federal 
Budget and by the Advisory Council (2019b) but funding is deferred until 2022-
23…the end of the next session of Parliament when a different party may change 
direction. 
 
More broadly, both the Netherlands and Canada have struggled with long health system 
wait times. Again, the approach and the success are considerably different between the two 
countries. Dutch wait time indicators improved after 2006 and many continue to meet 
standards. In Canada, the $5.5 billion Wait Times Reduction Fund addressed just five 
clinical areas192 starting in 2004. After ten years of extra funding, the results were mixed 
and uncertain. CIHI (2012) reported: “Different time frames, definitions, summary measures 
 
188 See: https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-regulations-patented-medicine/document.html.  





192 There were five broad areas named, but only specific procedures (in brackets) were targeted: Cardiac care (bypass 
surgery), Cancer care (radiation therapy), Diagnostic imaging (MRI and CT scans), Joint (knee and hip) replacement and 
Sight restoration (cataract surgery). 
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and inclusion criteria [meant] no interprovincial comparisons [were] possible likely because 
each jurisdiction managed its own strategy” (p. 4). This lesson suggests real challenges for 
the federal government if it introduces national standards as part of national pharmacare, 
even with generous funding. 
 
The Canadian group insurance industry – insurers and advisors – operate independently 
of governments and have even less incentive to aggressively lower drug costs because their 
administrative charges and commissions are based on a percentage of drug premiums or 
claims, and not on a per transaction basis. Higher drug prices and pharmacy fees mean 
higher insurer revenues. Dutch insurers are mandated to negotiate lower prices and better 
quality. While both public and private payers negotiate drug prices (most new drugs by the 
pCPA, and far fewer among private payers) through Product Listing Agreements, the terms 
are confidential. Private insurers and pharmacy benefit managers incur extra cost for this 
work but get no credit from their customers for lowering drug prices, an oddity in a 
competitive market. 
 
5.4  Summary of International experience: Germany and The Netherlands 
The recurring struggle of introducing national pharmacare in Canada demonstrates 
Enthoven’s complaints of the NHS in the 1980s. As Boothe (2015) makes clear, the Canadian 
health system seems to prefer small-step and slow-moving change even when something 
different is required to fix an important problem. 
 
Germany and the Netherlands were selected because they have social insurance systems 
that are founded on the same principles of social solidarity but have taken different 
approaches to reflecting their own political, structural, historical and popular needs. They 
have integrated planning for both social and private insurance systems. The private role has 
encouraged a competitive market that can adapt to a fluid, steadily evolving drug insurance 
system. Governments have supported more types of drug price and cost controls than in 
Canada. The Dutch model of managed competition, in particular, appears to have achieved 
superior value for money in drug access.  
 
Both EU countries have aggressively managed their legislative and regulatory framework 
to address drug cost issues. This has happened despite having a much larger domestic 
pharmaceutical industry (in absolute terms for Germany and in relative terms for the 
Netherlands) that is a very important driver of employment and research and development 
investment. Germany’s prices and policies are more transparent. While its patented drug 
prices are significantly higher (PMPRB, 2018a), Germany’s per capita drug spending (after 
removing the 19% VAT) is significantly lower than Canada’s according to OECD reports. 
Unlike Canada, Germany’s policy includes some controls and incentives for improved 
physician prescribing, which Canada may now consider (Advisory Board 2019b). All three 
countries have achieved very high generic penetration though Germany and the Netherlands 




In structure, the Dutch approach of a universal Basic plan seems more appropriate for 
Canada and more equitable. Unlike Germany, we have no legacy of sickness funds aimed at 
low and middle earners. Access to private health insurance by exempted segments of the 
population creates equity and financing concerns. The earmarked contributions of SHI 
models funded by employers, workers and the state tend to generate greater public support 
because funding can be more easily compared to the benefits received (Allin, Stabile & 
Tuohy, 2010).  
 
Drug costs per capita in the Netherlands are among the lowest in the OECD. Its overall 
health expenditure is higher, however, driven by its costly long-term care sector but also 
reflecting its greater national wealth. Its transition to today’s model was long and somewhat 
painful. Many private insurers left the market but those that remained ultimately took over 
the public sickness funds. The single, mandatory national health system introduced in in 
2006 has reinforced social solidarity and significantly reduced private insurer 
administration costs (Allin, Stabile & Tuohy, 2010). It is unclear what difference not-for-
profit status might make to insurer performance in the Netherlands, relative to the publicly-
traded, for-profit status of many of Canada’s insurers, including the three largest. Voluntary 
insurance and group coverage in the Netherlands remain very popular despite the wide 
coverage and relatively low out-of-pocket cost. While insurers continue to compete on 
service, price, operational efficiency, Dutch reforms have yet to demonstrate a material 
effect on quality. 
 
Broader governance participation in both Germany (through the FJC) and the 
Netherlands (through mandated patient involvement with insurers and providers) is 
appealing even if confined only to prescription drugs. There is growing but still limited 
experience with this in Canada.193 Broader governance participation better reflects the 
increased complexity of health care and drug insurance and dampens the opportunity to 
politicize decisions. Governments could rely on more diffused responsibility for policy and 
program decisions. That is important because improvement will take far longer than a four-
year election cycle, as the Netherlands has demonstrated. 
 
Operating a federally-governed health system may be easier than Canada’s patchwork of 
provincial jurisdictions, but lower levels of government may also be better suited for 
adapting policy to local and regional situations.  
 
While Germany established the social insurance model 136 years ago, the Netherlands 
has demonstrated its adaptability to introduce an even more market-oriented system. That 
suggests the Canadian situation can also be transitioned from today’s large, though largely 




193 Examples would be the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care’s Citizen’s Council and CADTH’s Patient and 
Community Engagement Framework. See: https://www.cadth.ca/patient-and-community-engagement.  
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Both these EU governments have refined its governance role over time to provide 
appropriate and effective regulations and oversight, facilitate stakeholder discussion, 
protect public values and reinforce solidarity by developing consensus. Both countries have 
much more sophisticated risk-sharing controls on health insurers designed to curtail 
behaviour not in the public interest. Such a framework would have to be developed here.  
Clear rules and roles ought to improve trust which is a necessary foundation given the 
otherwise competitive role of these players.  
 
Although this comparative review cannot conclude Canada should adopt either 
country’s model in whole, it is reasonable to assume a more regulated and better governed 
mixed funding model could work and be no less effective than a single payer. Quebec’s 
experience (Sec 6.7) indicates the model is not as important as the quality of governance 
and the execution of timely policy changes.  
 
5.5 Quebec 
Quebec implemented a social insurance model in January 1997 (Pomey et al., 2007; Busby 
and Robson, 2011; Institute for Competitiveness & Prosperity, 2014) with a formalized 
private-public partnership to provide mandatory drug insurance to all residents. Before 
then, 15% to 21% of the population had no drug coverage and others had only partial 
coverage.194 With the introduction of universal coverage, the number of provincial claimants 
reportedly increased from 1.5 million to 2.1 million (Actegis, 2018). After 1997, private drug 
plans could no longer discriminate on the basis of age (up to 65), sex (virtually never an 
issue in practice), or health status (e.g., through the exclusion of pre-existing conditions), 
and coverage had to be at least as generous as the provincial plan administered by the Régie 
de l'assurance maladie du Québec (RAMQ). Employers do not have to cover drugs unless 
they provide any form of health or disability plan, but if they do, coverage is mandatory for 
all employees and their dependents. Private plans are first payer for those under age 65. 
Over 8,000 drugs are covered.195  
 
5.5.1 Cost sharing196 
Cost-sharing rules (except for the annual premium) apply to both RAMQ and private plans 
and change annually on July 1. Most private plans cover more drugs, have lower deductibles 
and coinsurance but may have higher premiums. For those aged 18-64 during 2019-2020: 
 
 
194 There are three sources. 1. Marc Desmarais, President, Conseil du Medicament, Province of Quebec reported 17% in a 
presentation, “Quebec’s “Régime général d’assurance médicaments” (Prescription drug insurance plan), undated. 2. 
Actegis (2018) states 1.1 million had no coverage, equal to 15% of QC’s 1996 population of 7.25 mm. 3. Labrie (2019) 
reported 1.5 million uninsured in Quebec in 1993, almost 21% of the population of 7.16 mm. These percentages are similar 
to AB and NB. 
195 Available at: http://www.ramq.gouv.qc.ca/en/citizens/prescription-drug-insurance/Pages/prescription-drugs-
covered.aspx.   
196 Available at: http://www.ramq.gouv.qc.ca/en/citizens/prescription-drug-insurance/Pages/rates_effect.aspx.  
 
 130 
• Annual premium for RAMQ beneficiaries varies by net family income and is from $0 
to $636. For private plans, premium varies and is negotiated by the insurer and the 
employer. 
• Deductible is $21.75 per month ($261.00 annually). 
• Coinsurance is 37% of the balance after the deductible. 
• Annual out-of-pocket maximum is $93.08 monthly ($1,117 annually). 
 
The combination of premiums, deductible and coinsurance means out-of-pocket cost is 




The RAMQ covers three groups: people age 65 or older who choose the RAMQ plan, those 
on social assistance, and those aged 18-65 (and their dependents) who are not covered by a 
private drug plan (Adhérants). Currently, about 3.6 million residents (RAMQ, 2018, p. 62) 
have prescription drug coverage through RAMQ. Table 6.9 provides comparative 
information. 
 
Table 5.10 – RAMQ Coverage by Number of Residents and Cost 






Seniors (65+) 1,376 2,323 641 
Adhérants 1,833 820 259 
Social Assistance 426 761 0 
Adjustments  (382)  
Totals 3,635 3,522 900 
Source: 2017-18 RAMQ Annual Report, pp. 62, 107, 109. *Personal cost means the payment 
of deductibles and coinsurance to a maximum annual out-of-pocket payment of $1,066 
(2017-18). 
 
In addition to the RAMQ drug cost noted ($3,522 million), $1,225 million in premiums 
are paid by Adhérants and seniors, and administration costs of $61 million are not 





Equity is provided through exemptions and subsidies for certain residents. The cost of 
the following groups is fully covered by the province (RAMQ 2018, p. 109):  
 
• Families on social assistance. (N=331,000) 
• Seniors receiving 94% or more of the federal Guaranteed Income Supplement.197 
(N=69,000) 
• Adhérants 
o Children under age 18, and people with disabilities. (N=197,000) 
o Full-time, unmarried students living with their parents between ages 18 and 
25. (N=32,000) 
o Low income adults. 
 
In all, 627,595 (22% of) RAMQ beneficiaries who have made at least one claim paid 
nothing for their provincial drug coverage. The subsidy for those people amounts to $1,054 
million (RAMQ 2018, p. 109). 
 
The most recent information is that about 878,000 people (24%) insured by the public 
plan pay nothing for their drugs and about 500,000 low-income persons pay no premium.198 
Quebec has the lowest estimated rate of cost-related non-adherence in Canada (Law et al., 
2012; Law et al., 2018). 
 
RAMQ (2018) reported 4.6 million people were covered by private drug insurance (p. 
107).199 The CLHIA (2018a) reported 5.9 million Quebec residents were covered by private 
extended health plans in 2017 within which drug coverage is mandatory. The difference is 
1.3 million people. The CLHIA attempts, perhaps unsuccessfully, to eliminate duplicate 
coverage which happens when one person is covered as an employee in one plan and a 
spouse in another, or when dependent children are covered in each parent’s plan. 
 
In addition to a much larger formulary, Labrie (2019) reported that Quebec residents 
have the advantage of access to more drugs approved by Health Canada than the average of 
other provinces (33.4% vs. 25.6%). Provincial coverage decisions were also made faster in 
Quebec than the rest of Canada after a new drug is approval by Health Canada: 477 days on 
average in Quebec instead of 674 days for other public drug programs. 
 
 
197 The maximum annual income eligible for the GIS for a single person between October 1 and December 31, 2015 is 
$17,280. Other income caps apply depending on spousal age and income. Source: 
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/oas/pdf/table-of-rates-oct-dec2015.pdf. There is a lower 
maximum out-of-pocket cost for residents receiving less than 94% of the maximum GIS. 
198 RAMQ news release, June 25, 2019. Available at: http://www.ramq.gouv.qc.ca/en/regie/press-
room/news/2019/Pages/public-prescription-drug-insurance-plan-changes-to-the-financial-participation-of-some-insured-
persons.aspx.  
199 The population of QC was 8.4 MM on July 1, 2018 (Statistics Canada, Table 17-10-0009-01. Population estimates, 
quarterly), leaving 0.2 MM unregistered or covered by private insurance.  
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5.5.3 Does Quebec Cost More? 
A major failing of Quebec drug policy has been cost control (Pomey et al., 2007; Smolina & 
Morgan, 2014; Gagnon, 2015). Smolina and Morgan (2014) calculated that Quebec spent 
about $1.5 billion more in 2012-13 than other provinces would have spent based on 
spending differences per capita. They calculated a difference of almost 23%200 on a $6.6 
billion annual drug budget.201 Most (80%) of this difference was due to more prescriptions202 
and higher prices paid (26%), offset slightly by the use of somewhat less expensive drugs 
overall (– 5%).  
 
Pomey et al. (2007) cite the Quebec Minister of Economic Development who attributed 
this extra cost to the 18,600 jobs provided directly by pharmaceutical manufacturers in the 
province (p. 475).203 Industry employment is now considerably less. Pharmaceutical and 
medical manufacturing jobs in Quebec reportedly fell 28 per cent between December 2006 
and October 2011, from 10,422 jobs to 7,549 (Silcoff & Marotte, 2012). Still, the Patented 
Medicine Prices Review Board continues to report that Quebec has disproportionately more 
research and development (R&D) work by patented medicine manufacturers relative to its 
population – 34% of Canadian R&D in 2017 (PMPRB, 2018 p. 60) versus its 23% share of 
Canada’s population.204 However, Quebec’s share of R&D is declining: it was 41% in 2012 and 
44% in 2007 (PMPRB Annual Reports). Persistently lower employment and research spending 
may be part of the reason why Quebec has recently made changes to its industrial policy for 
this sector. 
 
Some of the higher cost is also due to Quebec’s reluctance to engage in Product Listing 
Agreements before it joined the pCPA in 2015. Using data from Ontario’s Auditor General 
2017 Annual Report that reported Ontario had created savings of 15.2% of its total public 
drug program costs in 2015-16, Actegis (2018, p. 27) estimated Quebec could have saved 
$352 million that same year if it had all the same PLAs in force as Ontario. In 2017-18, 
Quebec received drug price rebates of $222.3 million on 82 products (RAMQ, 2018, p. 110). 
 
Since at least 2002, Quebec’s per capita drug costs have been described as the highest in 
Canada (Pomey et al., 2007; Smolina and Morgan, 2014). Quebec dropped to third highest in 
 
200 This is higher than CIHI (2013) which showed a 17% difference in 2012. Smolina and Morgan report 5% of the excess is 
due to age differences in the population of Quebec versus the rest of Canada. See Table A, Canada, per capita ($795), and 
Table B, Quebec, per capita ($928). Note that CIHI averages all of Canada, while Smolina and Morgan remove Quebec 
before calculating the average for the rest of Canada which helps explain the larger difference. 
201 This figure is not easily reconcilable with CIHI data that shows 2012 spending in Quebec of $7,532 MM on prescription 
drugs. Of that total, Quebec provincial spending is $2,457 plus Drug Insurance Funds (premiums) total $886, equalling a 
sub-total of $3,343 MM. This is about equal to drug spending of $3,315 MM shown in the 2012-13 RAMQ Annual Report 
(p. 96). 
202 Smolina and Morgan reported the average days’ supply dispensed in QC was 20, versus 36 in SK, 39 in MB, 41 in ON, 46 
in AB and peaking at 51 in NS.  
203 Many of the major brand drug companies maintain their Canadian head offices in Quebec, such as Merck, Novartis, 
Pfizer, PharmaScience, Sanofi and Bausch Health, among others. 
204 Statistics Canada, as at Q4 2019. See: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000901.  
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in total per capita prescription drug spending in 2013 but is again the highest, 15% above 
the national average (CIHI, 2018a).  
 
The private per capita share of drug spending in Quebec is equal to the national average 
(57%) and almost identical to Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta (Table 6.9). ESC (2019) reported 
specialty drug use is higher in Quebec than other provinces (p. 62). 
 
The provincial share of per capita drug spending in Quebec ranks third highest by 
dollars and second lowest by percentage among Canadian provinces. These figures do not 
include premiums contributed to the Drug Insurance Fund (DIF) by individuals which are 
counted as public by convention. Spending differences may be due to many reasons, such as 
plan design, age, ethnicity, prevalence of private coverage, disease incidence and prevalence, 
treatment access and protocols, prescriber and pharmacy behaviours, and policy decisions 
(Table 5.11). There is a nearly ten year difference in median age among ten provinces, with 
Quebec ranked fifth. 
 












NL 274 905 30.3 66 46.5 
PEI 243 747 32.5 65 43.6 
NS 291 962 30.2 67 45.1 
NB 270 1,018 26.5 70 45.9 
QC 294 1,046 28.1 57 42.5 
ON 393 940 41.8 56 40.6 
MB 244 692 35.3 55 37.3 
SK 290 784 37.0 52 37.3 
AB 379 887 42.7 55 36.9 
BC 221 664 33.3 61 42.2 
Canada 330 909 36.3 57 40.8 
Sources: (1) CIHI, 2018a. Table G. (2) Statistics Canada: Population Estimates on July 1, by 




Table 5.12 shows that the overall provincial share of costs in Quebec has escalated 
somewhat less than in Ontario and considerably less than in Alberta since 1997. However, 
the Quebec provincial increase is 88% higher than British Columbia has experienced. Each of 
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these provinces has very different eligibility and cost-sharing criteria. However, over the last 
15 years, Quebec social security (Drug Fund) premiums generally increased much more than 
costs for the Quebec government and other provinces. Costs have shifted to citizens who 
contribution to the DIF.  Increases have been more similar in recent years. 
 
Table 5.12 – Percent increases in provincial per capita drug costs, selected years 





10.8 6.9 4.4 -3.3 3.1 173 
Quebec – Drug 
Insurance Fund 
25.9 29.7 10.5 6.4 -4.3 383 
Ontario 8.8 10.1 5.6 0.7 8.1 189 
Alberta 6.5 12.5 2.1 -0.06 4.6 295 
British 
Columbia 
8.4 -2.8 2.3 -3.3 1.9 92 
Source: CIHI 2018a, Table G. Notes: (1) “Cumulative” is the percentage increase calculated 
by dividing the 2018F per capita provincial spending amount (not shown) by the same 
figure noted for 1998. (2) The QC DIF is considered public spending even though 
contributions are paid by individuals. (3) The 2018 increase in Ontario reflected new 
spending from OHIP+. (4) The BC provincial share increased much less than the other four 
segments, and was the lowest in Canada in 2018F. However, BC’s costs were the second-
highest among all provinces in 1998, second only to Ontario ($115 vs. $136). 
 
5.5.4 Policy Roadblocks 
Under RAMQ’s “BAP 15” rule, brand drugs enjoyed 15 years’ protection from generic 
substitutes but also required drug manufacturers to provide the “Best Available Price” in 
Canada to Quebec (Paris & Docteur, 2006). The 15 year period began when a brand drug was 
listed on the RAMQ formulary and continued even though generic products may have been 
(and were frequently) available earlier. In other provinces, 20-year patent protection begins 
when a drug’s product or process patents are filed with the Canadian Intellectual Property 
Office. The Quebec rule was introduced in 1994 and rescinded in January 2013. At that time 
a drug price freeze was also implemented (Norton Rose LLP, 2012). One report indicated the 
net cost to the province of BAP-15 had risen to $193 million annually by 2011-12, making it 
no longer feasible (Lacoursière 2012, in Actegis 2018, p. 20).  
 
Since January 2013, Quebec’s private plan generic fill rate has been increasing faster 
than other provinces but it still lags the Canadian average. It was 54% QC and 57% nationally 
in 2013 (Express Scripts Canada (ESC), 2014, p. 35). Across both private and public plans, 
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generic substitution rates in Quebec (75%) were higher by volume than the Canadian average 
of 72% (CGPA, 2018). In private plans, Quebec’s generic fill rate increased the most of all 
provinces from 53% in 2014 to 62% in 2018, and is now just slightly below the national 
average of 63% (Telus, 2019, p. 17-18). 
 
Another unique policy decision is that Quebec pharmacists are not required to provide 
100-day supplies of well-tolerated chronic use drugs, as is the general practice across 
Canada. Instead, 30-day supplies are dispensed, meaning pharmacists earn three dispensing 
fees when most often a single fee would be paid for the larger quantity elsewhere (Smolina 
& Morgan, 2014). In 2012, 99.5% of all maintenance drug claims in Quebec were dispensed 
with 30 days’ supply or less. The comparable Canadian private plan figure was 60% (Express 
Scripts Canada (ESC), 2013, p. 61). On average, Quebec private-pay prescriptions contained 
35 units of oral solid drugs, only 55% of the 64 units dispensed in Ontario (PMPRB, 2015b, 
p. 25). The average quantity supplied per prescription in Quebec is about half (54%) the level 
in the other nine provinces. Quebec with 23% of the national population accounts for 43% of 
all prescriptions.205 
 
Finally, members of private plans usually pay a share (50% or less) of the market 
premium negotiated between the employer and the insurer. Although likely rare, it is 
possible the provincial plan could have lower monthly premiums. This situation has not 
been evaluated. 
 
Gagnon (2015) called the RAMQ model “inequitable, inefficient and unsustainable.” He 
stated: 
 
• “The public [drug] plan tends to balance its budget by shifting costs onto the 
shoulders of private plans rather than containing its costs.” There is another side: 
 
o For many years, all provincial plans have shifted costs to private plans by 
listing products much more slowly or by negotiating lower prices that apply 
only to the province through confidential Product Listing Agreements.  
 
o Quebec has typically listed far more new drugs than other provinces, and 
lists them much faster than all other provinces (Gamble et al, 2011).  
 
o Until December 2015, Quebec was not part of the pan-Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Alliance (pCPA) and its legislation did not allow it to 
negotiate Product Listing Agreements. However, Section 60 of the 
Medications and Pharmaceutical Services Act Respecting Prescription Drug 
Insurance206 was changed in April 2015 (Fasken Martineau, undated), and 
shortly after the province announced it would join the pCPA. While the prices 
 
205 Personal communication. IQVIA, Canadian CompuScript. MAT September 2017. November 10, 2017. 




negotiated remain secret, private insurers and brand drug manufacturers are 
now negotiating their own PLAs (PDCI Market Access, 2015) and the CLHIA 
wants to join the pCPA (Personal correspondence, 2015).207 
 
• Private plans are inefficient because “drug plans without the capacity to evaluate 
cost-effectiveness become a major source of waste.”  
 
o Economic analysis is rare but increasing in private drug plans. All three of 
the largest Canadian insurers now consider CADTH recommendations. 
Manulife was the first to launch its DrugWatch program in 2015.208 Telus 
Health, the largest Pharmacy Benefit Manager, also performs an economic 
analysis on new drugs.209 
 
o It is also important to remember that employers cover a working population 
and private drug plans are part of employee compensation. Employers have 
different motivations, such as productivity, employee satisfaction and good 
labour relations, and so often choose to pay for drugs that provincial plans 
do not. That noted, there is wasted spending when generic and therapeutic 
substitution happen less than in provincial plans, and when pharmacy fees 
and drug mark-ups are not controlled. Express Scripts Canada had estimated 
one-third of every dollar spent on chronic use prescription drugs is wasted.210 
 
• Gagnon did not specifically address his statement about unsustainability. 
 
o The sustainability issue is important for both private and provincial drug 
plan managers in Canada and elsewhere. In Canada, the threat is greater 
among small employer plans where company finances may be inadequate to 
cover even one specialty drug claim, and where employees are not often 
represented by a labour union. Anecdotally – and there are no other data 
available – some small employers have terminated their “defined benefit” 
drug plans in favour of “defined contribution” plans where their liability is 
capped at a set level each year, such as $5,000 or $10,000. Such plans cover 
routine claims, but will leave thousands of dollars payable by employees – or 
transferred to provincial drug plans – in the event of a typical specialty drug 
claim. While provincial drug plans work within annual budgets, governments 
have theoretically unlimited taxation power to fund such entitlements. 
 
 
207 Personal communication with Stephen Frank, (then) VP Policy Development and Health, Canadian Life and Health 
Insurance Association. Letter dated September 22, 2015. 
208 See: http://www.benefitsconsultant.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Manulife-DrugWatch-Brochure.pdf 
209 O’Reilly D, 2019. Evidence-informed drug reimbursement: The role of health economic evaluation. Presentation available 
at: https://plus.telushealth.co/blogs/health-benefits/en/telus-health-2019-conference-toronto/ 
210 This statement appeared in its 2012 Drug Trend Report although ESC no longer supports this statement. Personal 
communication, J. Herbert, ESC, August 23, 2018. 
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5.5.5 Risk-sharing through industry pooling211 
Each year, the insurers operating in Quebec update a mandatory, self-regulating pooling 
mechanism that applies to all insured and Administration Services Only (administered by an 
insurer but self-insured by the plan sponsor) group drug plans except those having at least 
6,000 employees. The pool is operated by the industry-owned Quebec Drug Insurance 
Pooling Corporation under the authority of the Quebec government. The corporation’s small 
governing Board has representatives from insurers, employers and/or benefit plan 
administrators and/or trustees. Claim costs are transferred among the insurers on a break-
even basis so that no insurer or employer profits. Like all risk-sharing processes, insurers 
that better manage claims and keep them below the threshold may be disadvantaged over 
more laissez-faire claim management by other insurers. 
 
Pooling charges are collected as part of the group premium and pooling thresholds and 
charges vary by group size. Larger groups pool drug claims at higher levels and also pay 
lower charges per employee. For 2019, the threshold ranges from $8,000 per certificate 
(employee and all dependents) for groups with fewer than 25 employees, to $120,000 for 
groups between 1,000 and 3,999 employees.212 Once an employer has 4,000 or more 
employees, a “free market” exists because claims costs are highly predictable, employers are 
large enough to absorb most claims, and sophisticated enough to obtain pooling protection 
from their insurer. 
 
The Quebec system is different and more comprehensive than what the CLHIA 
introduced in the rest of Canada. 
 
5.5.6 Taxation 
Quebec charges premium taxes to employers with life and health plans, and this remains at 
3.48% of total premium. Quebec requires individuals to pay a 9% sales tax on group life and 
health insurance premiums.  These are general taxes, not specifically levied to provide for 
health services and help offset the above-average share paid by Quebec for its public drug 
plan. The Health Services Fund levies a payroll tax on employers of between 1.25% and 
4.26% of payroll depending on the employer’s industry and revenue.213 Unlike all other 
provinces, employer contributions to group medical and dental benefit plans are taxable 
benefits to employees, meaning there is no tax subsidy in Quebec. 
 
 
211 All information is from the Quebec Drug Insurance Pooling Corporation website: https://mutualisation.ca/en/.  
212 The 2019 Terms and Conditions are available at: https://mutualisation.ca/en/2018/10/22/2019-terms-conditions-are-
now-available/.  





While the Quebec drug plan is governed and operated by the Province, the role of private 
insurance is enshrined in the underlying legislation, An Act respecting prescription drug 
insurance (The Act), Section 3.214  
 
Section 37 of The Act prohibits group insurers or employers discriminating on the basis 
of age, sex or health status of the employee or a dependent, or “a person suffering from a 
functional impairment who is domiciled with the person.” 
 
Section 43 of The Act requires insurers and drug plan administrators to pool high-cost drug 
claims “according to the terms and conditions they determine.” Insurers and administrators 
must report their terms and conditions to the Minister by November 1 each year.  
 
The Act clearly provides a great deal of latitude to insurers and administrators to 
administer and report in accordance with the letter and spirit of the law. 
 
5.6 Summary: Quebec  
The social insurance model in Quebec specifically divides responsibility for universal drug 
coverage between the government and employers. It has significant premiums, coinsurance 
(37%, the highest in Canada) and deductibles. It also has generous exemptions and subsidies 
and caps individual out-of-pocket costs at just over $1,100 annually. The RAMQ limit on 
out-of-pocket cost is the same for all incomes, meaning it is regressive: it provides greater 
benefit to wealthier individuals who would find this amount more affordable. (Other 
provinces typically set personal cost limits as a percent of the prior year’s family income – 
see Table 4.2.)  
 
Until 2013, Quebec’s industrial policy favouring the pharmaceutical industry has 
superseded cost pressures from its health spending. Quebec’s BAP 15 policy, its decision to 
shield pharmacies from pricing transparency and its failure to negotiate drug prices with 
manufacturers have all driven up costs beyond those of other provinces. So did its decision 
to mandate a place for private insurers that have much higher administration costs and pay 
higher costs for a wider range of drugs than offered by the provincial plan. However 
squeezing them out would have alienated the private insurers that remain important 
corporate citizens, employers, and investors in Quebec (Pomey et al., 2007). In 2018, the life 
and health insurance industry employed 31,700 Quebecers and had $138 billion invested in 
Quebec.215 A fully provincial drug plan would also have cut significant provincial revenues 
for premium and retail sales taxes. 
 
 
214 An English version of the Act is available at: http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/A-29.01.   




The model has been criticized (Smolina & Morgan 2014; Gagnon, 2015) but they have 
not generally separated the model from the underlying policy. For example, although 
Smolina and Morgan report that 80% of the overspending is caused by more drugs 
dispensed per capita, and explain the balance by higher drug and pharmacy prices, they 
state higher overall use “may, in part, be explained by the introduction of Quebec’s 
compulsory drug insurance program…” (p. 24). They believe policy options will be difficult 
to introduce because of “structural inefficiencies created by the mixed funding model…” (p. 
25). Another explanation may be politics and slow-moving policy changes, but the model 
did not cause those. 
 
Since 2013, the province has dismantled many of the barriers to lower prices and costs 
it set up in an effort to support brand drug manufacturers with Canadian headquarters in 
the province. Generic substitution rates are now almost at the Canadian average. While the 
pharmacy industry has largely escaped demands for greater transparency and 
accountability, its autonomy could be reined in whenever sufficient political will exists.  
 
While the Quebec model of social insurance is not perfect, it mandated universal 
coverage 22 years ago and even under questionable policy, its financial performance has not 
been so far off provincial averages that it has not been able to recover ground quite quickly 
following recent policy changes. Pomey et al. (2007) wrote: 
 
Policy-making would be more responsible and have a better chance of success, 
[Giandomenico Majone (1975)] wrote, if it were founded on the scrupulous 
consideration of social, political, economic, and other constraints, rather than on 
theoretical arguments about what was most desirable. Twenty years later…Marmor 
reframed the issue in terms of the importance of an execution strategy, arguing that 
“we need to move beyond our preconceptions of plans to realistic forecasts of their 
implementation” (1994, p. 216).” (p. 486) 
 
Beyond financing, implementation is perhaps the most difficult aspect of any change 





5.7 Summary of Health System Features in Three Jurisdictions 
 
Table 5.13 – Key Drug System Comparators – Germany, Netherlands and Quebec 
 Germany Netherlands Quebec 
Health System 
Rank 
8th of 11 3rd of 11 9th of 11 (Canada) 
Drug Cost per 
capita 
$777 (5th) $406 (25th) $833 (4th) (Canada) 
Scope Universal health 
coverage regardless of 
age or health status 
for all employed 
citizens earning less 
than €60,750 (2019) 
annually. 
Civil servants, self-
employed and higher 
earners may purchase 
private coverage. 
Private health 
insurance (PHI) is 11% 
of all system 
spending. 
 
Basic universal health 
coverage regardless of 
age, health status or 
sex. Voluntary private 
insurance (VHI) covers 
84% of population and 
is 6% of spending. 
Universal drug coverage 
regardless of age, health 
status or sex.  
Private plans must be at 
least as generous as the 
Quebec provincial plan. 
Employers with a health 
plan must cover drugs 
for all employees. 
Province covers all 
others. Private health 
insurance covers 65% 
and is 12% of spending 
(Canada). 
Mandate Individual and 
employer. 
Employer and 





Governance Federal Joint 
Committee 
determines all health 
services and sets 
provider quality 
measures. 
FJC has 13 voting 
members from social 
insurers, physicians, 
hospitals, dentists, 3 
unaffiliated. Five 
Under the Health 
Insurance Act (Zvw), 
the government sets 
coverage with advice 
from the National 
Healthcare Institute 
(ZiNL). 
Régie de l'assurance 
maladie du Québec 
(RAMQ).  
Insurers are self-
regulated with annual 
report to the province. 
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 Germany Netherlands Quebec 
patient reps are 
observers. 
Funders 124 not-for-profit 
social insurers, 
residents and German 
government 
23 mostly not-for-
profit social insurers, 
residents and the 
Dutch government 
Provincial and federal 
governments, 
employers, residents. 
Most insurers are for-
profit. 









coinsurance with min. 
personal cost €5, max 
€10 per script. No 
coinsurance if drug 
cost is at least 30% 
below reference price 
(N=5,000 drugs).  
Insurers may risk-
share with individuals 
(rare). 
 




payroll tax: 12.65% 
with 6.95% paid by 
employers. Employees 
taxed on this. 
Annual health 
insurance premiums 
averaging €1,300 plus 
€385 deductible per 
adult. 
Government funds 
children, refugees, and 
certain services for all 
such as General 
Physician visits. 
Insurers may risk-rate 
under VHI, but none 
do. 
69% public, 31% private. 
Out-of-pocket: 15% 
(Canada). 
General tax revenues. 
QC Health Services Fund 
(Employers): 1.25% to 
4.26% of payroll 
depending on revenue. 
Retail sales tax: 9%. 
Insurance premium tax: 
3.48% 
RAMQ: Drug premium 
up to $636; deductible 
of $261, coinsurance 
37%. 
Private: Premium 
amount and sharing 
variable by plan; 20% 
coinsurance typical. 
Out-of-Pocket 
Drug Cost Limit 
2% of family income. 
1% for those with 
specified chronic 
diseases (all health). 
After Basic premium 
payment, the 
deductible is the limit 
(€385 – all health). 
$1,117 (drugs only). 
Private insurance 
cannot exceed RAMQ 
limit.  
Tax Subsidies About 9% are 
exempted due to 
income cap or chronic 
disease costs (Blümel 
and Busse, 2016). 
“Health care 
allowances” graduated 
for low income singles 
and families. Eligibility 
tested by incomes and 
assets. 
Focused on low income 
singles and families. 
One in 5 (22%) of those 
covered by RAMQ paid 
nothing for their drug 




 Germany Netherlands Quebec 
Formulary Negative formulary. 
All patented drugs are 
included but must 
have added benefit to 
get price premium 
over reference drug(s). 
Many generics are 
tendered for lowest 
price. 
Standard national drug 
list. Many drugs 
subject to reference 
pricing. Many generics 
are tendered for lowest 
price. 
Province sets drug list, 
minimum level of 
reimbursement (65.1%). 
No tendering. Generic 
price agreement with 
drug manufacturers. 
New drug prices 
negotiated since 2015. 
Risk-sharing Prospective. Age, sex 
and presence of 80 
chronic and costly 
diseases. 




1. No government 
subsidy. 
2. Personal risk is 
under-written at 
policy onset, then 
does not change.  
3. Employer 
contributes up to 
maximum social 
insurance premium 
but not more than 




Must set aside 
“aging reserves” 




Prospectively based on 
age, sex, income 
source, socio-economic 
status, region, if one of 
20 chronic diseases, if 
one of 13 in-patient 
diagnostic groups.  
In Quebec, the 
insurance industry 
manages a pool for drug 
claims exceeding a 
certain value according 
to the size of the 
employer. This claim 
pool is then allocated to 
each insurer operating 
in Quebec according to 
their market share. 
In the rest of Canada, 
insurers pool recurrent 
high-cost drug claims 
above a set annual 
threshold only for small 
employers with fully-
insured health plans. 
Open enrolment Twice annually. New 
applicants any time. 
Each January 1. New 
applicants any time. 
Not available. Automatic 








FJC. GKV-SV (insurer 
association) negotiates 




NZa. Zn (insurer 
association) negotiates 
with drug companies 
and pharmacies.  
RAMQ: By regulation up 
to late 2015. Drug price 
now as part of pCPA. No 
pharmacy mgmt.  
Private: Individual drug 
price negotiation now 






rates, premium and 
reserve calculations, 
premium changes, use 
of profits. 
PHI rates are set and 
frozen at enrolment 
based on age, sex and 
health status. 
Self-regulation. Self-regulation. Enforces 
mandatory minimum 
standards for plan 
design and eligibility. 
Government receives 






Drug prices for 
reference drugs and 
those with costs 30% 
below the reference 
price are public. The 




ensures better value 






physicians in cost 
control. 
German drug prices 
are still among the 
highest in the world, 
Unique to the three, 
The Netherlands has 
achieved much lower 
drug prices and costs, 
and has seen drug 
prices decline in some 
recent years. 
The private insurance 
market has retained 
significant competitive 
latitude, even though 
insurers are almost all 
not-for-profit. 
Managed competition / 
regulation in health 
insurance appears to 
be slowly achieving 
policy goals (e.g., 
improving quality), 
although the Dutch 
health system remains 
Canada has not 
introduced the price 
and cost controls found 
in other nations, 
especially reference 
pricing.  
Canada has not reacted 
to much diminished 
R&D spending by patent 
drug manufacturers. 
Canada has retained a 
fully private and 
competitive insurance 
market with a cost 
structure much higher 
than provincial drug 
plans. 
QC has an increasingly 
competitive market, 
now aligning with other 
provinces in pricing and 
policy. In the past, 
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 Germany Netherlands Quebec 
although this is 
balanced to some 




one of the most 
expensive in the world. 
industrial policy has 
inflated prices and 
costs. Pharmacy 
industry not subject to 
price controls. 







Opinion Leader Interviews: The federal role  
Research Question 2  
 
What advantages and disadvantages of our current shared-funding model are recognized by 
private and public drug plan opinion leaders?  
 
a. What are optimal roles for the federal government to play in achieving adequate 




This chapter will identify and examine the role of the federal government in achieving 
universal drug insurance, commonly known as national pharmacare. It outlines recent 
developments undertaken by the federal government, and reactions from provincial 
governments and private payers.  
 
As a reminder, this chapter relies on 26 semi-structured telephone interviews conducted 
with opinion leaders in 2017. Participants were drawn from the federal (N=4) and provincial 
(7) governments, private payers (7), professional associations (2), labour (2), business (1), 
public policy, (1), the pharmaceutical industry (1) and academia (1). 
 
Opinion leaders clearly and unanimously agreed the federal government’s engagement 
was crucial. Five themes regarding federal leadership were inductively uncovered: 
facilitation, research, funding, relationship management as well as nation-building.  
 
Opinion leader participants unanimously agree that the status quo must change but 
they differ in priorities, process and goals. Almost all are focused on lowering drug prices 
and costs. National pharmacare (NPh) has rapidly ascended to prominence over the last 
three years, and yet no participant in 2017 suggested it was imminent. Single payer is 
described as an ideal option by some participants but is described as impractical and 
unnecessary by other whose employer has a financial stake in the current model, such as 
insurers, pharmacy and the brand pharmaceutical industry. Those groups promote a ‘fill-
the-gap’ model that retains a role for private insurance. One of the major umbrella patient 
advocacy groups, the Best Medicines Coalition, is indifferent to the model.216 
 
Although one or two leaders blamed the bureaucracy for a lack of progress, positioning 
in the October 2019 election and this sample suggest the barrier is political. This is 
consistent with Boothe (2015) who has described NPh as a political deliberation. 
Responsibility for delay may rest with the Liberal party leadership since the membership at 
 
216 See Pharmacare Position Points: September 2019, available at: https://bestmedicinescoalition.org/ 
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its 2019 policy conference endorsed “Implementing Universal Access to Necessary 
Medicines” as their first priority.217 
 
6.1 Overview of the federal role 
Canada does not have an overarching strategy for its prescription drug programs (Morgan 
and Boothe, 2016). There are no explicit goals for $34 billion in total annual spending. A 
strategy and goals are structured to solve problems but the problem(s) may be unclear or 
contentious. The problems and solutions may be mismatched. One participant spoke for 
several when he said:  
 
“In many ways, pharmacare is a solution in search of a problem, a philosophical debate, 
as opposed to what is the problem we’re trying to solve? If it’s drug cost, pharmacare, 
most would argue, is not the solution. Providing more drugs to everybody is certainly not 
going to reduce cost. I think our biggest challenge is to identify what truly is the problem, 
which I don’t think anyone has done very well yet.” (Health professional association 
executive) 
  
However, the federal government has been clear that there are two problems from their 
perspective and they must be solved in order. The first is that drug prices are too high, and 
the best-matched solution is reform of the PMPRB and its potential integration under the 
Canadian Drug Agency. The second problem is the lack of universal access to a standard 
national formulary.  
 
That noted, the quote above indicates there is confusion among other stakeholders, and 
confusion creates resistance to change. Given our fragmented provincial and private 
systems, one important role for the federal government is to gain consensus on the 
problems and then mediate solutions with the provinces and possibly private payers to 
address those problems. Recent F/P/T meetings indicate this process has begun at least 
between governments, but progress is uncertain, other stakeholders may not have been 
engaged, and so decisions will be deferred. 
 
By convention, the provinces have authority over most operational aspects of health 
services, but the federal government provides funding through the Canada Health Transfer 
(and other means) which in turn provides leverage to pull the jurisdictions into new 
programs or improve existing ones. The important roles of each level of government are not 
explicitly set out in the Constitution Act of 1867. The Act and subsequent court decisions 
have given the provinces authority over hospitals, professional services, health care, public 
health and the market behaviour of insurance companies (Flood et al., 2018).  
 




The scope and impact of the federal role evolves as the Premiers change their positions. 
This is not predictable given provincial election cycles. It was previously noted (Section 
4.3.1)  
that the Premiers in power in 2004 wanted to hand drug programs to the federal 
government. But following their annual meeting in July 2018, the Premiers articulated four 
expectations of the federal government regarding NPh. In addition to improved access to 
therapies and better understanding of the administrative ‘business case’, they wanted to 
retain autonomy over the design and delivery of public drug coverage, they insisted that 
federal NPh funding be “long-term, adequate, secure, flexible and take into consideration 
present and future cost pressures” and they demanded full opt-out privileges and full 
financial compensation.218  (At that time, Quebec stated it would opt out.) Insistence on 
provincial autonomy has created significantly different entitlement programs across 
Canada, which creates important hurdles for a federal government intent on developing a 
national formulary and universal access. 
 
Given this background, the general question is whether or how the themes arising from 
participants may inform or predict federal policy, funding and program design, and how the 
current and emerging approach to NPh has been predicted by Kingdon. 
 
 
218 See: http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Final_communique_July_20-1.pdf.   
Potential Federal Roles 
A recent policy paper (Hartmann, Davidson & Alwani, 2018) identified seven objectives 
for the federal government (p.31) related to NPh. There was no clear definition of terms 
or any discussion of relative priority or the trade-offs among them.1  
 
1. Access (universal, or for selected population cohorts) 
2. Affordability (patient-level cost-sharing, including premiums) 
3. Consistency: Formulary  
4. Consistency: “Parameters” (variations in provincial program eligibility and out-of-
pocket costs) 
5. “Cost” efficiency (drug cost; drug price negotiation) 
6. Role of private (insurance)1 
7. Additional federal cost (multiple estimates, half without sources referenced) 
 
This 65-page report devoted less than one page to describing private insurance. Private 
insurance was not mentioned in the more detailed assessment and discussion of 
approaches, nor in the concluding chapter. (See Chapter 7) 
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6.2 Ideas from Experts 
The federal government already plays several roles in health, consisting of regulatory, such 
as drug approvals (safety and efficacy), reviews of new patented drug prices, clinical and 
economic reviews of new drugs, public health,  and funding of research (Canadian Institutes 
of Health Research), health information (Canadian Institute of Health Information) and 
health services from five federal health plans (Non-Insured Health Benefits, Military and 
RCMP personnel, Veterans, Corrections, Refugees) as well as coverage for federal employees 
and retirees. 
 
Active and retired senior bureaucrats responsible for administering provincial drug 
plans favoured the continued involvement of private insurance plans to help them manage 
both their budget and the public’s expectations. The Advisory Council (2019b) recently 
reported its recommendation for a public single payer drug plan to be phased in over eight 
years. This indicates some daylight between politicians who are largely responsible for the 
decision agenda and bureaucrats who are most knowledgeable about alternatives and 
implementation.  
 
The next sections use a range of expert opinion to identify four tangible roles believed 




When interviewed in 2017, none of 26 opinion leader participants anticipated the federal 
government’s commitment to publicly explore NPh in general, let alone its implementation.   
 
 “In my lifetime, I don’t believe it will ever happen.” (Former provincial drug plan 
manager) 
 
An important question is why these leaders, almost all of them senior and many of them 
very close to the issue, did not mention the federal government’s interest in NPh. Policy 
development does not appear to have included consultation with any of the experts 
included in this study. This suggests policy can be random, secretive or politically 
motivated219 rather than consultative, transparent and rationally constructed. While 
Kingdon’s model would properly position single payer NPh as an ‘off-the-shelf’ solution, to 
these experts it did not appear ripe for federal political interest. Cuts to the Canada Health 
Transfer had just been introduced and plan administrators knew NPh was likely to increase 
costs. They were certainly aware of previous NPh initiatives given their positions and 
tenure. The question was not “if” NPh would return to active consideration, but when. It was 
the timing that surprised them.  
 
 
219 Political motivation was frequently brought up when discussion turned to the Ontario government’s original OHIP+ drug 
plan. This Case Study is described in Sec 4.5.1. Policy must appeal to politicians and advance their decision agendas. 
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Virtually all participants believed that federal government involvement was essential for 
universal drug insurance to be developed, although a range of goals, processes and 
intensity was noted. In the absence of national standards or a strategy for access to 
prescription medicines, provincial responsibility for health care has led to a variety of plan 
designs and eligibility rules. Former provincial drug plan leaders pointed out that provinces 
are unlikely to improve eligibility or formularies without federal leadership and funding. 
Against this variation and interest in developing national standards and a national 
formulary is the HESA recommendation that drug plan consistency be voluntary for each 
province. This echoes the National Forum on Health (1997) which concluded: “While a 
national formulary for Canada might be considered, it is probably not necessary and could 
take a long time to develop… there would be no reason not to let each province establish its 
own rules” (p. 15).   
 
Finally, two participants cautioned that while our present discussion focused on drugs, 
we should understand drug insurance exists in the context of an entire health system.  
 
“… any discussion about a pharmacare program hopefully involves the federal actors 
that are responsible for industry strategy and support and that as well as price, so that 
we’re having an integrated conversation about the whole pipeline and not just the 
particular valves along the way.” (Labour policy expert) 
 
“… too often we talk about drug coverage and particularly outpatient drug coverage and 
we do not embed it in the context of health care as a whole for the patient.” (Federal 
senior bureaucrat) 
 
Contrary to these expressed views but consistent with its mandate, the Advisory 
Council’s final report (2019b) did not nest NPh in a broader system context. 
 
Eighteen participants made at least one comment on how the federal government could 
encourage NPh. No participant opposed an important federal role. The most commonly 
mentioned roles were financial or funding (N=10), administrative support such as 
facilitation, formulary development and principles (N=9), explicit leadership (N=8), and 
relationship management roles that enable policy and program development (N=8). These 
four have been grouped and labelled tangible. Specifically mentioned twice but perceived as 




Participants were asked generally about major problems and priorities, their preferences for 
the structure, administration and funding of prescription drug coverage and about 




The context of the following statement was about ideas and lost opportunities to act. 
Participants were asked about the structure of drug plans and how we might transition to a 
new model. The participant had countered that before that, “we have to agree on what good 
looks like.” 
 
“Government has many funding tools. A social insurance model is one. General tax 
revenue is another. A dedicated tax is another. But I think until we come to ground on 
what that type of coverage could look like, what do we want it to look like? What does 
good look like for Canadians? Then you can cost it. And then you can sit and have a 
reasoned discussion about can we afford this?” (Federal senior bureaucrat) 
 
This statement echoed comments made by others that problems, options and goals 
should be defined before we leap to solutions – a rational rather than political approach to 
policy. The context was more generic than specific to the federal government’s role. 
 
Among those with an opinion, there was general agreement the federal government will 
need to provide adequate and sustained funding. Without that, national pharmacare 
becomes unattainable. 
 
“I think if you’re coming to the table with money, then you’re at the table with a 
perspective and the right to be able to control certain things. Without putting federal 
money on the table, I don’t think the provincial governments are going to be even 
remotely interested in having a conversation that might somehow go to more of a federal 
[national] solution than a provincial one.” (Private insurance senior executive)  
 
This participant clearly stated that the ‘old way’ of provinces drifting along with only 
incidental alignment between them was unlikely to solve the need for universal drug 
insurance. New federal funding should be conditional on the provinces meeting national 
standards for eligibility and formulary.  
 
“…[no one] has [yet] suggested we use the same model for pharmaceuticals which would 
in essence entail re-acknowledging that delivery of a pharmaceutical insurance program 
would be at the provincial level, a provincial responsibility in the same way that the 
delivery of hospitals is a provincial responsibility. But that there would be a requirement 
to meet common standards in terms of who has access to coverage, what kinds of things 
are covered, etc., and under what conditions, and to have those standards in return for 
an appropriate measure of federal contribution for financing.” (Former senior federal 
bureaucrat) 
 
This is the crux of the constitutional allocation of responsibility for health insurance. 
While the Premiers clearly want to retain control and get new federal money, the federal 
perspective is that they must agree to act in the national interest by meeting new national 
standards, and new federal monies would now make that possible. The federal government 
has been very clear that consultation with the provinces is crucial to implementing NPh, and 
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that each province may opt in on its own schedule. Quebec is usually a special case, and 
would be very likely to continue its own plan: 
 
“I think for me, it's really that possibility to have a national drug insurance plan is more a 
political issue than a civil servant, I would say, issue, because we have one here in 
Québec. So I think there is no appetite I would say to try to modify it. In a sense, if the 
federal government decided to implement one, I think the Québec government would 
want to receive money and they will manage it like they are doing right now.” (Former 
provincial drug plan manager) 
 
There is a general consensus when participants spoke of funding that the federal 
government should come to the table with money in order to have legitimacy, leverage and 
greater persuasive power. This is consistent with the federal government’s greater fiscal 
capacity to spend. But the national standards discussed are not limited to a formulary 
design or universal coverage. They are framed very generally.  
 
“Personally I think they [the federal government] should probably define minimum 
coverage which should apply to all Canadians, but with that they will have to provide 
budget to the provincial governments to support that [unclear]. For me if they take the 
decision to impose a drug plan, a minimum for all Canadians, they will have to provide 
budget for it.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
The Premiers have been clear and consistent in their funding demands: “long-term, 
secure, flexible and fully offset present and future cost pressures” (Canada’s Premiers, 2019 
Final Communiqué, p. 2).220 The federal share of direct health spending has decreased 
significantly since hospital and physician coverage were originally introduced with 50-50 
funding and that has been a concern to provincial governments.  
 
“On top of all, you know the challenge that we’ve seen is that over the years the feds have 
stepped away from funding healthcare, and so they don't have the same influence over 
the provinces and the provinces haven’t got the same, we haven’t come up with the 
consistent goals of where we need to go.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
Before a program can be launched, even minimal funding can be useful to facilitate 
progress. For example, data and research are needed to consider any changes. 
 
“I don’t think they have to fund everything but I think them funding certain components 
really gives a lot of traction on moving an issue forward only because then it stops the 
jurisdictions from saying, oh well we would love to do this but we don’t have A, B and C. 
And then they can come in and say look, we’ll take that problem off your table and we’ll 
deal with it.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
 




The major challenge at the moment is that funding roles and commitments are purely 
speculative. Liberal policy is suggested through the Advisory Council’s report, but the 
government has not yet announced any model or mechanism.  
 
6.2.1.2 Administrative Support (Coordinator / Secretariat / Facilitator) 
This role was mostly derived from a question about the opportunity for substantive 
collaboration between governments and private payers. Some participants framed it more 
broadly to include both senior levels of government. Despite its periodic funding decisions 
that have harmed Federal/Provincial/Territorial (F/P/T) relations, in a very practical way, 
the federal government’s bureaucracy has facilitated provincial cooperation in the past and 
can continue this. They can propose national issues that need jurisdictional engagement. 
However, bridges between governments and private payers have barely been established. 
 
“I think one of the advantages of the federal government, so from a provincial 
perspective, people will look to them as the money-holders for some of this stuff. I don’t 
know how realistic that is… But I think they should be taking on that role to bring 
together folks to talk about common issues, to try to find some solutions… So they’re able 
to help mobilize, trying to move it from policy to reality. …In the previous years there 
used to be something called the Pharmaceutical Issues Committee [PIC]. There was a 
Secretariat within Health Canada that, they didn’t have a huge amount of staff but they 
were able to develop the white papers, the policy papers, engage folks in conversation, to 
do a lot of the legwork that’s needed to resolve some of these issues. Because in the 
absence of that, the individual jurisdictions will just say, look we’re really busy with our 
own issues. We just don’t have the time to do that.” (Former provincial drug plan 
manager) 
 
Previous experience noted above with the PIC and current success with the pCPA 
suggests a ready-made forum and process for bureaucrats to develop the operational goals, 
priorities and processes needed to implement national pharmacare. The pCPA also reports 
to the Premiers through the Council of the Federation, a direct line to real power. 
 
Such a forum might enable well-informed discussion of alternative models, including 
two provincial approaches that already exist in Canada: Quebec (social insurance) and the 
‘western Canada’ (catastrophic) model established in BC, SK and MB.   
 
“Really what we are talking about is how that share between government and private 
occurs within drug spending. Québec’s created a way to share it on populations and BC 
and Manitoba and Saskatchewan have learned how to share it on spend, economics. 
Which is better, I don’t know. When you look at Europe, one would say that Québec 
probably is more like Germany. BC and others are more like the NHS. Both seem to work. 
…I don’t know what the answer is, but I think that it’s tweaking either the Québec 
approach to make it applicable across the country or it’s tweaking the BC, Saskatchewan, 
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Manitoba approach to make it more applicable across the country.” (Former provincial 
drug plan manager) 
 
In other words, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, just adapt one of the two models 
for use across the country and bring all other plans up to that standard. Quebec’s goal was 
a unified system with universal coverage, while western Canada focuses on income-
dependent levels of catastrophic coverage. 
 
Some participants believe the provinces are unlikely to come together on their own to 
harmonize their plans in terms of eligibility and funding even though they are getting closer 
with formulary drugs, especially for generics (See Case Study – Formulary Consistency). 
 
“If you get every province coming up with their own formularies, I think that starts to 
become somewhat counter-productive. So if you could sit down and say let’s all come to 
the table, again, in a facilitator role and say, let’s take a look at what your formularies 
are and let’s try to come up with a common formulary which then could result in 
common pricing and purchasing or pricing models and stuff.” (Private drug plan expert)  
 
This suggests an opportunity for the federal government to facilitate an important 
improvement that the provinces have yet to achieve on their own – standardized 
formularies. Another participant generally agreed with that assessment and the need for 
greater alignment in formularies but added a loud note of skepticism that the federal 
government would play, or be allowed to play, some kind of facilitative role. 
 
“If you leave it up to provinces, there is going to be winners and losers because our 
programs are all so different…. Our formularies are pretty in sync now…what’s different 
is who we cover and how we cover them in terms of deductibles and that whole structure. 
It would be very difficult to change, if you left it just up to the provinces, because again of 
the political cycle and there’s going to be winners and losers. …So I think in order for 
anything substantial to be done, it would have to be national, it would have to be 
federally led [and] federally funded. In my lifetime, I don’t believe it will ever happen.” 
(Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
There may be several reasons why provincial formularies have not been harmonized and 
why eligibility criteria and cost-sharing differ by province and even by plan within each 
province, excepting Quebec. Creating a national standard, beyond just a formulary, could be 
undertaken by the new Canadian Drug Agency which was announced in the February 2019 
federal Budget. The CDA appears likely to merge two provincially controlled agencies (the 





Case Study – Formulary Consistency 
 
Formularies are not as well coordinated as some participants suggested. The PMPRB 
(2017) examined a sample of 729 drugs (half of 1,456 drugs listed on at least one of the 
11 public formularies included), that accounted for 82% of total prescription drug costs 
in 2015. Over all 11 plans, the Board found that 79% of drugs representing 95% of all 
spending, on average, were found to be commonly listed. For generic drugs, the average 
increased to 86% (97% of costs) but dropped to 67% for single-source drugs (93% of 
costs).  
 
Pairing each plan with another, there was less consistency for single-source drugs (51% 
to 80%) than for generic drugs (78% to 92%), and the variation was much greater for the 
41 high-cost (annual cost >$10,000) drugs included in the study (37% to 90%). Only 48% 
(350) of the drugs were listed in all 11 plans and 18% (131) were listed in less than half 
the plans. This study supports part of the concern expressed by patient groups about 
the “quality” of public plans. 
 
This PMPRB study indicates that there remain significant differences in provincial 
formularies. Even though common drugs account for a very high share of spending 
overall, there are much bigger differences for high-cost drugs…which are likely the 
hardest to afford for patients and unlikely to be part of the essential medicines list 
proposed by the Advisory Council (2019b).  
 
 
The federal government could also play one or more important niche roles, perhaps in 
coordinating policy to ensure access to very expensive drugs for rare diseases (DRDs, also 
known as orphan drugs). A DRD strategy was announced in the 2019 federal budget and 
recommended by the Advisory Board (2019b), but funding would not begin until 2022, very 
near the end of the current government’s full mandate. 
 
“You know, I think the orphan drug thing is one that naturally we look to them for. I think 
that’s where conversations are happening and whether they need to step in and 
coordinate that across geographic boundaries and stuff.”… I think it’s fair to say that the 
spirit of Canada would suggest that we shouldn’t have people in one part of the country 
with a clearly inferior formulary and access to the drugs that others have.” (Insurance 
executive) 
 
“And then the federal government, if their mandate, as they say, is to provide access to 
drugs, then there is a role I think for them to play… Why don’t they take on all of the rare 
disease drugs and let us handle what [is] outside of that?” (Former provincial drug plan 
manager) 
 
In summary, administrative support can be in one or more specialized areas, but 
participants believed the federal government must again play a role to facilitate and incent 
coordination among the jurisdictions. While some of this may be intended in this year’s 
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Budget and Advisory Council report, it will also require spending significant political capital 
to plan and launch a new drug program. 
 
6.2.1.3 Leader / Policy Leader 
Over decades pharmacare as a policy initiative has started in Ottawa, though clearly made 
no further progress. Federal leadership has been in word but not in deed or dollars. This 
potential role emerged as participants responded to questions identifying major problems, 
to addressing sustainability and unmet needs for drug insurance, asking why there was no 
universal drug plan in Canada and about the opportunity for collaboration. Participants 
from various sectors said the federal government had to lead change, but it was most 
commonly stated among labour experts. 
 
“I think the federal government should provide leadership.” (Labour policy expert 1) 
 
“No, I see it as the federal government needs to take the bull by the horns. It has to be 
there, one, because everyone agrees there has to be one formulary, one bulk buying. 
…They [the federal government] will have to work with the provinces. There’s no doubt 
about it but they need to lead it. And if they don’t lead it then we will continue to having a 
piecemeal.” (National labour executive)  
 
“I think it is probably fair to frame that question, why hasn’t the current federal 
government been a leader on the issue of pharmacare? We have in Ontario had fairly 
strong statements from Ministers if not the Premier around pharmacare. Maybe the 
question is then why are we not hearing similar comments and very affirmative 
statements from others in other provinces?” (Labour policy expert 2) 
 
“I think my view is that probably federal leadership is necessary. Not that we need a 
federal plan but there probably has to be federal money and a certain amount of political 
will and political capital expended on that.” (Academic)  
 
[Researcher] What prevents Canada from having universal drug insurance as we do for 
hospitals and physicians? What's behind all that? 
“I think it is a, it’s the lack of leadership from the federal government.” (Former 
provincial drug plan manager) 
 
“It’s just time for national leadership on this one. I really do think it’s time for national 
leadership.” (Federal politician) 
 
“I think that means that we've got to crack open, or at least it’s high time to crack open 
the Canada Health Act [to include drugs]. And that's going to take leadership at a federal 





Related to the need for federal leadership, two participants suggested provinces might 
fear accountability, and resist supporting NPh in exchange for federal funding.  
 
“I think people are always wary that if they get money, there’s going to be strings 
attached to it all the time, and I think that’s happened in the past, right? So there’s a lot of 
historical biases as well.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
  
“But historically as soon as the provinces are told what to do with the money they fight 
back and go “that’s not your jurisdiction, that’s ours.” So is it [conditional funding] 
reasonable? It may be intelligent but I don’t know whether it would be deemed reasonable 
or not.” (Private drug plan expert) 
 
The F/P/T relationship is a crucial dimension that must be solved before NPh can be 
introduced. Provinces have reservations with the adequacy and permanency of federal 
funding based on past experience. Equity among the jurisdictions is also a concern, as 
illustrated in the following exchange with a provincial drug plan manager. 
 
[Researcher] Now if I challenged you the same way you challenged me at the onset, what 
do you mean by national pharmacare? 
I mean the federal government pays for the drug plan for every Canadian whatever level 
that is. It is not provincially or territorially funded. 
[Researcher] I guess some people would define national pharmacare as a more coherent 
or coordinated or consistent level of coverage where jurisdiction remains with the 
provinces, but there may be some national standards or some targets around access, 
formulary breadth, out-of-pocket costs, things like that. Do you see that coming?  
It’s not going to happen unless the feds pay. 
[Researcher] Okay, so the only way universal coverage, if I can bring that term back, the 
only way universal coverage could happen is if the feds come up with the money to 
either fill the gaps or completely change the existing model.  
No, filling the gaps won’t do it. 
[Researcher] Okay, why? Because… 
Because every province gets a different amount. 
[Researcher] Yes, okay, so the equity between provinces is a problem.  
Correct. 
 
HESA directed the Parliamentary Budget Officer to model NPh on Quebec’s formulary 
presumably because Quebec has the most drugs on its formulary. If provinces with better 
plans get less federal compensation to meet a new national standard formulary, then 
Quebec would likely see itself as disadvantaged. (The alternative that every province gets 
the same per capita ‘bonus’ would dramatically increase program cost.) However, if federal 
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funding accounts for differences in patient cost-sharing, Quebec would get more federal 
money because its out-of-pocket costs are relatively high.  
 
It’s important to note the federal government has never been the sole payer for a major 
ongoing health program. Even in the 1950s and 1960s, its limit was 50% and that applied 
only to the two medicare programs. It’s not clear why a national drug program needs full 
federal funding, other than the trust issue between politicians and the negotiating tactic of 
asking for more than you think the other party will give in order to get a minimally 
acceptable deal. Fortunately, participants report there are successful bureaucratic channels 
and precedents to work out administration and implementation. However, which level of 
government funds, administers and/or leads a new NPh program will be determined 
through political negotiation. 
 
In order to sell NPh implementation as an issue of national importance, the federal 
government must sustain a collaborative relationship with the 13 jurisdictions at both the 
political and bureaucratic level. The jurisdictions must reciprocate. These roles set up the 
final tangible role, described below. 
 
6.2.1.4 Relationship manager 
Trust is a common and essential thread in a democracy. Citizens need to trust their 
governments to act in the collective best interest of the country rather than in parochial or 
political interest. Businesses have to know that their interests are being heard and 
considered in policy and programs. Within government, politicians have to trust the 
information and recommendations provided by their bureaucratic deputies. As two senior 
bureaucrats noted, stakeholders that lose ground following any major policy announcement 
have to be considered as well, since they can be the most difficult to manage post-decision.  
 
At the meso level, trust is the foundation of relationships which were assessed at three 
levels: (i) Between senior levels of government (the jurisdictions), (ii) Between bureaucrats 
and their political masters, and (iii) Between government and business players. 
 
6.2.1.4.1 Jurisdictional relationships (F/P/T) 
Participants reported good trust and close working relationships between bureaucrats 
representing the federal government and the jurisdictions, borne of several years of 
working together.  
 
“I think things are in pretty good shape in terms of the provincial drug plans and federal 
drug plan leaders. There’s a long history of working collaboratively together since the 
inception of CDR221 and numerous collaborative work since then. So there’s lots of respect. 
 
221 The Common Drug Review was established in 2003 through the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health. 
CDR includes six federal drug plans and all jurisdictions except Quebec. 
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There is a proven track record despite our many challenges because of our political cycles 
and priorities, different budgets and different drug plan structures that can work 
together.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
However, that trust is not absolute. Adequate and sustained federal funding is also 
crucial for provincial bureaucrats to support federal initiatives. That trust must operate at 
professional and personal levels. 
 
“Yeah, and I think that’s [sustained federal funding] a real concern for folks. What am I 
buying myself into? I’m going to say yeah, we need to do this. I’m going to lose control 
over individual decisions. I’m going to be left holding the bag at the end of the day. If 
somebody has to say no to coverage of a particular drug, people aren’t going to go 
running to the federal government. …they’re going to start attacking the provincial folks. 
…I think people are uncomfortable, as much as we want to support each other, you end 
up taking the flak for decisions that are often made outside of your jurisdiction. And 
people don’t want to know the history or understand why. As much as they say they do, 
and you try to explain it to them, it’s yeah, yeah, but I just need my drug. That’s just 
human nature.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
Determining the roles and responsibilities of each level of government is a recurring 
problem in health care. There are legitimate reasons for wanting the federal government to 
negotiate and enforce national standards, and why provincial governments would be better 
equipped to operate NPh with adequate and permanent federal funding. The public then has 
to consider how to pay for it. 
 
“So if the idea is that we just ramp up pharmacare underneath something like the 
Canada Health Act, within there or separately, then there’s still that, once again it’s still 
up to the individual province to determine what’s medically necessary so we can get 
different coverage.  
 
…. So it could mean in the end that individuals have less choice than what we have today, 
right? That we are covering a broader population, therefore we are taking up more of the 
expenses and all the math I’ve seen behind the scenes saying that we can see savings in 
there, but that comes at an increased cost to government. Then the next question is how 
do we fund that? What’s my revenue flows? Premiums or increased taxes, right?” 
(Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
6.2.1.4.2 Bureaucrats and Ministers 
Politicians have far higher visibility than bureaucrats but have no direct responsibility for 
program operations. They are, however, specifically accountable to voters and taxpayers. 
Bureaucrats have operational skills and responsibility coupled with political and budget 
accountability. It is assumed NPh would be professionally administered by the civil service 
with politicians providing oversight (governance) and Finance or Treasury Board people 
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focusing on spending. Government participants were asked whether the priorities vary 
between political leaders and senior civil servants. Their comments focused on their own 
experience and revealed a sense of vulnerability. 
 
“So as a bureaucrat, you’re accountable for the management of your program, the 
expenditures, so I had to follow the drug line and look at growth. You’re reporting to 
Treasury Board folks around if you’ve underspent or overspent and why, and why didn’t 
you get your forecast right? You’ve got a lot of financial folks in government that are 
sitting there watching you very closely.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
Clearly governments must live within their budgetary limits. A good example would be 
the home care program in Ontario. Its budget now exceeds $3 billion annually but it is not 
an entitlement program like drugs, hospital and physician coverage. Once those earmarked 
funds are spent, no additional money is available until the next fiscal year. This approach 
requires rationing (limiting hours and types of services) in order to ensure the funds last 12 
months. 
 
“I think all of these pieces fit together in the sense that where you have a publicly funded 
system to one degree or the other, you’re always going to be faced with financial 
constraints and more demand than you can meet. So you know ultimately the Ministers or 
whoever is responsible has to ultimately make a tough decision.” (Federal senior 
bureaucrat) 
 
Kingdon positions bureaucrats as knowledge brokers and process leaders who are 
chiefly responsible for developing alternatives. (Politicians generally control the policy 
agenda.) Career-oriented bureaucrats believe they provide politicians with professional 
advice and options. Others see them anchoring the status quo, resisting change and 
focusing only on budget control. Both political and bureaucratic roles are important and 
typically complementary as reflected in this lengthy quote: 
 
 “Political folks don’t want to get into the minutia of implementation. They want to 
understand what are the risks? Who’s going to get hurt or harmed through this process? 
What’s the benefit to them and their government? They are there to, as soon as a party is 
in power, what they’re focusing on is how do they stay in power, not working on the 
logistics of how do you move the current drug program to a pharmacare type program.  
 
“I think sometimes the staff within the Minister’s office don’t fully appreciate that the 
bureaucrats have been talking about stuff like this for probably five or 10 years and so 
whenever you try to, try to engage in some of those discussions, unfortunately it 
sometimes comes across as, okay fine, you’re just being obstructive and they don’t pay as 
close attention. Whereas I think really the intent of the bureaucrat is to say look, we’ve 
gone down this path. There’s [sic] a lot of lessons learned. You need to understand the 
context of some of this stuff. So that’s where I think there is sometimes that adversarial 
approach. …But any senior bureaucrat is going to try to at least take what the end-state 
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is that the Minister wants and will try to figure out what is the right path to get to that 
end-state.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
However, if the introduction of NPh becomes imminent, politicians may need to become 
better informed so they can explain, defend or advocate their party positions to their 
constituents. Ideally, we would want them to make astute, fair and timely decisions and 
understand the costs and benefits of adequate universal drug insurance on patients’ lives. 
 
6.2.1.4.3 Business and governments 
Since a single payer model is very likely to require employers to continue to pay for drug 
insurance through some form of taxation, it is important that employers (and private plan 
members) trust governments to understand and respond to their workplace needs. 
 
One insurer executive candidly admitted that the insurance industry is frequently left 
out of health ministry deliberations and that governments seem to go to the same 
stakeholder groups – an “echo chamber” – where the same ideas bounce back and forth 
between familiar players in a closed system.  
 
“Health policy is very challenging. First of all, as I’m sure you know [laughs]. ... I find it to 
be a bit of an echo chamber. There’s [sic] stakeholders that are not recognized as being 
inside the tent and I think we’re probably one of them. The doctors, the nurses, the 
hospitals, to a large extent the drug companies, they’re all at the table, and employers 
and insurers and consumers of health services are not often inside the tent. (Insurance 
executive) 
 
Decades ago, insurers and physicians were positioned against a public health care 
system for hospitals and medical services. Physicians went on strike in Saskatchewan to 
retain professional independence before medical insurance was implemented there in 1962 
(Shah, 1998, p. 289). Physicians in Ontario went on strike as recently as 1986 over the right 
to ‘extra-bill’ patients beyond negotiated rates (Bliss, 2010, p. 11-12). In the 1940s, Boothe 
(2013, p. 427-28) reports insurers supported public health insurance although they joined 
physicians in opposing public hospital and medical coverage during the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
The participant idea that insurers are not “inside the tent” on health policy is in some 
ways complementary to Boothe (2013). If insurer views on health are not valued by 
government, let alone sought, they will have minimal if any influence on policy and program 
decisions. When insurers do express views, they do not appear to influence decisions 
either…although it may be a relief for public officials to know they will not face direct 
opposition from this otherwise powerful lobby. This lack of influence helps explain why 
private insurance has been minimized and barely considered in NPh-focused documents. 





Insurers do have power in financial circles though. Relationships between insurers and 
financial services regulators and federal Department of Finance officials are long-standing, 
deep, broad and reciprocal. 
 
“…we will get calls from Finance because they know we will be impacted by something, or 
because they want our opinion on something. Before they do, if they’re even thinking of 
doing something, sometimes we’ll get calls and they say, hey, we’re thinking of doing this. 
What do you guys think, or would that work? They will consult with us. That doesn’t 
happen in the health policy field to any significant extent. Because we don’t have those 
relationships, we don’t, we’re not seen by the health policy folks as an important 
stakeholder. We tend to be later to the table and because you’re late to the game you are 
dealing with sometimes decisions that have already been made, and therefore you have 
to go in at a higher level… That’s also happened where we’ll have to go in at a high level 
just because we don’t know where in the bureaucracy an issue is being dealt with.” 
(Insurance executive) 
 
This is important because of the central role Finance plays in all new spending 
decisions, especially a program potentially as costly as NPh. It’s also worth noting that 
before he entered government, the current Finance Minister led the largest pension and 
benefits consulting firm in Canada. He is closely tied to private insurance. Insurer power 
and influence with the federal government in financial services does not extend to health 
decision-making in provincial domains. The insurance industry association (CLHIA) has 
made only limited progress in establishing itself as a partner of provincial governments and 
there has been no public collaboration on drug issues. 
 
“I think that there is a relationship, particularly with CLHIA now and the drug plans, but 
struggling I guess to figure out how the two can work together.” (Former provincial drug 
plan manager) 
 
We may question why insurers have not invested in better health-focused relationships 
with provincial governments considering over $17 billion (CLHIA, 2018) in revenue from 
extended health benefits that supplement medicare services is at stake. Employers and 
benefit advisor firms have achieved even less. Since relationships are weak between public 
and private payers, there is a struggle to understand and anticipate what the other side may 
do, or what priorities exist.  
 
From an arms-length vantage, insurers are concerned that health ministry bureaucrats 
limit their concerns and consideration to their own purview and their own budget 
accountabilities. They aren’t trusted to see the bigger picture, the need for more integrated 
strategy, or the national interest. 
 
“I think the politicians get a better understanding of this. You have to almost go outside 
the Ministry of Health to other folks to start making this case because then folks at the 
Ministry of Health are not always focused on the overall health of Canadians. They’re 
focused on managing the health care system. So if it’s going to cost them something and 
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it doesn’t help the health care system but it helps the health outcomes of Canadians, or it 
might not even be cost, it might just be time and resources, not a dollar cost. But it’s hard 
to get their attention on things that are outside the health care system, the publicly-run 
health care system. I’m not sure that they look at the broader health care, like non-
publicly funded health system, as anything that they have any responsibility for.” 
(Insurance executive) 
 
But it can cut both ways. One provincial drug plan manager believed that insurers and 
employers can be fickle in the scope and quality of benefits they provide, and shift costs to 
government plans almost at will. 
 
“Private drug coverage, they de-list drugs. They don’t add new drugs. They have co-pays, 
percentage co-pays with no annual max, and they just keep ratcheting that up to reduce 
either the employee’s or the employer’s [unclear] contribution. So if we’re looking at filling 
the gaps, they’re just going to keep taking and taking and taking and dumping and 
dumping. To me that’s a losing battle. I wouldn’t fill that gap.” 
[Researcher] If I can paraphrase, the more the provinces pay or expand, the more private 
insurance will back off and reduce the level of coverage that they provide. 
“Yes, and they’re doing that. In [province], there aren’t that many gaps except in the 
private insurance world that there’s a bit of a growing gap in that many employers are 
moving to maximum benefits or health spending accounts and people don’t understand 
enough what they’re choosing to make sure they have enough coverage.” (Provincial drug 
plan manager) 
 
If this comment is representative of provincial drug plan managers, it suggests a level of 
frustration and mistrust or misunderstanding between the two key payers borne either of 
experience or ignorance. It means that discussing or negotiating a place for private drug 
insurance under national pharmacare will be even more challenging. 
 
6.2.1.5 Nation building 
The final federal role arose from statements asking why Canada does not have universal 
prescription drug insurance and whether there are important unmet needs for drug 
coverage. Responses indicated that national pharmacare, especially when framed within the 
Canada Health Act, may have high iconic and intrinsic meaning in terms of the Canadian 
identity, nation-building or citizenship. Just as the five principles of the Canada Health Act 
are inseparable, so too might be the addition of pharmacare to existing hospital and 
medical services. On a rational level, NPh is just another health program. However, NPh may 
also have a “higher calling,” well suited to the federal government.  
 
“I think my view is that probably federal leadership is necessary. Not that we need a 
federal plan but there probably has to be federal money and a certain amount of political 
will and political capital expended on that. And I don’t see that in the federal government 
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right now, right? They’ve got other priorities related to health, which is fine. There’s lots 
of important work going on there, but I think that’s an important piece of the puzzle that 
is missing right now in terms of pharmacare.” …Partly I think there are both practical 
and symbolic reasons why federal involvement is important.” (Policy expert) 
 
One participant clearly framed national pharmacare as nation-building, as something 
that affirms Canadian values. 
 
“I think there is this acknowledgement that this will be a major project. This would be an 
historic moment. If people understood it for its significance, it would be, it would be that 
second stage of Medicare that Douglas had talked about but we’ve largely forgotten 
about. It would be another generation’s contribution to our social architecture. As much 
as we think of the CPP and the hospital insurance or the physician services insurance act 
as historic documents and certainly historic moments, we haven’t been animated by that 
process of nation-building in a sense, defining ourselves in some very tangible way in 
terms of what we will be in the future as a country.” (Labour policy expert) 
 
6.3 Discussion: The Federal Role 
The role of the federal government was not anticipated. Originally, there was no question or 
sensitizing concept that directly asked about this. However, question 5 (Why do you think 
Canada does not have prescription drug insurance like it has for hospitals and physician 
services?) often elicited a response that included the federal government or the topic simply 
became part of the discussion. As the interviews proceeded, the topic repeatedly appeared 
and its importance became clear. This was amplified as I became aware of the HESA 
investigation which was happening concurrently…although I was not following HESA at that 
time. 
 
Four tangible roles were inductively identified through participant interviews – funder, 
administrative support, leader and relationship manager. Participants also positioned NPh 
as a rare opportunity for nation-building, a theme picked up by Dr. Hoskins (Advisory 
Council, 2019b): “The time for universal, single payer, public pharmacare has come. This is 
our generation’s national project…” (p. 3). The roles are both rational and emotional. 
 
All these roles require trust and done well, can even create trust. “Trust is an axiomatic 
element of successful leadership” (Hasel & Grover, 2017, p. 849). At a personal level, leaders 
demonstrate several key qualities such as integrity and trustworthiness, communication 
skills, and providing clear goals and direction (Giles, 2016). Leadership includes what 
decisions are made and how they are made which captures the need for transparency. While 
a detailed review of leadership is outside the scope of this thesis, we can conclude that trust 
in leaders is needed to allow policy to be supported and successfully implemented.  
 
Participants have described sectoral coalitions in government and industry but weak or 
uncertain levels of trust between them. Periodic withdrawals and restructuring of federal 
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health funding, the latest in 2017-18, leave provinces unwilling to trust the federal 
government as a funder of change. For their part, provincial ‘avoidance behaviour’ during 
10-Year Plan requires the federal government to ensure accountability for any new funding. 
Both levels of government must see themselves becoming willing agents of nation-building. 
Against these challenges, participants from many sectors recognized the federal 
government as the natural leader notwithstanding its need to act accordingly. 
 
Along with the “special problem” of funding, implementation must now be considered. 
These two problems are the left and right Achilles heel for NPh, especially for academics 
proposing a single payer model. 
 
“I think the political leaders are often targets of some of the papers that keep flying 
around from [Pharmacare] 2020 so obviously when it’s presented in a certain way, it 
looks attractive. When you look at potential cost implications or the potential impact on 
service delivery there are some questions that are raised. Probably you’re talking about 
incremental cost [versus savings]. Probably you’re looking at getting into that cost 
discussion too, which taints the whole thing.” (Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
“Often these cases say if we implemented [NPh], this will be your savings. There is often, 
they are often silent on the actual reality of the cost of implementation and when you can 
actually, tangibly realize these savings. And there’s not a lot of honesty about how do we 
get from here to there. And I think that’s actually, I would suggest to the detriment. It’s 
always: ‘if you put in place it’s going to be fine.’ Well that’s fine and dandy, but really the, 
I would say the real test of a good strategy is the feasibility of implementation. And 
they’re often silent on that. They’re often silent on shared jurisdiction and silent on many 
things that really are key…” (Federal senior bureaucrat) 
 
“It is such a complex system, and I do think some of these researchers do have some good 
points but I think that this… call for a national pharmacare program and these numbers 
like [Dr. Steve Morgan is] throwing out that save the system $15 billion or whatever he 
said, and then when you read all of the limitations which nobody reads, the fine print, 
you know he has lost a lot of credibility. So I do think they do bring up some good points 
about the gaps in our system and that kind of thing, but I think they’ve gone a little too 
far.” (Former provincial drug plan manager)  
 
Others clearly trusted and could accurately cite the key findings of some academic 
studies: 
 
“When you think that if they would establish a national pharmacare program, and CMAJ, 
what in 2015 came out with that report [Morgan et al.], it would cost, it would cost you 
around $1 billion. You could save $7 to $9 billion. … Right now the evidence is showing us 
if it’s single-payer, one administrator, one bulk buying, one formulary that’s how will you 




“Every piece of information we heard from people who are knowledgeable about the 
subject have convinced me that by bringing in universal healthcare system that the initial 
cost of it, and my best numbers that I can quote are somewhere between maybe three 
and $5 billion a year would end up, once it’s running and all the efficiencies of universal 
pharmacare are realized, would end up saving Canadians and Canadian society as a 
whole somewhere between nine and $14 billion. So I think actually as a society, we can 
actually achieve 100% coverage and save money through a well-designed universal 
pharmacare system.” (Federal politician 1) 
 
“Nobody knows yet what that cost equation looks like. I think the Pharma 2020 group 
would argue that there is significant savings available across Canada and those savings, 
if properly deployed should be sufficient to make this a universal program without 
additional cost to anybody.” (Federal politician 2) 
 
It was noted earlier that none of the experts interviewed for this study recognized any 
significant or imminent action on this file. Perhaps none of them were consulted, or 
perhaps they had been but it was confidential and they were unable to speak of it. It’s also 
possible that bureaucrats were looking for a more compelling argument that included 
robust, real-world cost estimates.222 Though it had been persistently presented, perhaps 
bureaucrats did not consider national pharmacare, in any model, to be an appropriate 
solution to the problem of high and rising drug prices and cost. They may have assessed 
that expanded coverage would immediately add cost but savings from “bulk buying” would 
only gradually lower unit prices for new drugs. Private insurance would no longer be a 
budgetary safety valve. The influence of variable prescribing, dispensing, health literacy and 
other practical factors are not integrated into published NPh studies. 
 
Within government, the potential or preferred role of private insurance varies. 
Politicians speak publicly about minimizing or even eliminating a role for private insurance 
but the bureaucrats interviewed who are operationally responsible for provincial drug plans 
universally support the role played by private drug plans in reducing public risk and cost.223 
The two politician participants were unable to articulate a case for private insurance. One 
policy expert participant repeatedly noted that the private coverage given to politicians is 
an important reason why they have not yet implemented a single payer public drug plan: 
their current access to medicines would also be reduced with a smaller public formulary 
and sometimes higher cost sharing.224 
 
 
222 At the time of the interviews, HESA had not yet issued a report and the Advisory Council had not yet been established.  
223 This is different in that total cost is likely higher with private insurance. However, bureaucrats are only accountable for 
their own budget envelopes. 
224 Politicians did not address the gap between their coverage as members of a private plan and the coverage provided to 
their constituents through provincial plans. The private drug plan for Members of Parliament has lower cost-sharing (20%), 
a broader formulary and a lower annual cap on out-of-pocket costs ($3,000, p.19). In 2019, an MP’s salary is $178,900, plus 
non-taxable expense allowances. In Ontario, the Trillium plan would require an MP to spend 4% of salary ($7,156) before 
receiving any benefit, and then only on the smaller formulary of the Ontario Public Drug Plan. The Public Service Health 
Care Plan document is available at: http://www.pshcp.ca/media/38813/pshcp-member-booklet-web-en.pdf. 
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A comprehensive counter-proposal that includes private insurance could still appear. 
(As noted earlier simply adhering to “fill the gaps” is not a strategy.) More commonly, 
specific tactics and positions that may together create a strategy have been proposed. 
Papers by the pharmacy professional association and recent submissions to the Advisory 
Council by the CLHIA and others are confronting limited and dated research on transition, 
implementation, costs, models and how to fund this new policy. Within the crucial realm of 
funding are the sensitive issues of taxation, fairness and patient choice. The emphasis on 
fidelity to the single payer model has been challenged by practical concerns about 
feasibility by vested interests in private insurance. While those interests will (should) be 
challenged, feasibility and practicality are important filters if important changes are to 
occur. All solutions, traditional and alternative, ought to be rigorously assessed for their fit 
with cost, access and equity problems. 
 
“So I think the biggest challenge we have is that the drug file is exceedingly complex and 
simple solutions don't work necessarily for complex problems. I think that right now 
because of the budget issues, the bureaucrats can't be all that creative, and elected 
officials truly don't understand the complexity of the system and so we’re getting what we 
are getting. We are getting essentially, no, no, no, we’ll just negotiate on price rather than 
fundamental shifts in the system. And I think that’s what we’ve gotten for a good number 
of years. That’s why we are partially in the state we’re in.” (Former provincial drug plan 
manager) 
 
6.4 Chapter summary  
The research question pursued in the chapter asks about federal government roles. There 
was strong agreement among many participants that Ottawa could play several roles – 
funder, coordinator-facilitator, leader and relationship manager – perhaps all best 
summarized as leadership. Nation-building is probably exclusively federal in nature. 
Participants did not appear well-informed about social insurance as a structured and proven 
alternative to a single payer model. Social insurance is not likely on the short-list “decision 
agenda” so a window may open only if implementing a single payer option is once again 
stymied. 
 
Many participants agreed that drug prices have driven concerns about future 
sustainability and affordability among payers but the drug industry is not a trusted 
collaborator. Payers favour more collaboration between them but many relationships are 
narrow, shallow and in a formative stage. With respect to NPh, a major provincial concern is 
adequate and permanent funding and the current federal proposal of $6 billion over four 
years for all its new health care objectives hardly passes that test.  
 
One labour participant sparked the idea that creating a real-world NPh will primarily be 
a bargaining session. Before that table can be set, participants believe the federal 
government is the only party that can call the meeting to order. Against this hope is the 
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realization the federal government has not indicated it will step into any of those roles. One 







Opinion Leader Interviews: The role of private insurance  
 
Research Question 2  
 
What advantages and disadvantages of our current shared-funding model are recognized by 
private and public drug plan opinion leaders?  
 
b. Is private drug insurance acceptable and should it be included in national 




This chapter describes the current and potential role for private insurance in a national 
pharmacare program according to opinion leaders and influencers in public and private 
drug plans. Participant perceptions provide new and important real-world insights and 
evidence to determine what kind of plan is optimal for Canadians as both patients and 
payers.  
 
Participants agree on the need to improve system sustainability and personal 
affordability, both driven by the high cost of drugs. The brand (vs. generic) pharmaceutical 
manufacturing industry is commonly viewed as untrustworthy. Poorly informed employers 
can lead to financial surprises, drug plan cancellation and a risk transfer to provincial 
liability. Somewhat surprising was the support expressed by provincial drug plan managers 
for the continuation of private insurance, largely as a safety valve to limit the cost to 
provincial treasuries.  
 
A few concerns surfaced. First is the lack of trusted relationships and limited experience 
by provinces and private insurers in collaborating on drug plan policy or programs. A 
second concern is how payers can create a national standard for drug plans to ensure 
adequate universal coverage. Related to these problems is how to engage employers and 
unions. With OHIP+ fresh in mind (Sec. 4.6.1) there is concern about how to manage politics 
in administrative and operational decisions. This includes political decisions made without 
a practical understanding of private insurance and importantly, what assumptions are made 
about employer needs and preferences if a single payer NPh model is used. Finally, there is 
a need to educate in areas such as differing goals between payers, the Quebec model and 
the place of regulation to govern private drug insurance. 
 
 
225 Drawing from the literature, government opinion leaders, primarily senior bureaucrats responsible for provincial drug 
plan administration, have the tenure, organizational knowledge, network, and subject matter expertise to identify a 
suitable model(s) and exert significant influence on implementation. Similarly, private payer opinion leaders included also 
have the tenure, expertise, authority and network to effectively advocate for change and influence implementation. 
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A bright spot was the complementary use of technology – private plan services aimed at 
consumers and patients, and public plan expertise in health technology assessment – that 
could benefit everyone if both continue following introduction of NPh. 
 
While there was no resistance to the need to change, there was an important divide in 
the place of private insurance in a new NPh plan. Both practical and ideological barriers 
must be overcome. Better relationships will encourage the collaboration needed to optimize 
change.  
 
7.1 Results: Ideas from Experts 
There is no qualitative research on how private and public drug plans experts and 
influencers with real-world experience see universal single payer national pharmacare. Their 
advice can help ensure that what happens actually works, and that we avoid theoretically 
pure but operationally impractical decisions on roles for the federal and provincial 
governments, private insurers and other important stakeholders. 
 
The role of private insurance is among the most contentious and important decisions 
before us. It is the main difference between proponents of single payer and “fill the gap” 
solutions. 
 
“If there is political momentum that builds and people, Canadians generally endorse this 
approach, there will still be considerable latitude to define what we all meant when we 
said we are endorsing single-payer universal pharmacare. I think the critical issue will be 
really on the insurance piece of it.” (Labour policy expert)  
 
The main issues and discussion points derived from the interviews are listed below and 
described and illustrated with participant comments. 
 
1. Most common problems 
2. Practical considerations and the case of collective bargaining 
3. Payer relationships 
4. Opportunities and conditions for collaboration 
5. Considering politics 
6. Different philosophies: Private sector concerns about government 
7. Emerging themes 
 






7.2 Most common problems 
7.2.1 Financial risk 
Even though each payer group has different sponsors, funding, structures, priorities and 
covered populations (Table 4.1) they generally agreed on sustainability226 and 
affordability227 as the two key issues. Equity and access were also frequently mentioned. 
Payers were generally worried about “the high cost stuff,” meaning recurrent claims for 
high-cost specialty drugs and drugs for rare diseases (DRDs). Since these are system-level 
concerns beyond the control of either payer group, there may be opportunities to work 
more closely together to address those financial threats. 
 
“I think the problem we’re trying to solve is in our industry specifically, there is a question 
of sustainability in drug plans, in part because the lack of certainty in terms of employers. 
The payers of plans have very little ability to predict what their future costs are going to 
be any longer. Even in particular, the impact of rare disease drugs which hit them, right, 
as well as the growing use of biologics and the rise of chronic disease.” (Insurance 
executive)  
 
When asked about the major problems facing drug plan managers, one participant 
captured most of the major topics noted by other public and private participants. These are 
bolded for easier identification. 
 
“I believe that it’s access, access to the medications that people need. … So I think the 
biggest issue they faced, from a public policy issue, is how do I ensure there’s fair, 
consistent, equitable access. Second issue then, as you look at that is sustainability of the 
healthcare system and so if you’re going to give access, how are you going to give access 
[to] those that [are] going to go forward. The system seems to have the capacity to take all 
monies that are thrown at it [laughs], it’s insatiable. And I think then the third aspect 
within this access and sustainability is accountability. We really don’t have a good system 
in place to determine whether or not we are getting the outcomes that we desire from the 
medications that we approve.” (Former provincial drug plan manager)  
 
However, there was a counter-point: 
 
“I would say, I mean, I can throw out the word sustainability but frankly people have 
been saying that for 25 years and the sky has not fallen yet. ... We do deal with 
 
226 Sustainability can be generally defined as the ability to maintain a predictable course. For insurers, this means prior drug 
costs can reliably predict rates for the current period. For provincial drug plan managers, it means better ability to plan and 
control annual budgets. Environmental factors also affect drug plan sustainability, including the cost of new drugs and the 
rate at which they replace older therapies, as well as underlying demographic drivers like aging and higher rates of chronic 
disease. 




sustainability by making changes all the time [emphasis], and by managing the drugs 
that are listed on our formulary.” (Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
7.2.2 Drug insurance tied to employment 
Traditional long-term careers underpinned the provision of group benefits during at least 
the first three decades of private insurance (1970s through 1990s). The employment 
relationship has now changed with more precarious work – temporary, part-time and “gig” 
jobs which significantly lessen the ‘employment contract’ between worker and employer. 
Almost always, those employees do not have a health benefit plan. The cost of drugs then 
shifts to the patient or to the government for catastrophic costs, if the drug is covered by 
the public plan.  
 
One participant noted the voluntary and precarious nature of employer plans. Cancer 
drugs were noted as a sometimes tragic example of differences in provincial and private 
drug plans. In four provinces, newer, efficacious orally-administered cancer drugs are not 
covered by provinces except (possibly) through slow Exceptional Access programs. 
 
“And then my third major concern is the potential for the contraction of private benefits 
which would expose more Canadians to risks in terms of the cost of drugs. ...Or, what 
happens if someone loses their job and receives a cancer diagnosis, right? Who’s going to 
pay for the out-of-hospital drugs that they need as part of their treatment? And that 
varies across the country.”  (Academic policy expert) 
 
The statement also supports the need for national standards so coverage does not 
depend on where you work or live. The risk of voluntary, employment-based drug insurance 
also concerned a second participant: 
 
“And the conversion of full-time to casual, part-time without coverage. There’s been an 
enormous shift towards part-time employment just to avoid things like pensions and 
health benefits. … The job place has changed, so contract work has emerged. Part-time, 
casual work has been replacing full-time work. … I think it’s just about a changing 
understanding of the employment model and what that means to the cost of drugs to 
Canadians and the affordability of drugs.” (Federal politician) 
 
This same federal politician also reported that people “inside the industry…the 
brokers…” advised that employers were already feeling the strain of providing drug plans: 
 
“So about 36% of people have private drug plans.228 Let’s just talk about those for a 
second now. …So if we are relying on employer-based private plans, they [employers] are 
already experiencing significant increases in the burden of [funding drug plans]. …My 
 
228 The participant changed the number as this exchange continued. The CLHIA reports about two-thirds of Canadians have 
private drug plans. CIHI (2018) reports private insurance accounts for 37% of all prescription drug spending. 
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understanding is the private plans are starting to become quite at risk.” (Federal 
politician)  
 
In some ways this indicates anecdote becoming evidence of a major problem in access. 
CLHIA data show more and more Canadians covered by group benefit plans, although the 
industry’s calculations are higher than survey data suggest and are not independently 
validated. There is no comprehensive national market data available on how employers have 
changed their drug plans in recent years.  
 
7.3 Practical considerations and the case of collective bargaining 
Participants in this section point out some specific, practical, real-world challenges. They 
include a specific tension between politicians and bureaucrats in delivering a 
comprehensive NPh plan in 2027 (Advisory Board, 2019b) and doing that within a 
sustainable budget. The potential impacts of collectively bargained drug plans is noted. 
While those who administer plans are familiar with these details, politicians who propose 
policy and programs are likely unaware of these possible stumbling blocks. 
 
7.3.1 Transition: Reconciling differences 
As noted, even the best provincial drug plan (QC) provides access to fewer drugs than most 
private plans. If public insurance was more comprehensive, there may be less interest in 
preserving private insurance. One labour participant acknowledged the challenge of 
balancing the goal of comprehensive coverage with the ability or willingness of 
governments to pay for it. He notes a side issue of what non-formulary drugs might be 
available to those who want and can afford them.229 
 
“We appreciate that people will understand that although we would call for a single-payer 
insurer for pharmaceutical products, that’s not to suggest that you would be prohibited 
from purchasing pharmaceutical products out-of-pocket. Ideally, we’re not going to 
suggest, we wouldn’t promote a single-payer pharmacare plan and then say we‘ll 
negotiate supplementary insurance at workplaces to cover the gaps. We don’t want to 
promote a system that from the beginning has gaps… although we realize there are gaps 
we’re not going to set ourselves up to acknowledge that we will fail from the outset.” 
(Labour policy expert) 
 
 
229 Sometimes when CADTH reviews a new drug, its clinical value is accepted but its cost-effectiveness is not. For example, 
after considering the manufacturer’s submission for Osimertinib (Tagrisso), CADTH reported it would recommend the drug 
for provincial reimbursement subject to two conditions: (1) Cost-effectiveness is improved to an acceptable level, and (2) 
Feasibility of adoption (budget impact) is addressed (E-Alert, January 4, 2019). An ethical and political question is whether 
a patient, wealthy or not, could buy a new, effective drug that a government plan will not cover unless or until it has 
negotiated a lower price. 
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Another participant acknowledged the reality that any budget-constrained public system 
will sometimes require a potentially unpopular political or bureaucratic decision. Resources 
are not unlimited so compromises are necessary and rationing of access will occur. 
 
“I think all of these pieces fit together in the sense that where you have a publicly funded 
system to one degree or the other, you’re always going to be faced with financial 
constraints and more demand than you can meet. So you know ultimately the Ministers or 
whoever is responsible has to ultimately make a tough decision.” (Federal policy 
executive) 
 
This sets up an important challenge for governments as they decide the structure and 
coverage NPh will provide, and how to transition from private coverage. Twenty-two million 
Canadians who are highly satisfied with their private drug plans (Sanofi, 2019) will not 
happily accept less than they already have. The Advisory Council (2019b) identified the 
Quebec formulary as its comprehensive drug plan. When the PBO costed a Quebec-based 
model for HESA cut $4 billion in drugs that were eligible under private plans. The original 
OHIP+ faced a similar issue when it did not grandfather patients on drugs that were 
formerly covered by their private drug plan. While these are administrative (bureaucratic) 
issues, they are exactly the type that is likely to create very important political headaches. 
Avoiding those may make create some impetus to consider a larger role for private 
insurance. 
 
While choice is a common justification for having a private insurance option, the same 
participant as above was not convinced that the current competitive market is offering a 
compelling choice of plans and insurers.  
 
“I don’t know to what extent drug plans are a major component of their [insurer] 
revenues but I think that’s where if you throw into the equation the benefits of single-
payer, what are the off-setting benefits of a multi-payer system? And people will say, well 
there is freedom of choice, you can pick A, B or C. [laughs] Well in my line of work there 
isn’t much distinction between A, B or C.” (Labour policy expert) 
 
7.3.2 A special case: Unions and collectively bargained benefits 
One participant pointed out that a labour union sponsors a large health benefits plan (the 
asrTrust) for retirees of the former Chrysler Canada and General Motors.230 Introduction of a 
single payer NPh plan would eliminate this trust, and likely cost some jobs and perhaps an 
operating profit for the union. More broadly, it is not clear how employers will manage their 
legal obligation to provide union members and sometimes retirees with a specific 
negotiated drug benefit plan that is very likely more generous than a NPh plan based on 
even the Quebec formulary. Would governments be willing to override collective 
 
230 See: https://www.asrtrust-cci.com/.  
 
 174 
agreements? That would be a messy political and legal challenge, as well as generally 
disruptive to labour relations. 
 
This situation would affect an important minority of workers: about one third of the 
labour force is unionized (Statistics Canada, 2016).231 However, since the majority of those 
members are in the broader public service, governments would also be faced with a similar 
bargaining challenge with their own employees.  
 
One participant felt strongly that civil servants would resist losing their richer private 
drug plan for a less generous fully public plan. (This consideration was briefly noted 
earlier.) 
 
“There is a very, there is probably an intersect of those public-private worlds that doesn’t 
get discussed enough that I think plays a very important part of the political economy 
and dynamic that contribute to an effective state of gridlock and confusion … In collective 
bargaining agreements that public-sector employees have negotiated …some of the most 
generous and broadest access to drug plans, to private employer-based drug plans … 
That creates a whole assortment of political dynamics and political issues associated with 
drug policy in Canada in the sense that a whole series of public drug plans exist that 
apparently aren’t good enough for those people who are working for governments. They 
expect and do get access to better, more generous plans with improved coverage.” (Policy 
expert) 
 
This situation again highlights the need for governments, employers and unions to 
anticipate the practical impact of a new public drug plan, and not just on collectively 
bargained contracts. 
 
In a bit of a twist, one participant noted that private insurers could change their role 
from insurer and risk-bearer to an administrator contracted by governments. This option 
has not been discussed in the current NPh debate. 
 
“I think ourselves and probably many other proponents of the single-payer pharmacare 
would prefer to go to the table and negotiate an appropriate role for existing insurance 
providers and plan administrators. … So we’re mindful that it isn’t a simple discussion 
about the single-payer, or for that matter the state, that we want to embolden the state to 
assume this responsibility when there could be agents in civil society that have the 
expertise. An example I would draw upon would be that the Ontario Drug Benefit Plan for 
the longest time was administered by Green Shield. The back office, out of sight as it 
were… It would I think materially be different if it was stated there would be no need for 








7.4 Payer Relationships  
Between private insurers and provincial health ministries, relationships are mostly positive 
but still quite narrow and weak. However, one provincial participant saw several 
opportunities to collaborate with private payers on problems of mutual interest. These are 
bolded for easier identification. 
 
“It’s tricky, but I think there’s definitely been more and more engagement over the last 
few years on things like expensive drugs for rare diseases [EDRDs or DRDs]. Some of the 
joint things like pricing. Certainly when we did the generic initiative, we consulted 
because having transparent price reductions were very important for CLHIA and their 
members. PLAs [Product Listing Agreements – confidential contracts between payers and 
drug manufacturers generally reducing a drug’s price or net cost to the payer] continue 
to create a challenge between [payers] because it [a drug’s price] is not transparent…” 
 
This same participant continued: 
 
“I think we’ve talked with [CLHIA executive] Stephen [Frank] about more alignment with 
CADTH. I think it would be interesting to start to consider should we be looking at more 
of a societal perspective [in CADTH’s economic analyses] as opposed to strictly the public 
perspective as far as any difference that does make. I think there is opportunity on some 
of the big issues like SEBs [Subsequent Entry Biologics, or biosimilars] or EDRDs 
[Expensive Drugs for Rare Diseases], those kinds of things. I think there is good 
opportunity for collaboration.” (Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
Private plans fund access to drugs but the needs and priorities of private plan sponsors 
or members may not be considered as governments create policy and programs. The 
participant correctly noted CADTH’s economic review of new drugs considers only the 
health system and not societal or workplace needs.  
 
Two public sector participants expressed a lack of trust and respect for private insurers. 
One participant felt private insurers were trying to take advantage of access to public 
insurance. 
 
“Private drug coverage, they de-list drugs. They don’t add new drugs. They have co-pays, 
percentage co-pays with no annual max, and they just keep ratcheting that up to reduce 
either the employee’s or the employer’s [unclear] contribution. So if we’re looking at filling 
the gaps, they’re just going to keep taking and taking and taking and dumping and 
dumping. To me that’s a losing battle.” (Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
Note that all provincial drug plans have cost-sharing for their general populations and 
in two jurisdictions (QC and MB) patient cost-sharing also increases every year. Similar 




One politician stated bluntly that private payers don’t manage their plans closely or 
consistently. His general conclusion was that private insurers add no value over what 
provincial plans offer. 
 
“There’s no formulary, there’s no restrictions. As costs go up those costs get transferred 
directly back to the employer. There is no negotiation for the private sector on the price of 
those drugs. It’s really just a negotiation on the cost of the administration of the plan. 
Then as quite significant costs start to emerge like biogenetic [sic] drugs, some of the 
immunotherapy medicines, as they start to become more common in prescriptions. Those 
are for a small employer, they can be enormously punitive.” (Federal politician) 
 
While relationships between public and private payers are limited in number and 
quality, a measure of trust exists although clearly there will be tensions. Still, it appears a 
reasonable foundation is in place that would allow collaboration. 
 
7.4.1 Bureaucrat opinions on the role of private insurance 
Economic modeling studies clearly state that a single payer NPh is certain to save money by 
lowering total costs. However, senior bureaucrats take a more narrow view, saying that 
private insurance should continue, in part, because it reduces their programs’ cost to the 
provincial treasury. Private insurance limits both the number of beneficiaries and program 
cost for provinces and provides a ‘safety valve’ by spreading the financial risk to employers 
and patients. In the end, private insurance may also reduce the need for tax increases. This 
is demonstrated in the following exchange with a former provincial drug plan manager: 
 
“And then the other thing is maintaining the private market. You know… I think we need 
to maintain the private market. 
[Researcher] And why do you think that? 
“Oh, they play a huge role in cost, in bearing some of the burden of cost. I think they want 
to maintain it too, and not just the insurers, but employers because it is something that 
they compete on in terms of hiring. I just think a system without private insurers will cost 
a lot more. 
[Researcher] … why do you think the combination of public and private could create a 
lower cost program than a completely public plan? 
“The cost for government would be higher if there was no… [private insurance]. … if all 
those costs, if that no longer existed, all of those people would now be on our public plan. 
The costs would increase and how would we get, how would we bear the cost of that 
[pause] without raising our taxes? I mean there’s only two ways that government can get 




Other public payers also favoured the continuation of private drug plans, although one 
participant said it could be better coordinated with public plans. Each of the first three 
comments below is from a different participant with provincial government experience. 
 
“I personally think it would be challenging to simply replace or get rid of private drug 
insurance. I’m not sure how you would do that because I think the one thing they do 
provide is choice… I think there is value in private payers. I don’t think it would 
necessarily benefit us to simply get rid of them.” (Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
“Is there a role for a private insurance company’s employee group plans to play? Yes.” 
(Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
“I think there needs to be a more rationed and balanced approach as to how that will 
proceed. Maybe the best system then isn’t a total public system, but rather is this blended 
model that we talked about but we just need to make sure that within the blended model, 
all aspects of it are working as effectively and as efficiently as they can. … What I think 
that they [the federal government] need to be able to do in this space is continue to have 
both those cash flows [public and private] in play. The trick isn’t to move to all one or all 
of the other because I think that that’s too much money. The trick is to figure out how to 
make both pools of those monies more efficient and effective. So I agree that employers… 
employers are used to paying for health benefits. How do you make it so that the spend 
that they have is a more effective spend?” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
“We have a very healthy, robust private [drug] insurance market in place, so let’s just 
determine what is the appropriate place for that insurance market. Let’s maintain that, 
either to work in a truly parallel way with the public system or to act as the safety 
valve…” (Former federal senior bureaucrat) 
 
Some politicians may want to see private insurance eliminated or severely curtailed but 
in contrast many bureaucrats appreciate the role played by private plans as a safety valve 
for their budgets. 
 
7.4.2 Payers and pharmaceutical manufacturers  
The pharmaceutical (pharma) industry appears to be the main target of concerns about 
sustainability by all payers. The high prices (affordability) of newer medicines, particularly 
specialty and rare disease drugs, are of particular concern. From the pharma perspective, 
Canada’s attempts to reduce prices, particularly since PMPRB reform was announced in 
2016, have created significant uncertainty about the industry’s future revenues and profits, 
as well as clinical trial activity in Canada and how quickly we will get access to the latest 
drugs. That noted, the industry here claims to have very little discretion on drug prices. 
They are set internationally based on several factors including national wealth, external 
price benchmarking, and our proximity to the US market which has the highest per capita 
drug costs in the world. 
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Neither payer group particularly likes or trusts the pharma industry. 
 
“So …the pharmaceutical industry are making, and I’ll be just really blunt, no effort 
whatsoever to address the pricing concerns in this country. No effort whatsoever to 
address the evidence-based [unclear]. So, are they a partner? No, they’re not. It’s an 
adversarial relationship. Once we get the structure right in Canada then maybe we move 
to a partnership.” (Insurance executive) 
 
“We have a long history that has led to that, a trust issue. And I do think that there is a 
role that [pharma] can play if we can get past that. We have had a very, I would say, long 
history of being, and I don’t want to say adversaries because we do try to collaborate 
when we can, but it’s often very one, from my perspective anyway, one-sided. [pause] And 
there’s always a hidden agenda.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
One participant noted that the pharmaceutical industry must consider NPh along with 
new drug price controls proposed by the PMPRB and the potential effects they would have 
on research and development, company-sponsored patient support programs, and the 
timing of new product launches. These changes may impact access to new medicines. 
 
“But if you take a look at where they’re tracking, if you take a look at the numbers that 
the previous Minister [Philpott] had indicated she was looking to save, although no one 
seems to know the basis of the denominator or the time horizon for her statement of 
saving $3.6 billion for Canadians. On the surface, that sounds like a good political 
message and an important one. Our industry would say okay, there’s a bunch of ways to 
save that kind of money. Price is part of it but if you’re going to try to do that only on 
price then that’s going to have significant consequences, both for our business viability in 
Canada but as importantly for Canadians even ignoring individuals who work in the 
drug industry in Canada. It may in fact create a challenge on business decisions as to 
drugs that will come to Canada. So that’s not very well understood.” (Pharma industry 
executive) 
 
The industry fears they will not have time to adjust to new pricing rules or explain them 
to their international headquarters. The consequences of narrow cost-centred decisions are 
“not very well understood,” providing further evidence of a poor working relationship 
between payers and the pharma industry. 
 
7.5 Opportunities and conditions for collaboration  
Public payers have collaborated to address drug access, affordability and sustainability 
problems. In 2010, Canada’s Premiers set up the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance 
(pCPA) to lower brand drug prices in public plans.232 Private payers are excluded from this 
 
232 See: http://www.canadaspremiers.ca/pan-canadian-pharmaceutical-alliance/. As at December 31, 2018, the pCPA had 
completed 262 price negotiations on new brand medicines. 
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forum although they have benefited because the pCPA has reduced generic drug prices and 
made biosimilar prices transparent for all Canadians. One insurer participant does not 
believe there should be a separate “pCPA” for private insurers.  
 
“I don’t think it makes sense for us to replicate the infrastructure the provinces are 
bringing. We will have different aims and different things we’re trying to achieve but 
most can be, in my view, bolt-on or we do that incrementally. But our view, and this is 
what we say all the time, is we want to be at the table with pCPA. That’s it!” (Insurance 
executive) 
 
Private insurers rarely use their collective buying power to negotiate prices or other 
listing conditions for new drugs due to concern about potentially violating the Competition 
Act. Some of the largest insurers do ad-hoc negotiations: the oldest example is Manulife’s 
DrugWatch.233 Private insurers want to be “price-takers” according to one insurance 
executive, and simply adopt pCPA prices after those price negotiations with brand drug 
manufacturers are complete. However, those prices are not publicly disclosed. 
 
Collaboration among payers has important potential benefits but one public plan 
participant believes allowing private insurers at the pCPA table could potentially undermine 
existing solidarity against drug manufacturers.   
 
“You have to ensure that private plans will be able to do similar [not list a drug until it 
goes through the pCPA process] if they want to be part of that [pCPA], because once you 
lose that solidarity then you lose a lot of leverage too…” (Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
At least one insurer is aware of the need to establish and grow trust between the payer 
communities based on one previous incident when insurers looked after their own interest 
without considering the larger long-term picture. This situation points out the need for 
clear rules of engagement. 
 
“I think the pCPA work on Inflectra [biosimilar to Remicade, a high-cost specialty drug] 
where they shared pricing with the private payer is a good example of where that came 
together. You know the challenge is the private payers have somewhat betrayed that by 
them cutting deals with the originator [company] biologic which will cause I think some 
hesitation on the public side to keep collaborating with us. I think we’ve got some other 
opportunities coming up now where we’re going to have to be a little more disciplined as 
an industry and say, look, if we’re going to work together with the public side, we’re going 
to have to make some commitments that we’re all in and we are going to support that 
biosimilar more exclusively rather than just watering it down with deals on the originator 
side.” (Insurance executive) 
 
 




7.5.1 Managing confidentiality  
There are challenges in sharing information between governments and private insurers 
because of the need for confidentiality on both sides. For governments, information sharing 
is difficult because of the need for impartiality and giving no party an advantage. For 
insurers, certain information is proprietary and so carefully guarded. This is another 
operating rule to address before effective collaboration can occur 
 
“Typically you are bound by confidentiality restraints in the budget process. What we 
would do is try to make a connection as soon as we were able to, but often it’s really after-
the-fact, which is unfortunate.” (Provincial drug plan manager) 
 
7.5.2 The role of competition 
Collaboration between governments and business would force consideration of how to 
manage competitive interests, including protecting intellectual property. Competition is a 
double-edged sword: while it drives innovation in private businesses, it can be a barrier for 
public organizations. This will be one of the greater challenges because insurers will not 
sacrifice their market position and billions in revenues for the sake of ‘playing nice’ with 
provincial drug plans. It could also be addressed through clear operating rules and 
boundaries on what defines anti-competitive behaviour. 
“One of the issues with IMC [Innovative Medicines Canada, the industry association for 
most brand drug manufacturers] and you get this a little bit I’d say with the private 
insurers too, more so with IMC, that they come up with some very good things and some 
very good ideas and projects, and philosophies, but because they’re all competitors, and 
they can all agree on it, but then when it’s their drug or affects their bottom line, then you 
see, you see it kind of fall apart.” (Former provincial drug plan manager) 
 
Another participant suggested that private plans create important and unique value 
relative to public plans because they may be more willing to innovate and can open a 
channel to patients. Such innovation, borne of a competitive market, is a positive 
development for patients and all payers. Private insurers also make use of their access to 
plan members to provide direct assistance, also something ministries of health and drug 
programs do not do. 
 
“What we’re looking at, as just a sidebar, we’re starting a pilot in June with [institution] 
and a genetic tester. We are then going to through our disability case management in the 
early stages of mental health where it’s a challenge to stabilize, a person is not 
responding or stabilized in a current medication. We’re going to cover the cost for that 
testing to help the physician make that determination of what is the best right drug. 
…That’s a good example though of what we’re talking about here. If we want to 
incorporate innovation such as that, that is one area where, because the private sector, 
we have access to the employer and employees which is a good channel of 
communication because government has difficulty reaching individuals that they are 




One participant suggested that combining the best of both public and private abilities 
could spark some creative solutions, and still avoid upsetting established roles.  
 
“I’m not huge on any of those other [single payer] options but then we get to some sort of 
shared funding model. You've got provincial [and] employer insurance, the option to... 
Here things get interesting. Here's where we’re talking about creative ways of making 
improvement to the existing set of arrangements without complicating vested interests 
wherever they might lie…” (Policy expert) 
 
While payer collaboration is possible careful planning is necessary to set ground rules 
and determine how best to use the strengths of both sides. 
 
7.6 Considering politics  
Politicians are unlikely to be drug policy or program experts. They will not always know the 
right questions to ask and some may not even be interested in alternative solutions, e.g., 
social insurance. That may change if NPh planning starts to consider implementation and 
funding. 
 
Participants reported politics are a powerful influence in Canada (see Chapter 6). The 
massive funding needs and highly visible personal and national impacts will ensure that 
politicians must decide on the most appropriate role of governments and for private 
insurance.  
 
In general, the right balance must be found between political opportunism and sound 
policy alternatives, ensuring problems are matched with appropriate solutions. 
 
“But the other thing that’s very significant in our healthcare system is politics, and how 
much of it is politicized. So much of policymaking is driven by, it appears to be driven as 
much by politics as by good policy.” (Former federal senior executive) 
 
As evidence, at least two participants identified politics were a specific concern when 
the Ontario government unexpectedly announced in April 2017 that OHIP+ would provide 
free provincial drug coverage to all residents under age 25.234 (See Section 4.5.1) The 
transition to almost any version of NPh will involve private insurers over a period of several 
years. 
 
“The recent announcement in Ontario about the kiddie pharmacare program, well it’s 
hard to argue against ensuring everybody has access to drugs. Basically, to address the 
one in 10 that might not have coverage to pay for the other nine in 10, doesn’t make 
 
234 The current government changed OHIP+ to make private drug insurance the first payer for any patient under age 25 
who had a plan, most likely through their parents. 
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sense. Was there a problem in that age group? Was it acute? Was that the best investment 
of our limited resources to solve a problem? That’s taking at a big hammer to, investment 
to solve what most would argue was probably, would require a more targeted program. 
That’s, in my mind, a philosophical and political approach. It’s more about elections than 
it is about providing good sound health policy.” (Pharmacy executive) 
 
“I mean you’d have to ask Ontario. That to me was completely political.” (Provincial drug 
plan manager) 
 
Private insurers and all businesses must work within the confines of political policy, 
programs and persuasion. This is illustrated in the following exchange which identifies the 
Quebec government’s three important motivations in introducing its unique drug policy in 
1996-97: (i) filling coverage gaps, (ii) protecting private insurers and (iii) protecting its own 
budget. Two out of these three will almost certainly apply to the current federal 
government. To date, there has been no NPh discussion about the need to protect private 
insurers. A conversation with a former provincial drug plan manager noted those concerns: 
 
[Researcher] Thinking back to the mid-1990s…Do you recall at that point any particular 
divisions or differences in how the political leaders and the bureaucratic leaders looked 
at the Castonguay report and then figured out what to do with it? 
“I think the main issue was related to people or patients who were not able to have access 
to a private insurance plan. The key issue was then what they will do with these patients 
and the final decision was that the government will be the insurer for them. That was the 
main issue, and how to manage costs also in terms of budget. The key was how to cover 
the working poor, I would say, who did not have access to a drug insurance plan by a 
private payer.  
[Researcher] Why did a social insurance model come up, because it's not one that's been 
introduced anywhere else in Canada. Clearly there are examples of it: the Canada 
Pension Plan is a social insurance model and clearly there are a number of similar 
models in Europe. Where did that idea come from? 
“I think the government had to protect the private insurers. They are an important 
employer in the province. So if you decide to stop or to replace the private plans by 
government plans, you create issues for all these employees and the private insurers too. 
[Researcher] OK, I get that. Do you think that the government also wanted to protect its 
own budget? 





It may be tempting for insurers, but also academics and politicians to speak for 
employers. This already occurs. But it’s impossible to generalize across 1.1 million 
incorporated businesses, especially when 95% have fewer than 100 employees. Small 
businesses don’t always speak as employers, they more often speak as personalities and so 
there is unlikely to be a consensus on the need for or form of NPh. 
 
One benefits advisor working with small and mid-sized employers said his business 
clients did not hold just one view on the roles of government and employers in providing 
drug insurance. 
 
“So there’s no easy answer, no different than individually. We all have different feelings, 
political views about how this stuff gets handled and I would say employers are the 
same.” (Private drug plan expert) 
 
The last participant’s statement is supported by one internet-based opinion survey that 
included large national samples of both employees and employers. It reported strong 
support for each of four alternative NPh models.  
 
• The strongest support (87% from 1,505 plan members and 84% from 403 employers) 
was for a NPh model that would “fill gaps in coverage for Canadians who have no 
insurance or who are underinsured. The workplace plan would not be affected.”  
• However, the least popular choice still received 57% support from employers and 
72% support from employees: “Replace all current provincial and workplace drug 
plans to ensure everyone gets the same coverage. Workplace drug plans would no 
longer exist.” (Sanofi, 2019 p. 16). 
 
7.7 Different philosophies: Private sector concerns about government 
In addition to asking whether we need universal drug insurance, many people will translate 
NPh into a more fundamental question about the role and size of government (Kingdon, p. 
133). This is particularly true in pharmacare where a very large, visible private industry has 
existed for decades and receives very high quality ratings from most plan members (Sanofi, 
2019). There is also a strong national identity with our public healthcare system. Within 
NPh, the size of governments bounds the role for private insurance. 
Insurers in Quebec 
 
To illustrate their importance in Quebec, life and health insurers currently employ 31,700 
people across all their operations, collectively pay $957 million in provincial taxes, and 
have $138 billion invested in the province including provincial ($29 bn) and municipal 




“But you’re right, we operate in a real world and in the realm of public, in the political 
world, there is a contest between how much we should allocate and how big government 
should be and how small it should be. And that’s the argument we have.” (Federal 
politician)  
 
“So then, depending on the stripe of your governing power, they may think why would we 
take that on something the private sector does? That’s a huge change.” (Provincial drug 
plan manager) 
 
Ministers rarely start their Cabinet posts as subject-matter experts. Even still, one civil 
servant understands that political “masters” will decide priorities and resource allocation.  
 
“So in my mind the fundamental question that each province needs to answer …is should 
my residents share in the cost of my pharmaceuticals? If so, what should that share look 
like? And I think everyone’s in a different time-space on working up that type of policy 
question. That’s where the political framework comes in mind. What do the political 
masters value? Is there something they want to invest their time and space into and if so 
how does this rank amongst their other competing priorities, right?” (Provincial drug plan 
manager)  
 
A comment was made about government sincerity to actually make the kind of change 
this participant believes is needed:  
 
“I just don’t know how realistic it is to re-do [the drug coverage model] [laughs]. Whether 
there ever would be the political will and courage to do it, I’m very cynical about [that]. 
Health care is the third rail, and we don’t seem to like telling Canadians that some of this 
stuff needs to change. … we still seem unable to have an adult conversation about how to 
reform it.” (Insurance executive) 
 
If progress is made, then some in the private sector are also concerned about how well 
F/P/T governments are likely to plan and execute pharmacare. They question stewardship 
and governance of our existing health system and its legacy of poor past performance.  
Commonwealth Fund research demonstrates other national systems have better 
outcomes while spending less (Shoen et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2014; Schneider et al., 2017). 
At its worst, one participant sees government as inherently and perpetually wasteful and 
incompetent: 
 
“Yeah, you might get a, some of the arguments or the opposing arguments might give 
you a taste of perhaps how a small business owner might think of this in terms of a 
publicly administered system. Basically, there is lack of trust or [fear of] mismanagement 
and wasteful spending. All of that stuff is going to come up and there’s [sic] tons of 




Competency is not a new concern. Boothe (2015) noted that around 2000 and the 
National Forum on Health: “Elites [had] high levels of concern about the problems of the 
existing system of hospital and medical insurance, such as wait times and overcrowded 
emergency rooms…” (p. 102) that were not being addressed. While fixing problems in the 
current system is a legitimate priority, the other concern here is trust in government’s 
ability to manage and govern the system as it is, let alone how it might handle change and 
expansion.   
 
One participant said that poor performance in health governance and planning does not 
warrant expanding the public system to absorb drug insurance. 
 
Essentially if we believe the only solution to the problems that all Canadian healthcare is 
to expand the Medicare model, I think we’re just being oblivious at the same time to the 
problems associated with the Canadian Medicare model in the first place and the fact that 
we get really poor value for money. I think that’s probably the best way to describe it for 
all things, doctors and hospitals, the assumption that somehow things are going to 
dramatically change were we to just to add drugs to that.” (Policy expert)  
 
This comment speaks loudly to the need to ensure good governance, oversight and 
competency to ensure a high-performing health system.  
 
7.8 Emerging Themes 
In addition to the general topics arising from the interviews noted in each section of this 
chapter, two higher-order themes emerge.  
 
The first theme is collaboration, which emerges from the shared financial and 
reputational risk to both payer groups that is a product of the same broad market forces. 
The separate channels of public and private drug plans allow suppliers to ‘squeeze-the-
balloon’, always attempting to make up financial losses on one side (usually public) from 
private payers, including directly from patients. While public bodies like pCPA deserve 
credit for more closely managing drug manufacturers, as a matter or equity private plan 
members should not be disadvantaged and pay higher prices.  
 
Whether or not NPh is launched by the federal government, private and provincial 
payers could work together to lower drug prices and costs throughout the Canadian market. 
This would ensure continuing access to emerging drugs, many of which will cost thousands 
or hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. The presence of private sector organizations 
may also help address the innovation opportunity for pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
ensure effective new products are quickly launched in the Canadian market. 
 
A standing advisory forum has already been proposed (Sec 5.3.5) that would report and 
make recommendations to Ministers of Health (or the pCPA or the new Canadian Drug 
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Agency), similar to Germany’s Federal Joint Committee. This would operationalize two 
“projects” that stem from a broader commitment to work together: 
 
1. The immediate needs are to develop a national policy for drugs for rare diseases and 
biosimilars, and perhaps to standardize new drug submissions and economic 
analyses. Making recommendations about a national formulary, limits to out-of-
pocket costs and regulating private drug plans could be included. Longer term, 
consideration may be given to developing an actively managed national prescription 
drug policy that stays abreast of fast-moving developments in products and policies 
globally. 
 
2. Second, the very practical issues arising from transition and implementation could 
be investigated, including topics such as competition, collective bargaining 
agreements and protection of confidential information. The Advisory Council did 
minimal work on this topic, awaiting policy direction from the federal government. 
This work requires the expertise of practitioners and sufficient time to plan and 
execute as recent experience with OHIP+ indicates. 
 
The second theme includes philosophy and principles, perhaps more challenging 
because these involve personal values and a national health system that is loved despite its 
chronic under-performance relative to international peers. That noted, there is little 
disagreement on principles and the main questions are about definitions and how many are 
reasonable (Sec. 2.2.2). This theme stems from comments made about the size and role of 
government, trust in government competency (and by extension transparency and 
accountability and including the reverse concern about the need to control private sector 
behaviours that are not in the public interest), and the occasional intrusion of politics into 
administrative matters. While it is unlikely any substantive and prescriptive policy may arise 
from any such discussion, and political involvement cannot be controlled (nor should it be) 
perhaps guidelines or boundaries may be discussed and outlined.  
 
7.9 Discussion: The role of private insurance  
The role of private insurance is one of the most important questions related to national 
pharmacare, and the dividing line seems to be more ideological than rational. Even though 
our health system for hospital and physician coverage is public, participants who favour 
single payer NPh do not totally dismiss a role for private insurance.  
 
Insurers are not without power, especially in Ottawa. They reportedly influenced the 
Quebec government in the late 1990s to maintain a robust role for employer-sponsored 
drug plans.235 Twenty-two years later, insurers have massive investments and economic 
impact, as well as significant workforces across Canada. 
 
 
235 Personal communication, Claude Di Stasio, (former) Vice-présidente, Affaires québécoises, CLHIA. October 20, 2015. 
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That noted, the depth and diversity of opinion among employers who pay for private 
insurance is not well known. Since employer-sponsored plans are voluntary, they may be 
terminated or limited at any time to reduce exposure to uncontrollable high-cost drugs.236 
This means risk and cost transfer to patients, the government, or to other parties. 
Unfortunately, there are no public data to track the extent to which this is already 
happening. This threat can be overcome with an employer mandate to provide coverage and 
meet minimum standards, as in Quebec, but this will be loudly resisted by small businesses 
that do not already provide coverage. If a full employer mandate is not feasible, then the 
government could also decide to cover anyone without private insurance, again, similar to 
Quebec. 
 
Funding has always been a central consideration to governments (Hall, 1964, Boothe, 
2015). Unlike private plans that are usually renewed each year despite cost increases well in 
excess of general inflation, public plans operate under budgetary constraints and must 
sometimes ration access through administrative rules, failure to list, and lengthy new drug 
review processes.237  
 
Neither payer group trusts the pharmaceutical industry, but its needs must also be 
considered because access to new, efficacious and cost-effective drugs is in the national 
interest and clearly in the patient’s interest. The pharmaceutical industry believes other 
government decisions affecting cost, such as PMPRB reform and patient support programs, 
must be considered alongside NPh. Drug companies operating in Canada must negotiate 
domestic access and prices with their global headquarters as well as with pCPA. 
 
Payer participants suggested a collaborative model including private insurance could 
ensure universal access and improve the sustainability of all drug plans by spreading risk 
and limiting public funding while still addressing cost and equity problems. A mixed payer 
model could also provide an option for additional coverage for those who can afford and 
qualify for it. However, collaboration requires higher levels of trust among payers and 
competition among health providers must be well managed.  
 
While collaboration is noted as an important need, there is a risk that drug price 
discounts negotiated by the pCPA and given to F/P/T plans by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers would be smaller if the base was broadened to include all private 
prescriptions. Governments would therefore pay more than they do in the current model, 
assuming drug companies have a finite budget for price discounts. This would only affect 
future negotiations. However, equity would gradually be improved by having a single 
national price for all public and private payers.  
 
Technology illustrates a complementary approach by public and private payers. Health 
technology assessment (HTA) used by CADTH and INESSS for public payers is superior to 
 
236 In unionized workplaces, no changes in health benefits are normally allowed throughout the duration of the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
237 Examples described in Part 1 include access to Avastin and no coverage for take-home cancer drugs in Ontario. 
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any used by private insurers. A single payer NPh may need to adapt its HTA to include 
employer, workplace and community interests. However, no public plan provides 
technologically sophisticated patient services like those provided by the largest private 
insurers. Their robust digital health technology platforms – the “omni-channel experience” 
according to one participant – are aimed at consumers and using various media platforms, 
i.e., web, smart phone, telephonic and call-centre available 24-7. These services include 
education on adherence to therapy, health promotion, pharmacy locators and internet-
based cognitive behavioural therapy. If these services are terminated due to NPh, patients 
may reasonably demand that provinces develop comparable services. This will not come 
cheaply or quickly. A social insurance model could use or adapt the best technology from 
both payers. 
 
Several participants noted that politics or the politicization of our health system 
generally is an important problem. The politics of drug insurance are unpredictable 
particularly for private payers ‘outside the tent.’ While a new single payer plan could 
potentially sideline private drug plans, employers would likely exchange insurer premiums 
for higher taxes. They would then lose control of the design and operation of drug plans 
that may no longer meet their needs or those of their employees. Ideally, politicians would 
have more practical knowledge of private drug insurance before they decide how or whether 
it ought to continue. 
 
Not surprisingly, private insurers also have issues. The industry has been slow to fix 
problems of its own making such as requiring mandatory generic substitution and capping 
out-of-pocket costs. Their pooling system for high-cost drugs is limited and failed to 
progress even in the face of much client criticism. They have no policy on covering drugs 
for rare diseases. While a private plan may have far larger formularies than even the most 
generous provincial plan, better coverage will certainly be determined by some combination 
of formulary and protection from excessive out-of-pocket costs. 
 
Employer drug plans have different goals and priorities than public plans. They should 
not be examined using the same criteria (see Table 5.1). Despite near-universal concern 
about prices and costs, most employers appear willing to pay for greater choice, 
technological sophistication and the unique customer service aspects of private insurance. 
They value competition to improve products and services. Many want to address 
organizational health issues such as absence, disability and presenteeism in concert with 
drug plan design and cost so they can better manage productivity and employee 
engagement and loyalty. These interests are rarely considered by governments in health 
policy or plan design.  
 
Interviews uncovered two important knowledge gaps. First, almost no one had deep 
knowledge about how to apply Quebec's social drug insurance model across Canada.238 Yet, 
this is the model costed by the PBO at the direction of HESA and proposed by the Advisory 
Council. It is not at this point a viable off-the-shelf alternative unless a single payer model 
 
238 Inability to fully review French language reports and research is a potentially important limitation. See Section 8.7. 
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again fails to launch. Second, no participant knew how regulation could be used to manage 
drug insurance and ensure private insurers meet the public interest. Regulation of private 
insurers (Sec 4.8) is central to a social insurance model, again highlighting this is an 
undeveloped option. 
 
There are a handful of reports about social drug insurance in Canada but neither HESA 
(2018) nor the Advisory Council (2019b) demonstrated careful assessment and serious 
consideration as an alternative to a public single payer plan. Neither major report noted 
regulation of private insurance as a feasible alternative. These need to be explored now if 
social insurance is to be ready as an alternative solution. 
 
Participant responses indicate private insurance is not generally seen as a problem in 
itself even though it likely adds unnecessary costs that can be better managed by public 
plans. Neither provincial and federal bureaucrats nor private payer participants considered 
a public single payer NPh to be a uniquely appropriate solution, though politicians, labour 
and academic participants favour it. The political and ideological appeal of this model must 
be reconciled with the practical knowledge and experience of those who plan and 
administer public and private drug plans. 
 
If the federal government ultimately decides once again to not pursue NPh, then the 
status quo could be considered a victory for private insurers. This does not absolve them 
from making important improvements that would further the goal of ensuring adequate 
universal coverage. The insurance industry could establish a minimum standard private 
plan, including mandatory generic substitution, a cap on out-of-pocket spending and 
perhaps even a policy on biosimilars to serve as a benchmark for employers (and 
provinces). Insurers could propose approaches to managing drugs for rare disorders. They 
could certainly improve the high-cost claim pooling mechanism that falls far short of their 
clients’ needs. Better access to private insurance claim data would also improve national 
drug policy and program development. 
Not all the responsibility of leadership should fall on governments considering the hugely 
important role already played by insurers and employers.   
 
7.10 Chapter Summary 
In contrast to the discovery of a strong federal role (Ch. 6) the place of private insurance 
was known to be contentious and possibly tenuous given academic studies supporting only 
a single payer approach. My sensitizing concepts and questions specifically asked about this 
topic.  
 
The research question for this chapter asked whether private drug insurance is 
acceptable and should be included in national pharmacare policy. A majority of participants 
agreed private insurance is important and wanted it to continue inside a NPh plan. This is 
likely a practical position although for some it is ideological based on personal values and 
how governments are perceived to manage the broader health system. For those who favour 
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private insurance, this likely means access to a larger formulary and adjunct services 
(including technology and disease management), and choice of plan design and funding 
amounts and sources. The somewhat higher cost is not a deterrent: risk can be mitigated 
because most plans have yet to introduce more active cost management tactics.  
 
On a more strategic or policy level, insurers are often perceived to be more passive 
managers of their own destiny in contrast to the more activist approach taken by 
governments through the pCPA, CADTH, INESSS and the PMPRB. Insurer costs can usually 
be passed on to their employer clients. If “fill the gaps” evolves to more of a social 
insurance model, then stakeholders will need to better understand the Quebec approach 
and consider how regulation and far better risk sharing may help the industry operate 
preferentially in the public interest. 
 
Two high-level themes have emerged from this chapter – those of collaboration and a 
need for some discussion on principles and philosophy. 
 
A final comment is that employers provide the source funding for private drug plans. 
While understanding the role of private insurance and insurers is important, this research 
does not presume to fully explain the roles that employers (and unions) may want to play in 







Theoretical Perspectives: Applying Kingdon’s Model 
8.1 Introduction 
It is not clear yet if the recent resurgence in interest for NPh will provide a different 
outcome than in 2004-06 when the National Pharmaceutical Strategy last prompted 
discussion about important changes in Canada’s drug policy and programs.  
 
In Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Kingdon (2011) explores the conditions 
that make policy change more likely. He identified three processes or streams: problem 
definition, policy solutions and politics. The convergence of these streams is signaled by a 
defined problem coupled with a pre-existing policy solution backed by a policy 
entrepreneur and high political interest. Convergence opens a window of opportunity, 
which is often short-lived. Action may or may not follow. The pattern for NPh is one of 
punctuated equilibrium.  
 
The three streams will be discussed in turn, with convergence of the streams into 
potential windows of opportunity as the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
8.2 The Problems 
NPh has been repeatedly linked in the literature to two clear problems: drug prices are too 
high and not all Canadians have adequate coverage.  
 
Inadequate drug insurance is recognized as an important problem, with two different 
models proposed to address it. A public single payer NPh was anticipated by the 1964 Royal 
Commission and more recently by the 1997 report of the National Forum on Health. It is the 
basis of most published academic studies (e.g., Morgan et al., 2015). Social insurance is not 
a new idea either but it has not been implemented in the Canadian health system except for 
Quebec’s drug plan in 1997. The problem of under-insurance is likely to be far greater than 
the number of uninsured. Alberta and New Brunswick are the only provinces without 
protection from catastrophic drug costs but residents can access their voluntary plans 
(Non-Group Coverage and NB Drug Plan, respectively) with minimal delay and will be 
covered for future expenses within the respective provincial formularies. That leaves just 
15,630 residents of Newfoundland and Labrador who had after-tax family incomes over 
$150,000 (2015) with no access to the NL Assurance catastrophic drug plan.  NPh is well-
suited to address the need for adequate universal drug insurance if it implements 
appropriate national standards. 
 
However, it is the drug price-cost problem that has arguably received the most attention. 
Total prescription drug spending almost doubled between 2004 and 2018 (CIHI, 2018). In 
recent years, attention has shifted from traditional blockbuster drugs to several very costly 
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new specialty biologic drugs (especially for oncology) and drugs for rare diseases with six- 
and sometimes seven-figure annual or one-time costs.  
 
Kingdon describes funding as a “special problem” (p. 105) for new public programs 
especially one with very high costs. But underneath, there are other important cost 
“problems” related to NPh as proposed, each presented below. Any of these could have 
stopped progress but the combination made implementation especially difficult.  
 
National data and comparative international surveys have indicated cost and coverage 
challenges for many years, but Kingdon warns: “Thus the data do not speak for themselves. 
Interpretations of the data transform them from statements of conditions to statements of 
policy problems” (p. 94). The problems are often subjective interpretations, connected by 
chance or entrepreneurial skill to ready-made policy solutions and political opportunity.  
 
Academic studies have produced large and attractive estimates of cost savings from NPh 
and for the most part, have presented them as highly likely, relatively simple (“bulk 
buying”), available quickly, and tied exclusively to a single payer system.  Many studies have 
made a routine call to national pride, by beginning with a statement that Canada is the only 
OECD country with a universal health system that does not include coverage for 
prescription medicines.  The best-known study (Morgan et al., 2015) was titled “Estimated 
cost of universal public coverage of prescription drugs in Canada. Its abstract reported: 
“Results: Universal public drug coverage would reduce total spending on prescription drugs 
in Canada by $7.3 billion (worst-case scenario $4.2 billion, best-case scenario $9.4 billion).”  
This paper made headlines and later won the CMAJ Bruce Squires Award.  
 
The Morgan et al. article was published just a few months before the 2015 federal 
election. The problem of drug cost was now paired with the national pharmacare policy 
solution. Politicians had an opportunity to critically assess this and related studies, but 
many would not have sufficient time, skills or inclination to do so. This solution still 
became part of the government’s “decision agenda” (Kingdon, p. 4) even though several 
drug program experts who participated in this research stated they did not fully accept the 
validity of this research.  
 
The Liberals came from third place in June 2015 to win the October 2015 federal 
election,239 energizing a progressive political agenda. Politicians like former federal Health 
Minister Jane Philpott were seriously focused on the cost control problem, echoing Boothe 
(2015). In a January 2017 CBC interview, Minister Philpott made it clear that “access to 
appropriate medications is absolutely essential” (00:40). She then remarked “we pay among 
the highest costs for drugs in the world” (01:15), but that “first of all, let’s get those prices 
down” (04:10).  In other words, lower prices and costs were essential for continued access, 
and NPh could only follow price reductions. Interestingly, it appears the Minister did not 
 




believe NPh could in itself lower drug prices or costs. After acknowledging an important 
problem of access (and equity), the Minister also framed the problem in financial terms. 
 
Related to the cost of launching a drug program, a second problem is the underlying, 
long-term state of F/P/T finances. Half the provinces and the federal government were in 
deficit for fiscal 2018-19: collectively, costs exceeded revenues by almost $31 billion (RBC 
Royal Bank, 2019. p. 2). Deficits typically discourage funding of expensive new programs 
but the door may still be open to more narrow tactics that could still improve drug 
coverage. As Section 4.12 describes, it is only the federal government that has the fiscal 
capacity to act over the long term. 
 
The Advisory Council’s proposed comprehensive pharmacare phase (a Quebec 
formulary due January 2027) comes with a $15.3 billion estimated annual cost to the 
federal government (Advisory Council, 2019b, p. 14). Large annual federal deficits are 
forecast at least until 2024-25 according to the December 2019 Economic and Fiscal Update 
(EFU).  Further, the PBO, in its analysis of the EFU, states: “Deficits in this range permit 
limited fiscal flexibility in the event of an economic downturn to maintain a declining debt-
to-GDP, and limited fiscal room to implement additional electoral commitments in the near 
term” (p. 3). To the extent the federal government proceeds with NPh, less money will be 
available for other national priorities such as pipelines, defence and environmental 
investments unless taxes are increased. 
 
Kingdon notes the reluctance of politicians and bureaucrats to implement a plan for 
which they have limited certainty of current cost and future growth. Indeed this concern 
was evident in the report of the 1964 Royal Commission and resulted in drug insurance 
being deferred until sometime following the introduction of medical insurance. Section 4.12 
and Table 4.4 identify 16 different cost estimates and ten estimates of the number of un- 
and under-insured Canadians. None is current or complete, incurring financial, reputational 
and political risk to the government. Current and complete data are crucial to presenting a 
reliable, real-world NPh budget impact analysis. This is the third important cost problem 
that discourages NPh. 
 
Health budgets and long-term funding are issues inextricably connected to F/P/T 
relations. This is the fourth major cost problem: despite the call for federal leadership, 
Ottawa cannot act alone. The federal government must negotiate health issues with the 
jurisdictions either as a group or bilaterally. The Constitution effectively gives provincial 
governments veto power in health and the current political dynamic indicates several 
Premiers are likely to opt out, at least initially. In addition, more than one mandate will be 
needed to achieve full implementation of NPh. Like the Netherlands, continued momentum 
will depend on the support of future F/P/T governments. For comparison, achieving NPh is 
orders of magnitude more complex than the four-year process of reforming the PMPRB. 
 




8.3 Policy Options 
Optimism reached new heights as the Advisory Council began its investigation into 
implementing NPh, even before HESA reported. A single payer NPh model had been the “pet 
solution” (p. 203), positioned as the only good choice by some academics and think-tanks. 
Every major public and private stakeholder was finally engaged at the highest levels. Polling 
indicated high public support for the idea. It was expected that the Advisory Council 
(2019b, p. 25) would finally settle how to implement and pay for NPh.  
 
Interviews indicated some influencers favoured single payer (politicians, academics, 
labour), but payers and bureaucrats with experience administering public and private drug 
plans wanted private insurance to remain in a “fill the gaps” option.  
 
Bureaucrats certainly understood the complexity of implementation and transition. 
Several participants in this thesis were in senior positions with knowledge and experience 
that would be recognized as centrally important to planning and administering NPh. 
However, they did not reveal that they had been actively consulted about the feasibility of 
launching NPh. “Sometimes, windows open quite predictably… At other times, windows 
open quite unpredictably” (p. 203). Perhaps no serious investigation of implementation 
issues had yet occurred, or other experts were consulted. This suggests that policy 
development can be random, the result of “a complex combination of factors [being] 
generally responsible for the movement of a given item into agenda prominence” (Kingdon, 
p. 76). 
 
From conception through implementation, both political and bureaucratic support are 
essential to get things done. Speaking again of the US, Kingdon concluded that politicians 
were more powerful than bureaucrats with respect to agenda setting (p. 31). However, most 
legislators lack deep knowledge of a complex and high-cost policy issues. If NPh is 
approved, bureaucrats then become more likely to impact implementation and generate 
alternatives (p. 31). Both politicians interviewed for this thesis were keen to “sell” HESA’s 
view of NPh but their limited knowledge of the details is consistent with Kingdon.  
 
The government’s animation of the HESA and its later creation of the Advisory Council 
signaled an important change in politics. In Kingdon’s language, the politics stream 
appeared to be converging between 2016 and 2019 with the problem and the policy 
solution. Eventually key stakeholders that were largely outside the debate – insurers, retail 
pharmacy, brand drug manufacturers – began to research their risks and create public 
advocacy positions that aimed to influence political parties towards more industry-friendly 
ideas about what changes were needed and how best to achieve them.  
 
Kingdon describes the “policy primaeval soup” (Ch. 6) as a broth of floating ideas and 
issues that either careen off each other or become attached to potential solutions that are 
created, shopped and championed by policy entrepreneurs. Other combinations can be 
shelved for more opportune times. It is difficult to identify a “focusing event” that triggered 
political interest in NPh. More likely, it may simply be a different group of politicians or a 
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different calculation of the political advantages of backing NPh which led the Liberals to 
establish HESA’s NPh investigation and then the Advisory Council. These steps would blunt 
an NDP claim that only it could ensure NPh progress.  
 
There is, however, an important cautionary note. Kingdon writes that sometimes, 
“solutions become attached to problems, even though the problems themselves did not 
necessarily dictate those particular solutions” (p. 177). If feedback from bureaucratic 
monitoring or public complaints indicates the fit between solution and problem is sub-
optimal or conditions change, then those solutions may be short-lived. To those risks can be 
added public indifference and key stakeholder disagreement. 
 
For any idea to survive, Kingdon suggests it must be technically feasible, promote 
acceptable values (equity, efficiency), have a tolerable cost and be acceptable to both the 
mass and specialized public, as well as to politicians (p. 131). As reasonable as these 
conditions may appear, he notes policy development is rarely rational: “Comprehensive 
rational policy making is portrayed as impractical for the most part, although there are 
occasions where it is found” (p. 19). Although both HESA and the Advisory Council claimed 
they had seriously reviewed alternatives to single payer, their reports present no indication 
about what they deliberated or how they came to dismiss alternatives such as “fill the gaps” 
and social insurance. 
 
Kingdon defines technical feasibility as “all worked out and “ready to go (p. 131) and 
“heavily involved with implementation” (p. 132). Bureaucrats and other research 
participants who are familiar with drug plan administration indicated they did not accept 
the large cost savings projected by academic models. Those studies did not explore 
implementation or settle funding sources or amounts. Consequently, bureaucrats – those 
who are responsible for real-world implementation and are accountable for administration 
and budgets – may have had a braking effect on HESA and Advisory Council 
recommendations because they believed a single-payer plan failed a test of technical 
feasibility, one of Kingdon’s criteria. 
 
Kingdon warned that opportunities seldom linger, so stakeholders need to prepare ideas 
even when there is no sign of imminent change. Academics and more recently the Canadian 
Pharmacists Association (CPhA) and the Canadian Labour Congress heeded that advice and 
spent some years ‘softening up’ the political and policy environment with their advocacy for 
a single payer model and an appeal to cost-conscious politicians that billions of dollars 
could be saved.  
 
But the unexpected revival of NPh after the 2015 election caught other interested 
parties, including senior-level career bureaucrats and private insurance participants by 
surprise. “Without the prospect of an open window, participants slack off. They are 
unwilling to invest their time, political capital, energy, and other resources in an effort that 
is unlikely to bear fruit” (p. 167). Insurers had no ready and ‘qualified’ alternatives, even 
though they had the most to lose. In the only drug policy paper issued by the CLHIA before 
2015, the focus was lowering drug prices and costs and it did not specifically mention NPh 
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(see Section 4.6.8). Alone among those in the private payer community, the CPhA was 
engaged and had prepared policy documents but it is, however, a relatively small player. 
 
Employers, as drug plan sponsors, were much larger and more important but were even 
more removed because their focus is on their core business interests. They would generally 
leave health system matters to others more qualified. As long as insurers and employers are 
seen to be “outside the tent” by bureaucrats and politicians, their role and goals would not 
be sufficiently understood and are less likely to be reflected in policy. A second important 
shortfall that weakened the policy argument was the federal government’s failure to 
recognise, consult with and engage other important stakeholders that could have helped the 
government build credibility and momentum. 
 
NPh had failed Kingdon’s policy tests of technical feasibility, stakeholder engagement, 
and a tolerable cost, in this case, for the federal government. One may conclude the Liberal 
Party was not deeply committed to the big idea of NPh and launched HESA and then the 




Political interest in NPh has ebbed and flowed for 75 years. Boothe (2015, p. 68) noted the 
inclusion of drug coverage in a federal health insurance proposal made to the provinces in 
1945. While there have been times when political support appeared, there has never been 
enough to implement a drug plan as bold as hospital or medical care decades ago. 
 
Kingdon notes that politicians tend to resist contentious ideas, making political choices 
more difficult: “Issues of high controversy and low [public] salience are particularly 
unattractive to politicians” (p. 38). NPh has high public salience, though it may not be as 
deep and intense as needed, and NPh had strong support from within the Liberal Party at its 
2018 Halifax policy convention. Still NPh has not yet gained enough attention from senior 
Liberal politicians. It may be that NPh struck influential Liberal (and Conservative Party) 
politicians as an idea with high and accelerating costs with the potential for significant and 
negative political consequences.  
 
If cost savings were the main driving political force for NPh, the answer is now to be 
found in PMPRB reform. The cost of new patented drugs is to be reduced 15% to 20% by 
repricing them in line with the new group of 11 comparator countries. Without this 
initiative, savings are unlikely to occur for several years. One reason is that a 
comprehensive universal plan would quickly increase drug utilization from the un- and 
under-insured. Over time, new drugs are added which are invariably priced higher than 
older drugs. In the long term, many other environmental variables are likely to have shifted 
such as population, disease profiles, provincial policies, private insurance coverage, new 
drugs and indications and prescribing practices. Politicians would take considerable short-




Small, incremental rational change is common for governments, especially when 
generating high-risk alternatives to existing programs. “People are sometimes reluctant to 
take big steps. Apprehensive about being unable to calculate the political fallout, politicians 
shy away from grand departures. Apprehensive about not fully understanding the 
unanticipated consequences that might ensue, specialists also avoid changes. Both worry 
about the budgetary implications of massive new programs” (p.80). Politicians generally 
retreat from solutions with larger-than-expected costs (p. 106).  
 
High controversy, suspect public salience and uncertain costs create financial and 
reputational risk to governments. In response, governments are likely to slow down and 
undertake due diligence to ensure fit for purpose. High complexity often creates conditions 
for slow resolution. Speaking of the US, Kingdon writes: “Congress is easily fatigued” (p. 
104) when legislation can’t pass and decisions aren’t made. The same limitation likely 
applies to Canada’s Parliament and provincial legislatures. 
 
8.4.1 National Mood 
Kingdon includes public or national mood as part of the political stream (Ch. 7). His 
interviews suggested that politicians “sense” public opinion and that this mood can either 
promote or constrain policy items. First, sensing is usually far more tangible than the word 
implies. It is usually narrowly defined as well, arising from direct interaction with only a 
small percentage of constituents, either as individuals or groups, or from advocates of 
certain ideas. Sensing may even arise from other sources or past experiences.  
 
Kingdon states that “the mood does not necessarily reside in the mass public” (p. 148), 
minimizing the influence of the general public and its direct impact on the decision agenda. 
Public opinion surveys show high public support for NPh, but there is uncertainty about 
how to pay for it, concern about potentially lost coverage, and the meaning of this term may 
not be consistently or accurately understood by the general public or in fact by politicians 
(see Section 4.4.7). Polling has indicated public support is actually higher for other health 
and non-health priorities (Pollara, 2018).  
 
Influential media outlets may have more sway since media reports the opinions of 
politicians, specialists and the public (e.g., though polling) and often provides their own 
editorials. This confluence of views makes it difficult to know which stakeholder influences 
or leads the others.  
 
All in, it appears the political stream at this moment is essentially unchanged from past 
resurgences described by Boothe (2015). The problems of inadequate coverage and high 
drug prices and costs have again had added profile in recent years but this appears fleeting 
and superficial. Governments have resisted boldness and made only incremental change. 
Tinkering has avoided substantive improvement for those in greatest need, e.g., the 
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underinsured who would benefit from national standards for much reduced out-of-pocket 
costs. 
 
8.5 Entrepreneurs, Coalitions and Streams 
To recap, a window of opportunity did not exist from 2006 until late in 2015 but then 
suddenly opened wide with subsequent work done by HESA and the Advisory Council 
(2016-2019). Then, the window appeared to mostly close since the 2019 Liberal election 
platform offered only minimal support for NPh. The window for some form of universal 
coverage may remain open because the Liberal minority government needs NDP support 
and NPh was noted in the 2019 Speech from the Throne, albeit briefly and ambiguously: 
“The Government will take steps to introduce and implement national pharmacare so that 
Canadians have the drug coverage they need” (p. 12).  
 
8.5.1 Policy Entrepreneurs 
Kingdon identifies the need for alternatives that are politically and publicly attractive and 
for highly capable champions with broad support. These policy entrepreneurs can be found 
in many stations, including elected officials and academia (p. 204). Two policy 
entrepreneurs can be identified so far.  
 
The first is Steve Morgan, a professor at the University of British Columbia. Dr. Morgan 
and his colleagues have for several years worked to develop a stream of advocacy research 
to both specialized groups and the public through general media communication (e.g., op-
eds) supporting a single payer NPh. They have kept the issue “alive in lean times” (Kingdon, 
p. 130) and their work helped ‘soften up’ those communities (p. 127-130), likely with the 
intention to shape public values (p. 123). They have also done some of what Kingdon calls 
“negative blocking” (p. 49): playing the role of champion protecting our public medicare 
system against the incursion of private interests. Currently (February 2020), over 1,300 
academics have endorsed this group’s Pharmacare 2020 initiative but only a handful have 
published work on this topic. Research from this group has been adopted by the Canadian 
Labour Congress and some of its member unions (e.g., Unifor, CFNU). 
 
Academics very rarely take such public advocacy positions. The group may share 
common policy values (p. 204) about NPh. However, their rigid support of only a public 
single payer plan and their lack of operational experience has limited their credibility 
according to some of my research participants. Kingdon notes that academic work is not 
always trusted: “…the value of the work is accepted, but practical people realize that its 
recommendations cannot always be implemented” (p. 57). “Feasibility,” he writes, “is heavily 
involved with implementation” (p. 132).  
 
The second visible policy entrepreneur is Eric Hoskins. As a former Ontario Minister of 
Health and Long-Term Care, he endorsed a public single payer drug plan and promoted it 
with his P/T peers. As Chair of the Advisory Council he accepted a small supporting role for 
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private insurance. Dr Hoskins may be motivated by his policy values, and potentially as a 
politician, by an interest in claiming credit for enacting OHIP+ and then expanding this 
template to across the country. However, the implementation of OHIP+, though not its 
principles, has been seen as rushed and flawed, and was easily unwound by the next 
government. Following tepid Liberal political support for the Advisory Council’s final 
report, Dr. Hoskins has rarely spoken publicly on this topic. Kingdon notes the importance 
of “sheer persistence” (p. 205) as a quality of policy entrepreneurs. 
 
Further evidence is needed that the implementation of either a public single payer or a 
social insurance model is feasible. That requires other experts which have so far not 
coalesced with the academic support group or with the core recommendation of the 
Advisory Council for a public single payer plan. 
 
8.5.2 Coalitions 
While a policy entrepreneur can build bridges, a coalition of organizations helps sort out 
conflicting or confusing priorities and preferences, and makes it easier for governments to 
ensure NPh progresses or at least that important changes occur. Kingdon describes this 
process as tipping: “…a process of coalition-building: bargains are struck, concessions are 
given in return for participation in a coalition, and as the bandwagon gains momentum 
people join out of fear of being excluded from participation in the goodies to be obtained” 
(p. 141).  
 
For example, the core focus of a coalition could be maintaining a private insurance 
component.  Initially this might engage pharmacists because their fee is higher in private 
drug plans. Patient groups may support a private alternative because they resist smaller 
formularies or higher barriers to access. To the extent a coalition exists right now, it is 
informal, such as speaking about consensus positions at conferences. There has been no 
follow-through to a more substantive and durable form. No concessions among potential 
members have been publicly disclosed because perhaps they are not yet necessary. A 
tipping point that would trigger coalition-building is not at all clear in this currently 
antagonistic F/P/T climate with its limited and scattered attention span and where the vast 
majority of Canadians have adequate coverage. 
 
Neither entrepreneur has caught sustained attention among the general public nor has 
either united the array of interested parties – national and provincial political leaders, the 
general public, patients, business, health professionals and labour – on how to fund and 
implement NPh. No symbol or imagery has emerged that captures the public attention 
needed to animate and implement a feasible solution. As Kingdon notes: “The joining of the 
separate streams described earlier depends heavily on the appearance of the right 
entrepreneur at the right time” (p. 205). As the window apparent closes, perhaps neither 




8.5.3 Diverging Streams 
Cracks in the window of opportunity have appeared. There was more than one problem and 
only one (inadequate drug insurance) was a good match for NPh. The policy idea and 
investigations by HESA and the Advisory Council of a public single payer model were too 
narrow in scope and did not account for administrative complexity, the high cost to the 
federal government and stakeholder resistance from the provinces, insurers, brand drug 
manufacturers, patient groups and pharmacy industry. Even as the Advisory Council was 
launched in February 2018, clear political support within the Liberal Party for a fully public 
single payer plan suddenly appeared limited or uncertain. The federal Minister of Finance 
stated: "We need a strategy to deal with the fact not everyone has access, and we need to do 
it in a way that's responsible, that deals with the gaps, but doesn't throw out the system 
that we currently have."  
 
The comment about “responsible,” spoken by this powerful Minister, indicated that cost 
would be an important political consideration, Kingdon’s “special problem.” The solution 
needed only to fill gaps, not replace the existing system of mixed private and public 
funding.  Single payer was no longer the only option and the phrase “fill the gaps” became 
the alternative even though it is not much more than an advocacy slogan. At that point, the 
three streams had either separated or never actually been joined, with several serious 
problems and an alternative policy solution (social insurance) that had not been seriously 
investigated by the government.    
 
Was this too little too late? Kingdon notes that “years of effort” (p. 143) are required to 
strike when the window of opportunity opens. However, alternatives may still be seriously 
considered later on, as Kingdon notes, if major complexities make the original solution – a 
public single payer plan – untenable. Most often, those alternatives will not be completely 
new ideas, but a reworking and recombination of previously floating ideas.  
 
8.6 Conclusions 
The Kingdon model provided an early warning that any form of NPh would at best be 
delayed as policy, program and funding alternatives were considered. The failure to join or 
the ultimate divergence of the streams is reflected in the piecemeal approach taken by the 
Liberal government. Of the many HESA and Advisory Council report recommendations, only 
a Canadian Drug Agency, a national formulary, and a strategy for drugs for rare diseases 
has been funded. None of these three steps is expected before 2022-23 at the earliest and 
none guarantees adequate universal drug insurance.  
 
It is possible that slow steady changes may also create a tipping point and get political 
attention and even priority in the future (Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen, 2014, p. 63). 
Martin et al. (2018), citing broadcast journalist Steve Paiken, wrote: “[The health system] is 
thus most accurately described not as a system in crisis, but a system in stasis (p. 1726).” 




Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen (2014) also point out that government policy or 
program neglect of environmental changes or an inability to adjust to them (i.e., stasis in 
the face of rapid change) can heighten the chance of punctuations (p. 84), perhaps led by 
business or professional interests that are no longer willing to wait for government action. 
A future trigger could be the continuing introduction of DRDs that are unaffordable to 
employers, or a growing focus on high-cost private drug plan claimants with complex health 
needs that demand a more responsive public health or workers’ compensation system 
where care is presently outdated or rationed. An emerging industry/business coalition may 
advance NPh by introducing imagery and framing that contradicts a fully public NPh, e.g., 
highlighting the loss of “better” private coverage.  Employers will then have to choose 
between unhappily paying more or terminating drug plans that then transfer risk to public 
plans.  
 
Negotiating universal coverage of a comprehensive drug formulary with minimal and 
standardized cost-sharing will take considerable time, skill and consensus (Kingdon’s 
tipping process). The combination of negotiation and high cost make it possible, even likely, 
that important compromises may eventually occur, such as different phasing or scope. The 
big-bang policy change may reduce to incremental change over several years so the 
bureaucracy can move it to implementation. “People are sometimes reluctant to take big 
steps. Apprehensive about being unable to calculate the political fallout, politicians shy 
away from grand departures. Apprehensive about not fully understanding the unanticipated 
consequences that might ensue, specialists also avoid changes. Both worry about the 
budgetary implications of massive new programs” (p.80). 
 
Regarding government decisions and actions, Allison (1969) states: “what happens is not 
chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, coalition, 
competition, and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an 
issue…” (p.708). Reflecting the random nature of government processes, it is a very 
challenging to predict and understand why something (or nothing) happens.  
 
In summary, Kingdon provides a reliable model of typical government processes, but 
government action cannot be perfectly predictable or even rational. Even if convergence of 
the three streams occurred, that does not guarantee any outcome. The status quo would 
therefore remain unless more politically attractive, administratively feasible, publicly 







In Search of Change: Conclusions, Lessons and Limitations 
9.1 Introduction 
A key question is how this roller-coaster issue of universal drug insurance has risen to the 
decision agenda and whether it stays there long enough to encourage an effective and 
feasible solution. There is broad public support for something called “national pharmacare” 
and now there is a better description of one version of that (Advisory Council, 2019b). This 
thesis has explored the issues using the literature, theory, three comparative jurisdictions 
and a relatively broad set of in-depth opinion leader interviews. Participants were clear that 
universal coverage is needed and generally believed private insurance should play an 
important role. The Advisory Council, and HESA before it, did not.  
 
Since the vast majority of Canadians have adequate drug insurance, and participants 
expressed a strong consensus position that the federal government must lead change, NPh 
might be framed in value-laden language of fairness, equity and nation-building. 
 
9.2  Theory-based Considerations Review and Application 
Kingdon has written about incremental approaches that respect financial constraints and 
the place of regulation as a feasible and relatively inexpensive approach to improving policy 
and programs. Regulation of private drug insurance could help fill coverage gaps and 
national standards for formulary scope and out-of-pocket cost could be jointly developed 
by private and public payers. Even experts who participated in this research have poor 
knowledge of the Quebec social drug insurance model and many cannot separate the model 
from the policies that created a high-cost plan. Much more work is needed before the 
Quebec or a social insurance model can be considered for application across Canada.  
 
Kingdon also notes that policy is often not rationally constructed and presents a 
primordial soup analogy to indicate a random coupling of time-worn solutions with the 
problem (soup) ‘du jour.’ Players and agendas often conflict and are messy. Both single 
payer and social insurance drug insurance models can provide adequate universal coverage. 
The latter is not well known even among a diverse group of well-informed opinion leaders, 
leaving it for all practical purposes as a fallback to be more carefully considered if a single 
payer plan again fails to launch. Both models meet Kingdon’s test of value acceptability and 
either is a better alternative to today’s coverage patchwork. In addition to familiarity, the 
two differ on technical feasibility, cost and political support. While the principle of NPh is 
very attractive in public opinion polls, what it means and what it can achieve in real-world 
terms is likely ambiguous to the general population. That may be by design.  
 
NPh appears to still have problem status on the government’s decision agenda. Small, 
tactical changes have been announced and funded – the establishment of the Canadian Drug 
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Agency that will develop a national formulary (among other tasks), and the development of 
a strategy for drugs for rare diseases. This minimalist approach seems to be reinforced by 
the Advisory Council’s interim 2022 solution of an Essential Medicines List (EML)240 that will 
address a problem of far less significance than, for example, funding a national standard 
for catastrophic out-of-pocket loss. However, an EML is a simple, low-cost option and may 
create the impression that important progress is underway. The actual outcome will be 
important only to a very small number of Canadians because patients covered by existing 
drug plans already have access to these generic and over-the-counter products and their 
cost is very rarely a barrier.  
 
While a policy entrepreneur may have appeared, it is odd there is not yet a coalition to 
champion an alternative solution even one as thin as “fill the gaps.” A key consideration is 
where common ground lies, and whether progress can be negotiated. The argument that 
system sustainability is at risk may be a focusing event (Kingdon, p. 94), although one 
participant likened it to crying wolf given its long run and limited bite. Every year more 
money is found. 
 
Relationships are critical to organizing the actors and trying to articulate and align 
national goals and political objectives. However, participants report that relationships are 
either weak (i.e., between provincial and private payers), antagonistic (all payers and the 
brand pharmaceutical industry, or potentially either symbiotic or dysfunctional (politicians 
and bureaucrats). Tuohy (2013) strongly supports the importance of relationships but aims 
at an alternative solution of a public-private mixed funding approach. 
 
“The challenge for policy makers is to identify entrepreneurial allies within the health 
care arena and to create opportunities for these allies within the public system. …In the 
case of prescription drug coverage, models that incorporate the existing base of private 
insurance into an integrated model of public and private finance could make private 
insurers allies of reform (as in Quebec and the Netherlands).” (p. 305) 
 
Three important applications arise from Kingdon’s work and the information in this 
thesis. 
 
9.3 Application 1: Exploring Coalitions and Collaboration 
At the highest level, our drug insurance governance model presents an opportunity for 
collaboration. Germany’s Federal Joint Committee provides a very feasible approach that 
pools intellectual and financial resources and brings complementary expertise to bear on 
complex and technical problems. However, this depends on a willingness by politicians to 
acknowledge certain limitations in our current approach and share information and a 
measure of power. 
 
240 The EML proposed by the Advisory Council follows the CLEAN Meds model (cleanmeds.ca) which includes 128 therapies 
(Jan 2020), mostly generic drugs, with some vitamins and over-the-counter drug products. That list currently includes just 




In recent years, the language of First Ministers’ annual communiqués remains what 
Boothe (2013) describes as tactical, i.e., focused on affordability and lower drug prices. In 
2016, the Premiers issued a vague statement with no sense of urgency: “Our governments 
will also consider a range of other measures to reduce pharmaceutical prices and improve 
prescribing and appropriate use of drugs, while striving to improve health outcomes. We 
also agree to explore approaches to improving coverage and access to prescription drugs 
for Canadians.”241 
 
In 2019, sensing opportunity from the Advisory Council report, the Premiers became far 
more specific: national pharmacare must remove patient cost barriers, have a clear and 
compelling business case (i.e., “benefits, risks, costs, and reliability of supply”) and ensure 
the jurisdictions retain responsibility for drug plan design and delivery. Funding must be 
“long-term, secure, flexible and fully offset present and future cost pressures…”. 
Jurisdictions must be able to “opt out unconditionally, with full financial compensation” if 
the federal government decides to fund NPh (Canada’s Premiers, 2019 Final Communiqué, 
p. 2).242 NPh requires a negotiation between federal and provincial governments, since the 
latter have veto power. 
 
It must be acknowledged however that the provinces do not always act in solidarity. A 
simple and common example is that even when the pCPA has negotiated a manufacturer 
rebate, a province has no obligation to list that new drug. Beyond that, the significant 
variations in provincial drug plan design and eligibility mean that any new federal funding 
that sets a national standard will advantage some provinces more than others.  
 
The most glaring problem arises if the Quebec formulary is used as the national 
standard. In that case, Quebec would not receive any additional funding. However, if there is 
also a national standard to significantly lower out-of-pocket spending, then Quebec will gain 
because its cost-sharing is very high relative to other provinces (see Sec. 5.5.1 and 5.5.2). 
This means, notionally at least, that provinces that have chosen minimal public drug plans 
(i.e., Atlantic Canada) will stand to gain the most by new federal money that allows them to 
offer, for example, a Quebec formulary and an Ontario out-of-pocket cap.  
 
To overcome these disparities, the federal government has at least two polar choices. 
They can provide a flat per capita subsidy (equal and simple) or they can propose an 
equalization formula (equitable and complicated). The latter could be similar to risk-sharing 
models used in the Netherlands or Germany that adjust for chronic disease loads and socio-
economic status. The answer is likely in-between with some limited adjustments for 
provincial variations, and a promise to monitor effects and make adjustments over time. 
The question of what provincial politicians believe is a “fair” subsidy, one they can sell to 
 
241 The Communique, Statement of the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ministers of Health, January 21, 2016, is available at: 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1029069.  




their own residents as a “win”, and what the federal government is willing to pay is a crucial 
determinant of progress. 
 
A second option is for the provinces to revert to their 2004 Council of the Federation 
request that the federal government take over all public drug plan administration. The 
normally fractious state of F/P/T relationships make that much less likely. 
 
Given their importance as funders, any coalition ought to include both the business 
community and the health insurance industry. It remains a mystery why these groups are 
not inside the drug policy “tent.” Polling a representative sample of employers to determine 
their willingness and under what conditions is a particular challenge. 
 
For its part, the private payer community did not anticipate that NPh would be an 
important part of the federal government’s decision agenda after the 2015 election. Health 
insurers are reasonably well organized through the CLHIA and unlike the pharmaceutical 
industry, insurers have high cards to play in the level of both employment and investment 
in this country. One executive participant made it clear insurers have ready access to the 
federal Department of Finance which has to be heavily involved if the NPh agenda is to 
advance. The pharmacy industry and brand pharmaceutical industry were also caught 
unaware, although the pharmacy professional association (CPhA) had already addressed 
some of the single payer policy agenda before 2015. All these groups are now in regular 
contact and no doubt recognize a certain synergy of NPh goals. Each gains when any one of 
them advocates for an alternative to a single payer model. The caveat is that insurers 
express little trust of the brand pharmaceutical industry, so any coalition including pharma 
is likely more a marriage of convenience. 
 
Crucial to coalition-building will be establishing a consistent set of ethics and values 
between members. Kingdon speaks to value acceptability (p. 131). Issues must be carefully 
framed to allow key stakeholders to identify with and support the issue over a lengthy 
implementation period. More work on establishing shared values and constructive 
narratives will be helpful to bring together parties with more in common than they may 
realize. 
 
Perhaps the private payer community could again be prodded to action by governments. 
Prior to implementing its new drug plan on January 1, 1997, the Quebec government 
reportedly gave insurers only about six months to develop a mutually agreeable approach to 
ensure private drug plans would continue in that province.243 Nationally, private payers are 
likely to accept an employer mandate, some grudgingly,244 which could help “fill the gaps” 
 
243 Personal communication, Claude De Stasio, formerly VP Quebec Affairs, CLHIA, October 20, 2015. The RAMQ plan was 
implemented January 1, 1997. 
244 The Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) generally resists any increase in administration or taxation of 
its small business members. While perhaps half its members already offer a good drug plan, The CFIB’s anti-tax and “red-




with an adequate formulary. As provincial participants noted, spreading the financial risk 
and cost among both major payer groups protects each from excessive exposure.  
 
Drug policy work on generic drugs which began in 2010 and was last updated in April 
2018245 shows common ground exists between the pCPA and the CLHIA. This begs the 
question why these two groups should not collaborate to address brand drug pricing, a 
national strategy for drugs for rare diseases (DRDs) and a national drug formulary. National 
standards could also be developed to ensure both formulary and cost-sharing are improved 
and equitable across Canada regardless of the source of insurance. Participating in this 
research expressed significant goodwill and may welcome the chance to work together. 
Notionally, either the CLHIA or the pCPA could initiate this work. 
 
9.4 Application 2: Funding 
Concern about drug prices and costs has been accentuated by higher levels of many chronic 
diseases, low treatment adherence, waste and inappropriate prescribing. Specialty drugs 
and now the massive cost of personalized gene and cell medicines have exacerbated 
funding challenges for all payers, even governments. While provinces are therefore reluctant 
to introduce improved drug programs, federal funding for universal drug insurance, or 
selected key features such as a national formulary or out-of-pocket cost limit or DRD 
access, could make an important difference. If NPh cannot proceed as a comprehensive 
package of services and reforms, then at least we ought to fix important problems on the 
road to a national strategy. Medicare advanced only when the federal government provided 
matching-dollar incentive funding for hospitals (1957) and physician services (1966).  
 
Including private insurance within a social insurance framework may be more 
compelling to politicians and bureaucrats than having governments fully absorb up to $19 
billion in private drug spending. Selling a smaller public formulary than what 22 million 
private plan members now have will not be easy. Lower out-of-pocket costs will help but 
some patients will prefer paying more to get more. 
 
Too many NPh plan designs and costing assumptions (Sec. 5.10) have been proposed to 
have certainty. NPh may not initially have much effect on total spending but it will likely 
change the allocation between payers. We are left with many “ifs.” If the massive cost 
reductions that have been promoted by academics actually occur without patients being 
medically disadvantaged, then no additional funding will be needed for many years. If there 
is a continuing role for employer-sponsored plans, their premium payments to insurers 
might be replaced by a payroll tax of roughly the same amount. If the federal government 
by design pays more, then presumably individuals would pay much less per claim.  
 
 





Social insurance requires employers and employees to share significantly in drug cost 
but this is already typical. Governments would top-up funding through general taxation. In 
exchange for up-front contributions, patients would have minimal cost for the drugs they 
buy. A dedicated payroll tax would also be more visible and perhaps trusted to deliver a 
specific, high-value program. Over time such a tax will suffer as it has in Germany and 
elsewhere from changes in labour market structure. Other administrative changes could 
include cost control through a reference drug system as exists in Germany (widespread) or 
in British Columbia (eight therapeutic classes). There are many, many ways to influence 
drug prices and costs, although there is no unified strategy to do this in Canada. 
 
Funding amounts and sources will remain contentious. It will be important to anticipate 
where opposition to funding reforms may arise. Some companies with minimal drug 
coverage will have to upgrade their plan to meet a minimum standard, but most businesses 
already have high quality drug plans to help attract and retain scarce, skilled talent. Based 
on New Brunswick’s experience in 2014 when it proposed a mandatory New Brunswick Drug 
Plan, the Canadian Federation for Independent Business246 is very likely to oppose an 
employer mandate. One senior bureaucrat noted the political importance of identifying 
potential losers from policy change and attempting to mitigate their losses early. The 
greater problem may be in the more limited formularies, restricted eligibility and high 
thresholds for catastrophic protection provided by provinces in Atlantic Canada. 
 
Perhaps the major challenge in financing universal drug insurance is agreeing on the 
cost, timing and burden-sharing of change especially for patients, the jurisdictions and for 
employers. The plan design must first be finalized. With various studies forecasting either 
billions of savings or billions in cost shifting, cost uncertainty makes change impossible, 
especially for risk-averse bureaucrats and politicians who are intent on re-election. 
 
Success relies on the ability of F/P/T governments to compromise in areas where each 
has undisputed strength. The federal government must decide to deploy its fiscal capacity 
to provide the jurisdictions with stable and long-term funding. For their part, the provinces 
must be willing to trust a funding commitment from Ottawa (despite its past withdrawals of 
health funding) and accept national standards in coverage quality. This climate of trust is 
rare but has appeared in the past, most recently in 2003-04 with two multi-billion-dollar 
health accords introduced under Prime Ministers Chretien and Martin (Tuohy 2018. p. 398-
409).  
 
9.5 Application 3: Leadership through Discovery and Transition 
Beyond funding is a need for federal leadership, and the importance of this factor, or its 
dearth, cannot be overstated. It is here that perhaps the biggest challenge lies in terms of 
attracting individual leaders, assembling coalitions, and engaging the public. Ministers of 
 




Health are typically transient as are the governments that appoint them. Participant 
interviews did not identify any policy entrepreneurs or “insiders” with potential to lead 
change. However, it is now possible that Eric Hoskins, former Ontario health minister and 
past Chair of the Advisory Council between February 2018 and June 2019 may step into this 
role.  
 
While significant financial and access pressures continue to build, there seems to be 
little agreement beyond the need for “change.” Germany has invested in a steady stream of 
legislation over the last thirty years to address the stream of market developments. The 
Netherlands took twenty years to implement its reform vision of market-oriented universal 
health insurance. One could struggle to find any similar initiative in Canada, other than a 
series of commissions and studies over the same period that have failed to spark the actual 
process of modernizing strategy. Even the Advisory Council recommended their vision of 
NPh be introduced inside the (1984) Canada Health Act with no changes in its five governing 
principles. Given the short tenure of Ministers and of politicians generally, it would seem 
that such a long view requires the support of the professional bureaucracy and external 
stakeholders. 
 
Kingdon identifies academics as a constituency who can play an important supporting 
role and be a source of policy alternatives. (The role of Pharmacare 2020 has ben previously 
noted.) Up until 2016, NPh likely remained of much greater interest to some in the academic 
community than it did to government leaders or to the general population. Evaluating how 
research is structured or translated to better meet the practical needs of governments and 
the business community may help the general and specialized publics make sense of 
academic research.  
 
The policy community has still not framed a solution that is acceptable to large private 
sector stakeholders. Perhaps that is not crucial but the chances of implementation would 
improve if there is consensus on this complex and technical subject by politicians, key 
stakeholders and the public. Driven by the federal Liberal party, HESA and the Advisory 
Council have developed a fairly consistent public single payer policy model which to date 
(December 2019) has yet to be endorsed as Liberal Party policy. Key gaps exist in the role of 
private insurance, in funding sources and amount, and the extent of national standards 
beyond a formulary.  
 
While somewhat lower cost, single payer is more complex. Even the Advisory Council 
which was to focus on implementation sketched this task out only in broad terms, leaving 
key features to be determined by others. The only feature generally agreed upon is that NPh 
will be universal. The Advisory Council has proposed a phased approach to a formulary 
with this first tactic fully two years away. We should ask why more progress cannot be 
made.  
 
Actions by the federal government since the Advisory Council report and the last 
federal election indicate an unwillingness to implement a comprehensive approach to NPh. 
It now appears that changes are likely to come in smaller, tactical form and take longer to 
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implement. Still, windows of opportunity are likely to open again since fundamental 
problems of adequate universal access are not yet resolved. 
 
Kingdon’s discussion of policy provides a number of instructive ideas to influence the 
direction and pace of change. Policy advocates must start or continue to soften up other 
leaders both within government and in other influencer communities, as well as the public 
(Kingdon, p. 128). Single payer advocates such as Pharmacare 2020 have a significant 
advantage with political, academic, labour and some media audiences given the time already 
invested. However, insurers and employers have direct access to at least 22 million 
individual drug plan members and could provide “fear-of-loss” messages about having less 
coverage, or longer wait times to get access to the newest drugs, or the lack of customer 
service competency in provincial drug plans. Insurers, pharmaceutical and professional 
associations may develop and promote more sophisticated advocacy material for general 
and specialized media. They may prepare and test “trial balloons” (p. 129) with various 
stakeholders that might include ideas from comparative international drug system research. 
Organizations representing employers (i.e., CFIB, Chambers of Commerce) can study the 
breadth and depth of employer opinion about NPh. Insurers, not well known in health 
ministries across Canada, could develop those relationships and propose projects that allow 
payer communities to jointly address policy issues such as standardized formularies and 
drugs for rare diseases. There are many options that can prepare the ground and ensure a 
more coherent and even unified approach that could make political action easier. 
 
Related to these efforts is the need to identify, encourage, equip and promote one or 
more policy (Kingdon, 179-83) or institutional (Tuohy 2018, 437-48) entrepreneurs who may 
choose to lead advocacy work. Any significant delay in progress or a change in focus may 
require new policy entrepreneurs (Sec.8.5). A new focus is in fact preferable at this stage. 
Acknowledging previous work, expertise is now needed to negotiate funding amounts and 
sources, fill in research gaps, and plan the implementation of some form or phases of NPh, 
including the transitional bridge from today to a better future strategy. 
 
9.6 Two Considerations 
Right now, payer groups do not fully understand each other’s plans and priorities. 
Situations and announcements too often catch other parties by surprise. Decisions vary by 
province, insurer and employer. There is a perception that each party acts only out of self-
interest and happily stays in its own lane and silo. Patients have been disadvantaged by 
poor consultation, piecemeal responses and a patchwork of coverage. 
 
The first potentially more effective approach is to create a national prescription 
medicines strategy to link appropriate solutions to a broader array of access, quality and 
cost problems. This would include but not be limited to national pharmacare. In addition to 
identifying and beginning to integrate goals, processes, funding and outcomes, a strategy 
would help Canada ‘future-proof’ our system against rapid evolution in products, patient 




Modeled after Germany, a second idea is to establish a standing forum of public and 
private payers (governments, insurers, employers and patients) to advise pCPA, the only 
body that includes all the jurisdictions, or the new Canadian Drug Agency (CDA). Greater 
transparency could help engage the public and overcome purely political considerations and 
institutional inertia. At a tactical level, stronger payer relationships would help identify and 
support national opportunities such as improved economic analyses of new drugs, 
increased use of biosimilars and creating a framework for drugs for rare diseases (DRDs). A 
secretariat could be equipped (or expanded if within pCPA or CDA) to sponsor rigourous 
practical research and consultation. For example, it could investigate the costs and 
opportunities of implementing a real-world Quebec drug insurance model across Canada. 
 
These ideas would encourage trust, understanding and an appreciation of each party’s 
role and symbiotic relationship. It would broaden inputs to reflect the considerably more 
complex, expensive and highly technical environment that permeates drug insurance. Each 
idea would reinforce a pan-Canadian approach, help integrate drugs with other health 
services and potentially overcome system inertia. 
 
Two other specific opportunities emerged from the interviews: 
 
1. The pCPA / CDA mandate should negotiate a single national price for new brand 
drugs. At least between now and 2027, private insurers could contribute to 
operating costs in exchange for benefiting from price discounts negotiated on their 
behalf.  
 
2. While the CLHIA is well-organized it does not include representation from 
employers, employer organizations, benefit advisors, pharmacy benefit managers or 
patient groups. A broader coalition could more effectively and credibly recommend 
a private drug insurance framework to governments (or the pCPA or CDA) for NPh.  
 
9.7 Strengths of this Study 
This research is centred on exploring an alternative model – social insurance – to break the 
impasse of achieving adequate universal drug insurance. Today’s private insurance is 
somewhat more expensive to administer over the proposed single payer model because it 
provides choice in plan design, technological improvements over public plans, pays over $1 
billion in taxes, and because it is administered by 24 for-profit and not-for-profit. private 
insurers. A new social insurance model is a viable alternative though a workable model has 
yet been fully developed. It could also achieve adequate universal drug insurance while 
eliminating one of the main barriers to implementation – high additional cost to 
governments. Social insurance would retain an important role for private insurance and 
should regulate the industry to achieve policy goals such as acting in the public interest, 
competitive innovation and equitably spreading risk and cost between private and public 




The combination of a comprehensive literature review, comparative analysis of social 
health and drug insurance systems in two European countries and Quebec, and detailed 
interviews with a diverse, national panel of opinion leader experts in public and private 
drug plans provides a unique and practical composite perspective on planning, 
implementing, managing and governing national pharmacare.  
 
This thesis adds to very limited research on how private insurance operates and has 
become institutionalized in Canada over the last five decades. It provides detailed 
descriptions of the operations and goals of two European health systems to identify what 
Canada could learn and implement. This thesis uses qualitative research to explore for the 
first time the perceptions and opinions of experienced, senior-level drug plan experts on 
NPh and reveals different priorities and concerns. More specifically, this thesis also 
collected and assessed current information on key NPh decision points, described below. 
 
1. Principles for a national approach to drug insurance are proposed that reflect 
current concerns. NPh should be affordable, effective, efficient, equitable, integrated 
and sustainable. This consolidates work from previous published papers. 
 
2. Eight reasons why nothing has changed are explained: (1) cost, (ii) limited policy 
ideas, (iii) resistance to change, (iv) impractical principles, (v) indifference of policy 
elites, (vi) political interpretations of the Canada Health Act, (vii) patients feel 
protected and (viii) insurer strategy. To the author’s knowledge, these reasons have 
not been consolidated or compared in previous published works.  
 
3. Kingdon’s three streams theory provides astute observations of how the US federal 
government may act or not act. To the author’s knowledge, Kingdon has not been 
applied in the Canadian context of achieving adequate universal drug insurance. The 
theory was very useful in identifying a lack of convergence in problem, policy and 
politics streams which suggests continued problems in implementing a 
comprehensive NPh model. Kingdon and the original work in this thesis provide 
largely complementary explanations. 
 
4. This thesis proposes a rationale for 11 key plan design considerations. This led to a 
submission to the Advisory Council by the author (cited in Advisory Council 2019b) 
and an essay published in January 2019 by Longwoods.com.247 The publisher has 
featured this essay at least three times in its weekly emails to subscribers. 
 
5. Contrary to common messaging that a single payer model is the only viable 
approach to implement NPh, there does not appear to be an established relationship 
between system model and system performance or quality. This thesis concludes the 
 




system is not the main determinant of health system success, and either model can 
achieve our most likely goals once they are clearly articulated.  
 
6. The summary of 15 studies (Table 4.4) that provided estimated costs for different 
versions of NPh is new. The estimates vary widely over time and in part because all 
use different assumptions, many of them unrealistic and misunderstood by 
politicians and the public who have no relevant operational experience. Other 
mechanisms to control costs are better matched to this goal, e.g., PMPRB reform, 
setting up the new Canadian Drug Agency, and creating a more inclusive and 
transparent governance structure.  
 
7. There are ten different estimates provided of the number of Canadians uninsured 
and underinsured for prescription drugs (Sec 4.10). None is current and complete.  
 
Oddly, numbers 6 and 7 combine to show there is no authoritative study that accurately 
identifies the costs and beneficiaries of one of the major problems NPh is supposed to solve 
– adequate universal access. This is a crucial information gap. 
 
9.8 Limitations and Further Study 
Chapter 4 captures three health systems at a point in time. While slow progress in Canada 
may provide greater currency and longevity, legislation, regulation and structure in 
Germany and the Netherlands seem to change more quickly to reflect a rapidly evolving 
market. While both European systems fortunately publish considerable information in 
English, other information in German and Dutch was not accessible to this author. This is 
also true for Quebec where most government information and an unknown volume of other 
work on the Quebec drug plan is available only in French and therefore inaccessible to a 
researcher with limited fluency in French. This was partially redressed by interviewing one 
bilingual former Quebec drug plan manager and exchanging views with a bilingual 
consultant resident in Quebec who has written extensively on the Quebec drug plan.  
 
The opinion leaders interviewed may or may not be representative of all provincial and 
private drug plan managers and executives and influencers, but the author believes their 
experience, opinions and perspectives are accurately presented. A purposive sample is 
necessary because there are so few people with deep knowledge of private insurance and 
NPh. All participants are highly experienced and qualified in their respective areas and were 
conversant in reasonable depth on universal drug insurance. Some demonstrated unusual 
insight. Their information and interpretations should be considered directionally valid and 
reliable at the time, but may have changed since the interviews occurred. 
 
Participants were not speaking primarily as employers, and it is employers that pay 
insurers to administer private drug plans. This is a very important constituency but one 
that is very hard to reach directly given the sheer number of private businesses (over 1 




I am relying on limited and possibly biased information provided by the private life and 
health insurance industry association to inform my discussion of the NPh debate. For 
example, the CLHIA’s methodology for counting health plan beneficiaries is not disclosed 
and its estimate is much higher than what large national surveys report (Law, 2018). 
Important comparative research would be possible in the future if the CLHIA provided CIHI 
with industry drug expenditures by province. Insurer investment in constructive public 
policy research, including appropriate access to data by qualified independent researchers, 
would help ensure private payer perspectives were included in the implementation of 
adequate universal drug insurance. 
 
The author’s personal experience in the private payer community was both helpful and 
likely a hindrance at times. Familiarity enabled me to get interviews with a broad range of 
well-informed people. My long work and volunteer experience may provide a better 
foundation of knowledge than a much younger person, but it may have shaped my own 
opinions and perceptions in ways that biased the way I asked questions and reported 
results. In the course of transcribing the interviews I came to appreciate that in a couple of 
the early interviews I may have expressed my own opinions more than is appropriate. 
However, given that the participants are very experienced and knowledgeable, I do not 
believe the impact was consequential.  
 
Six areas are suggested for further study: 
  
1. The effects and potential design of regulation on private Canadian health insurers 
needs to be understood. Kingdon notes this is a less expensive way to achieve policy 
change and insurers already have experience with light drug plan regulation and 
reporting in Quebec. Public plans could benefit as well if this includes the 
development of minimum standards for coverage and cost-sharing. 
 
2. A more effective national drug insurance governance model based on Germany’s 
Federal Joint Committee should be investigated. Involving patients and other 
important stakeholders would ensure a more dynamic approach to “future proof” 
our system. 
  
3. The Netherlands has achieved a truly remarkable reduction in prescription drug 
prices and average per capita costs while almost every other OECD member has seen 
steady and significant increases. While their market-based SHI system is beyond our 
grasp, there are government enablers and insurer behaviours that may be adapted 
for use here. 
 
4. The deep and lingering mistrust between payers and drug manufacturers needs to 
be resolved. While the pharmaceutical industry should introduce a more socially 
responsible pricing model, this innovative industry could build on Canada’s high-
performing biomedical research capacity and establish a more meaningful role in 
research and development. Several collaborative frameworks have been launched 
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between European governments248 and at least one between a government (Belgium) 
and its drug industry.249 These agreements may be examined for use in Canada. 
  
5. Further research on the health system needs, preferences and priorities of 
employers is needed, especially if they are asked to pay directly for any version of a 
new NPh plan. Even if a single payer plan is ultimately implemented, the employer 
contribution to prescription drug spending already totals $12 billion and would 
increase if there was an employer mandate.  
 
6. Finland has a hybrid financing system that combines single payer hospital and 
physician coverage and a social drug insurance model (Gagnon, 2017). This is similar 
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Incenting Change and Innovation  
Changing the health system has been called “the third-rail of Canadian politics”250: touch it 
and you die politically. Change does not come easily in drug policy and programs (Morgan & 
Daw, 2012; Boothe, 2013).  
 
As change is considered, innovation will be required. Work by E.M. Rogers’ and 
Greenhalgh et al. may be helpful to consider how to get key stakeholders to adopt the 
important changes needed to sustain adequate universal drug insurance. 
 
There have been thousands of uses of Rogers’ generalized Diffusion of Innovation 
model (Rogers, 1962; Rogers, 2004). While supporting Rogers’ theory, Dearing (2004) 
proposes a five-part integrated strategy for change which I have adapted and annotated 
with examples for the purposes of this thesis: 
 
1. Demonstrate the social and economic advantages. 
• Quantify and explain the gaps in drug coverage and the need for change that is 
more responsive to patient needs while respecting fiscal limits. Pick best 
practices from, for example, the existing Quebec social insurance model, or from 
outside Canada. 251 
2. Communicate ‘features and benefits’ of a new funding model to mass media, social 
media and to opinion leader networks. 
• Distill complexity to clear, crisp, common principles, values and language. 
3. Focus adoption at informed intermediaries who serve clients with the greatest 
needs. 
• Highlight current inequities to health professionals, patient advocates and 
cancer drug navigators. 
4. Advocate a set of solutions that fit the problem. 
• A complex problem requires closer collaboration including a continuum of 
regulatory options. 
5. Manage risk and resistance to change.  
 
250 The “third-rail” analogy has been used by many, but this comment is by David Naylor, former President, University of 
Toronto, quoted by Jeffrey Simpson, Globe and Mail, January 4, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-great-canadian-health-care-
evasion/article794642/#dashboard/follows/.  
251 In this thesis, Germany and The Netherlands. 
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• Show compatibility with values and current practices to reduce the perceived 
risk of change. Demonstrate “trialability” in Canada by reviewing the Quebec 
model. 
These steps are similar to those described by Katz (1963) who suggested innovation 
occurs more successfully when four dimensions are addressed: (i) communicability (easy 
explanation), (ii) pervasiveness (apparent impacts), (iii) risk (difference from status quo), and 
(iv) profitability (cost-effectiveness). 
 
Greenhalgh et al. (2004) provided a systematic review that used thirteen different 
research traditions to examine how health organizations assess, spread and sustain 
innovation. Their conceptual model acknowledges system antecedents (structure, 
absorptive capacity for new knowledge and a receptive context for change) and system 
readiness for change. Three initial observations are:  
 
1. The fit between the innovation and the system in which it is nested is generally more 
important than the attributes of the innovation itself. “…the attributes are neither 
stable features of the innovation nor sure determinants of their adoption or 
assimilation. Rather, it is the interaction among the innovation, the intended 
adopter(s) and a particular context that determines the adoption rate” (p. 598). 
2. The evidence supporting a change may be seen as ambiguous, contestable, 
continuously (re-)interpreted and reframed according to local issues. There will 
likely be a lengthy period of negotiation that will involve power struggles. 
Assimilation, should it occur, will be “…variously punctuated by shocks, setbacks 
and surprises” (p. 601). 
3. Adoption will be affected by the absorptive capacity of the organizations involved, 
including information technology and whether or not leaders are receptive to 
experimentation, risk-taking and change. The large scale of governments and 
insurers is likely positive in terms of resources, but their desire for stability may 
discourage the capture, sharing and creation of new knowledge.  
While the goal is to successfully identify a more feasible and useful approach to 
enhance coverage and administrative efficiency, it will be just as important to try to identify 
why innovation may not take hold. 
 
 
 
